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In a 1984 interview, Michel Foucault introduced a distinction between two forms of freedom: 
freedom as the ontological condition of ethics, and ethics as the “practice of freedom” 
informed by reflection. This text suggests that a good understanding of Foucault’s thoughts 
on freedom would require accounts of both ontological freedom and practices of freedom, 
but the secondary literature currently suffers from a shortage of work on these topics. This 
thesis attempts to fill this gap in the literature by offering a new account of practices of 
freedom which also shows the connection with ontological freedom. Drawing inspiration from 
the constitutivist approach to meta-ethics, I suggest that Foucault’s notion of the practice of 
freedom is best understood by identifying the “constitutive aims” of the practice, in other 
words, the aims that make an agent’s activity a practice of freedom. Such a framework 
allows us to understand how Foucault can make specific ethical suggestions without 
committing himself to substantive moral claims and also allows us to apply the notion of 
practices of freedom to a broad range of real-life examples. I first offer a new account of 
ontological freedom and then, using a constitutivist approach, engage in a close reading of 
Foucault’s work in order to identify the constitutive aim(s) of practices of freedom. With the 
aims in view, I demonstrate what it means to successfully practice freedom and then apply 
the account in two close readings of historical individuals. The first, on Socrates as 
presented in the Platonic dialogues, shows that we can apply our account of the practice of 
freedom to existing individuals. The second, on Oscar Wilde, argues that Wilde’s experience 
of agency in the practice of freedom was middle-voiced, rather than active, and thereby 
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An account of the practice of freedom 
In the 1984 interview, ‘The Ethics of Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom’ 
(henceforth EPF), we see the following exchange: 
Q.  You say that freedom must be practiced ethically… 
[Michel Foucault]  Yes, for what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the 
reflective [réfléchie] practice of freedom? 
Q.  In other words, you understand freedom as a reality that is already 
ethical in itself. 
M.F.  Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the 
considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection. (EPF 284, 
translation modified)1 
This passage, which is one of Foucault’s clearer explanations of the relationship 
between freedom and ethics, introduces an interesting distinction between freedom 
as the ontological condition of ethics and “ethics” as the practice of freedom informed 
by reflection. This passage suggests that a good understanding of Foucault’s 
thoughts on freedom requires accounts of both ontological freedom and the practice 
of freedom. Despite this, there is currently a paucity of literature on both. Some 
commentators proceed straight to the level of Foucault’s ethics, neglecting both 
freedom as an ontological condition of ethics and the general notion of practices of 
freedom. (McNay 1994, Taylor 1984). Other authors recognise a distinction between 
ontological freedom and practices of freedom, but, through either mischaracterising 
 
1 [Q] - Vous dites qu'il faut pratiquer la liberté éthiquement...  
[M.F.] - Oui, car qu’est-ce que l’éthique, sinon la pratique de la liberté, la pratique réfléchie de la liberté?  
[Q]  - Cela veut dire que vous comprenez la liberté comme une réalité déjà éthique en soi-même?  
[M.F.]  - La liberté est la condition ontologique de l’éthique. Mais l’éthique est la forme réfléchie que prend la 
liberté. (DE IV, 711-712) 
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ontological freedom or insufficiently developing its relationship with practices of 
freedom, they finish with an account of the practice of freedom which is unclear and 
hard to apply. (Oksala 2005, Rajchman 1985). Still other authors recognise the 
existence of practices of freedom and their relevance for ethics, but engage with 
practices of freedom as such only as a pitstop on the way to a discussion of 
Foucault’s ethics. (McGushin 2007) There is, then, a gap in the secondary literature 
on the subject of practices of freedom as such. In this thesis, we will address this 
gap by drawing out Foucault’s account of practices of freedom. In doing so, we will 
highlight the main features of such practices, show how they connect to ontological 
freedom, and give examples of how Foucault’s account can be applied to historical 
individuals. 
  In understanding Foucault’s account, we draw inspiration from recent 
constitutivist approaches to meta-ethics, more specifically the work of Paul 
Katsafanas. (Katsafanas 2013) A constitutivist approach consists in identifying what 
we could call the “constitutive” aims of an activity: the aims which, if held by an 
agent, constitute that agent’s behaviour as an instance of that specific activity. 
Accordingly, our account of practices of freedom identifies the aim(s) which, for 
Foucault, constitute certain activities as practices of freedom. Such an approach to 
Foucault’s account of freedom is warranted in part by the criticism levelled against 
him, especially during the Foucault/Habermas debate, that he makes more or less 
implicit normative claims while simultaneously undercutting the possibility of such 
claims through his critical approach.2 One of the key virtues of a constitutivist 
approach is that, while providing such a procedural account, it allows us to give 
Foucault’s account of freedom, and hence of ethics, while simultaneously showing 
 
2 See Kelly (1994), especially Fraser and Habermas’ contributions. 
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that his account need not fall victim to accusations of crypto-normativity. As 
constitutive aims provide standards of success for an activity, they allow for 
normative statements about instances of an activity without committing us to 
substantive normative claims. We can, therefore, show how Foucault can make 
normative statements about the status of, for example, domination, while 
simultaneously refusing to make broader moral prescriptions. Constitutivism has 
shown itself to be a productive approach to ethics, not only in the work of 
Katsafanas, who has fruitfully applied the framework to Nietzsche’s ethics, but also 
in that of Velleman and Korsgaard.3 As of yet, however, no one has used a 
constitutivist approach to try and tease out Foucault’s understanding of freedom. 
  A further strength of the constitutivist account is that it ties together well with 
Foucault’s account of ontological freedom. As we will argue, an agent is free in the 
ontological sense if they experience themselves as faced with a field of possible 
actions that allow them to modify the power relations they are within. Ontological 
freedom is the condition of possibility of ethics because without it, it is not possible 
for individuals to be agents. Given this, the notion of a practice of freedom is not 
something abstract and hard to identify; instead, practices of freedom are activities in 
which we act on the possibilities provided by existing power relations with the aim of 
maintaining or developing our freedom. Close examination of Foucault’s work shows 
that this aim can be specified according to three main axes: resisting domination, 
taking care of oneself, and engaging in the critical ontology of ourselves. We also 
see an interesting interdependency between ontological freedom and practices of 
freedom: to have practices of freedom, we must have ontological freedom, but to 
have ontological freedom, we must not engage in practices of freedom such that we 
 
3 See Korsgaard (2009), Velleman (2006) 
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eliminate our ontological freedom. 
  Another benefit of this constitutivist approach is that it gives our account a 
broad range of applicability. Given that practices of freedom are not intended to be 
universal in content, we would expect to see a wide variety of practices of freedom 
across history. As engaging in the practice of freedom means holding certain aims, 
we are therefore able to identify apparently disparate practices as practices of 
freedom. Some of this applicability will be demonstrated in two engagements with 
historical individuals undertaken towards the end of the thesis: Socrates and Oscar 
Wilde. These two figures differ in their historical period, their ways of life, and even 
their experiences of agency; but it will be argued that both can be identified as 
practitioners of freedom. 
 
The value of the practice of freedom 
We might question the value of this project: why turn to Foucault to understand 
freedom? Foucault’s account of the practice of freedom cuts across topics with 
apparently clearly demarcated sides, problematising distinctions and offering value 
to philosophers with disparate commitments. For instance, Foucault’s accounts of 
ontological freedom and the practice of freedom cover both sides of Isaiah Berlin’s 
famous distinction between negative and positive liberty. However, it would be 
inaccurate to simply reduce ontological freedom to negative freedom or to do the 
same with the practice of freedom. An individual who is being coerced, and hence 
who has restricted negative freedom for Berlin, could still be ontologically free for 
Foucault. On the side of positive freedom, Foucault gives us a model of an individual 
‘deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature 
or by other men as if [she] were a thing, or an animal’, (Berlin 2008, 178) without 
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committing himself to a distinction between the individual’s higher and lower selves, 
a distinction which Berlin fears can be used to justify coercing an individual into 
becoming her “higher” self (ibid., 180). Foucault, then, can give us an account which 
allows us to defend “negative” and “positive” freedom simultaneously, without the 
threat of support for positive freedom becoming authoritarian. 
 Similarly, Foucault’s understanding of freedom is agnostic with regards to 
questions of free will. The relevant kind of freedom for ethics is not metaphysical; it is 
instead a matter of how one experiences oneself within relations of power. We argue 
that the relevant distinction between ontological freedom and unfreedom is between 
being within power relations on the one hand, and being within relations of violence 
on the other hand. In other words, between experiencing oneself as an agent with a 
field of possible responses and as a patient acted upon. Foucault’s account, then, is 
compatible with either libertarian or compatibilist approaches to free will; depending 
on how we understand the field of possible responses, it is arguably even compatible 
with a hard determinist view.4 
  A final point of interest is that Foucault’s account of freedom does not simply 
emphasise individual liberty. Foucault conceives the practice of freedom, in its 
paradigmatic form, as an activity through which individuals create new forms of life, 
not just for themselves, but for and with others. The practice of freedom, Foucault 
maintains, allows for new communities, new relations with others, which are more 
intense and less easily co-opted by authoritarian power. This, according to him, it is 
 
4 This claim rests on the specific distinction between relations of power and relations of violence. In relations 
of violence (a Foucauldian term of art), an individual is physically coerced into some course of action and they 
have no recourse; they cannot even desist from the action. In relations of power, by contrast, an individual has 
a field of possible responses open to them. However, the difference in the responses open to them is 
determined by the relationship they are within; in other words, even on a hard determinist view where the 
agent could not do otherwise, it could be argued that there is still be a meaningful difference between 
ontological freedom and unfreedom. For a clearer discussion of ontological freedom, power relations and 
relations of violence, see Chapter 1. 
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the result of practicing freedom in concert with others who hold the same constitutive 
aim: ‘The art of living is to eliminate psychology, to create, with oneself and others, 
individualities, beings, relations, unnameable qualities.’ (Foucault 1996, 317) 
 
The structure of the thesis 
Chapter 1 begins with a discussion of the need for a new account of ontological 
freedom. We start with the work of Lois McNay and Johanna Oksala, arguing that 
shortcomings in their accounts show us, respectively, the importance 1) of starting 
from the level of ontological freedom and 2) of producing a new account of 
ontological freedom. We then give such an account, arguing that ontological freedom 
refers to being within power relations, otherwise characterised as “experiencing 
oneself as being faced with a field of possible actions”. 
  In chapter 2, we draw from Foucault’s work formal conditions of success for 
our account of the practice of freedom: that freedom has gradations; that there is a 
clear connection between ontological freedom and the practice of freedom; that the 
practice of freedom produces ethical content. We then clarify the approach we will be 
using to investigate Foucault’s account. Foucault, we argue, has a procedural, not a 
substantive, account of freedom. Drawing on the work of Paul Katsafanas, we argue 
that this account is best understood using a constitutivist framework; in other words, 
to practice freedom is to hold the “constitutive” aim of the practice of freedom. We 
further clarify that constitutive aims need only be held pre-reflectively, not 
consciously, and also argue that holding a constitutive aim is both a necessary and a 
sufficient condition for engaging in an activity. 
  In chapter 3 we identify from Foucault’s work three candidates for the 
constitutive aim: resistance to domination, the care of the self, and the critical 
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ontology of ourselves. Although all three of these activities play important roles in 
Foucault’s ethics, we ultimately conclude that the aims can only be necessary, not 
sufficient, conditions of the practice of freedom. We suggest, however, that the three 
aims might be jointly sufficient to characterise the practice of freedom. 
  Chapter 4 takes up this line of argument. We examine all three aims taken 
together and conclude that this tripartite aim is the constitutive aim of the practice of 
freedom. We note that this tripartite structure gives a variety of degrees of success 
and failure at practicing freedom; we also note that within these categories of 
successful and failed practices of freedom there are further gradations. Finally, we 
explore the possibility of a paradigmatically successful form of the practice of 
freedom, which we call “the creation of new cultural forms”. 
  In chapter 5, we show how Foucault developed his model of the practice of 
freedom in his reading of Socrates. Examining Socrates’ practice of philosophical 
parrhesia, frank or free speech, we argue that it meets all three necessary aims and, 
therefore, that according to Foucault’s criteria Socrates was an active practitioner of 
freedom. 
  In chapter 6, we turn to Oscar Wilde and his experiences of the practice of 
freedom. Here our emphasis is less on whether Wilde practiced freedom at all, and 
more on the transformation he underwent in his experience of agency in practicing 
freedom. After his imprisonment, Wilde went from practicing freedom in an active, 
deliberate way, to experiencing the practice of freedom in a middle-voiced way; that 
is, as a process going on within him that he participates in while not having reflective 
control over it. As Wilde’s activity can still be read as a practice of freedom, his 
experience opens up a new way of understanding the practice of freedom, pointing 
beyond the more active form discussed elsewhere in the thesis.  
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Chapter 1: Ontological Freedom 
Introduction 
As we noted in our introduction, our point of departure for this project is the 1984 
interview, ‘The Ethics of Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom’ (henceforth 
EPF), specifically the following passage: 
Q.  You say that freedom must be practiced ethically… 
[Michel Foucault]  Yes, for what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the 
reflective [réfléchie] practice of freedom? 
Q.  In other words, you understand freedom as a reality that is already 
ethical in itself. 
M.F.  Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the 
considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection. (EPF 284, 
translation modified)5 
As we said before, this passage introduces a distinction between freedom as the 
ontological condition of ethics, and “the practice of freedom”. This distinction is 
important for Foucault’s account, but is not always maintained by commentators. A 
number of accounts of Foucault’s ethics begin directly from the discussion of the 
aesthetics of existence or the practices of the self, and do not take into account this 
underlying notion of freedom. However, as we have suggested, if we are to get a 
clear understanding of Foucault’s ethics, we must recognise the distinction he draws 
between ontological freedom and the practice of freedom. In this chapter, therefore, I 
 
5 [Q] - Vous dites qu'il faut pratiquer la liberté éthiquement...  
[M.F.] - Oui, car qu’est-ce que l’éthique, sinon la pratique de la liberté, la pratique réfléchie de la liberté?  
[Q]  - Cela veut dire que vous comprenez la liberté comme une réalité déjà éthique en soi-même?  
[M.F.]  - La liberté est la condition ontologique de l’éthique. Mais l’éthique est la forme réfléchie que prend la 
liberté. (DE IV, 711-712) 
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will answer the question: what is ontological freedom? And what is its relation to the 
practice of freedom? 
 
The value of the question 
Before we investigate ontological freedom, there is an important question to be 
asked: why look at ontological freedom at all? As mentioned above, many 
commentators have left this subject to one side and instead begun at the level of the 
practice of freedom. In this thesis, we could also move straight to the level of the 
practice of freedom. However, operating on the level of practices of freedom would 
leave us having to make a number of assumptions about what underlies those 
practices, and may leave us failing to understand them appropriately. This can lead 
us into certain difficulties. I will illustrate these difficulties by looking at the work of 
Lois McNay, in her very useful Foucault: A Critical Introduction. McNay argues that 
Foucault’s ethics relies on an unexamined notion of masculine agency. I will argue 
that, in starting from the level of the practice of freedom, McNay draws conclusions 
about Foucault’s underlying account which do not fit with his actual discussions of 
ontological freedom. 
 A second question is, granted that it is worth examining ontological freedom, 
why should we try and produce a new account of it? As other philosophers have 
recognised this distinction, we could simply reference their account and then 
continue on to look at the practice of freedom. One of the few such accounts was 
given by Johanna Oksala in her excellent Foucault on Freedom.6 Oksala recognises 
 
6 The others I am aware of are Han-Pile (2016) and Rajchman (1985). Oksala’s account has the virtues of 1) 
coming paired with an account of the practice of freedom, and 2) also drawing heavily from Rajchman. Han-
Pile comes to a similar conclusion to our account, that experiencing oneself as free is a condition for ethics, but 
does not go deeply into what this experience of freedom consists in. 
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the distinction between ontological freedom and practices of freedom and offers 
accounts of both. However, I maintain that her discussion of ontological freedom 
does not fit with Foucault’s own text and, further, would not allow us to ground an 
account of the practice of freedom. In the following sections, then, I will discuss 
McNay’s and Oksala’s accounts, argue that we need to carry out our own 
investigation into ontological freedom, and then attempt to give a new account. 
 
McNay on the ‘Aesthetics of Existence’ 
In Foucault: A Critical Introduction, McNay gives a detailed and critical account of 
Foucault’s ethics. As part of this critique, McNay argues that Foucault’s discussion of 
‘a Baudelairean notion of the heroization of the self’ and his debt to Greek ethics 
introduce an implicitly masculine notion of agency, which is a problem for an account 
which is supposed to begin with the individual and the practices they already find 
themselves within. McNay writes: 
The idea of a heroization of the self is a development of the theme of “virile self-
mastery” that characterised the classical practices from which the model of an 
ethics of the self is originally derived. By failing to problematise these themes of 
heroization and self-mastery, Foucault’s theory of an ethics implicitly relies on a 
conventional notion of the sovereign self, which in turn rests on an unexamined 
fantasy of male agency. (McNay 1994, 149) 
McNay offers two different demonstrations of Foucault’s failure to examine the place 
of masculine agency in his account. First, with regards to Baudelaire, McNay argues 
that the view of the artist ‘as a free agent of creativity is based not only on a 
mystification of the social conditions of privilege that lead to such a notion, but also… 
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is a profoundly gendered category.’ (ibid., 150) The idea of the free artist was made 
possible, McNay claims, firstly, by the division of labour within capitalism, and 
secondly, by gender differences in social norms. Citing Griselda Pollock, McNay 
argues that this view of the artist ‘drew on bourgeois norms of masculinity that 
allowed men to step easily between the two realms of public and private in a way 
that was infinitely more problematic for women.’ (ibid., 150) The Baudelairean artist, 
far from being a historical universal, was located in a specific historical and social 
context and was inherently gendered. 
 McNay’s second line of criticism is directed towards the Greek notion of self-
mastery. She notes that the practices of care of the self provided a model for 
Foucault’s ethics and argues that these practices ‘turned around the notion of 
enkrateia, or self-mastery seen in terms of the domination of one’s desires’, and as a 
result was explicitly gendered. For the Greeks, femininity was linked with passivity, 
and so to be passive in the face of one’s desires, to be immoderate, was to be 
effeminate. Self-mastery, therefore, ‘involved a struggle against the immoderate and 
womanly side of one’s character’ with the aim of maintaining oneself as active, and 
hence as masculine. (ibid., 151) Although Foucault maintained that we cannot 
uncritically draw on the classical practices of the self for a model of ethics, McNay 
claims that he nevertheless carried this theme over mostly intact. She further argues 
this by reference to Foucault’s notion of government, which she defines ‘as an 
agonistic and combative struggle between free individuals.’ (ibid., 152) In this 
struggle, McNay claims, the relation with the self is prioritised over relations with 
others, and she suggests that this mirrors the social implications of the Greek notion 
of self-mastery, where self-mastery was prerequisite for mastery over others. If 
McNay is correct, then a version of self-mastery, reliant on masculine agency, has a 
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central place in Foucault’s ethics. 
 McNay, then, has argued that ‘an unexamined and nostalgic fantasy of 
masculine agency’ is implicit in Foucault’s account of ethics. (ibid., 153) This would 
be a problem, McNay says, as for Foucault the ‘starting point for an ethics of the self 
is a critical ontology or politics of location that is as “precise as possible”, that is 
oriented to the “contemporary limits of the necessary.”’ (ibid., 151) Such a starting 
point should allow the practitioner to interrogate the limits of their current identify and 
thereby allow themselves to increase their capacity for independent thought and 
action. With this in mind, we can see the force of McNay’s critique. If Foucault’s 
ethics relies on specific historical conditions or implicitly masculine experiences of 
agency, then it will simply fail to be applicable to certain people, as it is not oriented 
towards their limits. More than this, even for individual who can operate in Foucault’s 
ethical model, there will be limits of their identity that they cannot interrogate as they 
are baked into the ethics itself; for instance, notions of masculine activity. As a result, 
Foucault’s ethics would be unable to have the critical and transgressive force he 
intended. 
 One immediate response to McNay would be to maintain that, although she is 
correct in her points, these specific models – Baudelaire and Greek care of the self – 
are not essential to Foucault’s ethics and so can be discarded while preserving the 
core of his account. However, McNay argues that this unexamined masculine notion 
of agency is indicative of deeper problems with Foucault’s account of ethics. She 
asks how, having stressed the necessity of rigorous self-critique, Foucault could 
have put forward an ethics with implicit masculine agency: ‘the detail that remains 
significantly unaddressed in Foucault’s own politics of self-location is the deflection 
or identification that permits him to situate a conventional and gendered notion… at 
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the centre of a radical ethics.’ (ibid., 151) McNay suggests that, rather than a self 
genuinely embedded in practices, Foucault is instead working with a ‘“disembedded 
and disembodied” notion of the self, which… covertly represents aspects of a 
specific male experience.’ (ibid., 154) For McNay, this shows a lack of a genuine 
ethical moment in Foucault’s account. The ethics of the self, she argues, consists of 
a critical examination of the practices by which individuals constitute themselves in a 
cultural milieu. These practices are not created by the individuals themselves, 
instead being drawn from or imposed by one’s culture or society. The ethical 
moment should come when the practices of the self are raised to ‘a level of critical 
self-awareness or reflexivity’ and are therefore shown to be contingent, allowing for 
new practices and new forms of experience. However, McNay argues, Foucault’s 
reliance on an unencumbered self prevents him from fully analysing the process. 
This unencumbered self means that Foucault’s ethics cannot properly contextualise 
itself within social and power relations. As a result, it becomes impossible to 
determine the distinction between mere conspicuous consumption and genuine 
gestures of resistance when it comes to constructing one’s life as a work of art. 
 McNay’s argument is that the implicit gendering of agency, itself a problem, is 
symptomatic of a deeper problems with Foucault’s account, namely that he is 
working with a sovereign notion of the self. However, it is not clear that she can 
establish this conclusion, as we need not grant that Foucault privileges masculine 
notions of agency. First, I would argue that the reference to Baudelaire is not 
intended to valorise the romantic model of the artist, but rather to draw our attention 
to a way of understanding self-constitution as a creative, rather than investigative, 
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project.7 Second, although Foucault does discuss Greek care of the self in contexts 
where he is talking about ethics, he is also careful to distance himself from Greek 
ethics. Even if we grant that his ethics does privilege a masculine notion of agency, 
this does not establish that Foucault’s project is committed to an unencumbered 
notion of the self. As we noted above, McNay has taken a top down approach: 
beginning from Foucault’s discussion of the aesthetics of existence, she has 
attempted to determine the nature of his underlying account. However, as we have 
noted Foucault already has an underlying account in his notion of ontological 
freedom. Even if McNay does establish that Foucault’s top-level account of ethics 
implies an unencumbered notion of the self, it does not follow that there is no 
account of the self as embedded within practices in his work. It is possible that 
ontological freedom would provide such an embedded self, but that Foucault had 
failed to correct build his ethics on top of that foundation. This is a rather damning 
defence, but there is still a difference between concluding that Foucault’s account 
has a workable foundation and concluding that the whole project should rejected. 
Furthermore, this defence only becomes necessary if we grant that Foucault’s 
account of the practice of freedom implies a masculine agency, which, as we will 
show in chapters 4 and 6, it does not.  
 Here, then, is where the utility of the distinction between ontological freedom 
and practices of freedom becomes apparent. Rather than, like McNay, having to 
begin with the account of ethics and work downwards, we can take the notion of 
ontological freedom as our starting point and thereby investigate precisely what 
concepts of agency underly the account of ethics. We can then move from the 
 
7 The sixth chapter of this thesis, which engages with Oscar Wilde, can be read as a further elaboration of this 
point.  Wilde is in many ways a prototypical dandy yet, as we will argue, he provides us with an instance of the 
practice of freedom that does not involve masculine, assertive agency; nevertheless, his activity can be 
understood using Foucault’s analysis of freedom. 
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ground up in analysing practices of freedom. McNay’s critique is vulnerable to this 
kind of response, as if we are able to establish that Foucault’s ethics is not reliant on 
a sovereign self, then McNay’s critique demonstrates, at best, that Foucault’s 
elaboration of the ethics of the self needs to be reworked in accordance with the 
underlying account of freedom and, at worst, that McNay has misread the account of 
ethics. Again, the former conclusion would be a damaging concession for Foucault, 
but I do not think it is one we need to accept. Nevertheless, taking up the distinction 
between ontological freedom and the practice of freedom, will allow us to get the 
clearer view of the structure of Foucault’s ethics we need. 
 
On Oksala on Foucault on freedom 
Oksala’s work differs significantly from McNay’s in that she, like us, recognises 
distinctions between different forms of freedom. In Foucault on Freedom, Oksala 
cites the same quote we took as a point of departure – ‘freedom is the ontological 
condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when it is 
informed by reflection’ – and uses it as a way of framing Foucault’s different notions 
of freedom. Oksala argues that freedom, as the ontological condition of ethics, does 
not refer to a concrete capacity of the subject: ‘Freedom is not an ontological 
characteristic of the subject. We are not born free, nor do we have an inherent 
capacity to realise our freedom.’ (Oksala 2005, 188) On her account, freedom 
attaches, not to the subject, but to ‘practices, forms of experience, or the being of 
language.’ (ibid., 191) More specifically, freedom refers to ‘the ontological 
contingency of the present: freedom is the opening up of possibilities of an age.’ 
(ibid., 188) Our current practices and subjectivities do not necessarily follow from the 
types of beings we are and they could, in principle, be otherwise. It is the 
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contingency of our practices and forms of life that ontological freedom refers to.  
 Oksala explains freedom as ontological contingency with reference to two 
areas of Foucault’s work: “discourse and language”, and “bodies and pleasures”. 
With the former, freedom refers to ‘the indeterminacy of discursive structure.’ By this, 
Oksala means that currently existing forms of discourse can only ever be a subset of 
the forms that could possibly exist, and so there can always be ‘unexpected orders 
and unimaginable conjunctions of meanings.’ (ibid., 189) For instance, scientific 
discourses, for Oksala, form a way of ordering language, but this cannot exhaust 
language as ‘avant-garde writing is capable of forming alternative, unscientific, and 
irrational ontological realms’, and these allow for different experiences of order, and 
hence different perceptions and practices. (ibid., 189) 
 Oksala makes similar arguments regarding the body and pleasures. She says 
that ‘Subjection sets the limits for normal experiences, but those limits make possible 
transgressions that affirm the limitlessness of bodies and pleasures.’ (ibid., 189) In 
the same way that scientific discourse establishes an experience of language, 
subjection establishes an experience of embodiment. However, transgressive 
behaviours can go beyond these normalised experiences and so reveal an element 
of freedom in disclosing an outside to the discursive order. For Oksala, freedom as 
ontological contingency refers to the contingency of the discursive structures and 
practices which constitute our experiences, and this freedom is the ontological 
condition for practices of freedom. 
 Having discussed ontological freedom, Oksala goes on to discuss the practice 
of freedom. Following the quote we saw above, the practice of freedom is the form 
ontological freedom takes when it practiced with a deliberative dimension. For 
Oksala, the subject exercises its freedom by ‘critically reflecting on itself and its 
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behaviour, on beliefs and the social field of which it is part.’ (ibid., 190) This critical 
activity opens up space for creative activity, for ‘exploring possibilities for new forms 
of the subject, new fields of experiences, pleasures, relationships, modes of living 
and thinking.’ (ibid., 190) The final aim of this critical activity, Oksala says, is 
‘developing forms of the subject that are capable of functioning as resistance to the 
normalising power.’ (ibid., 190) 
 Although I agree with Oksala that we need to pay attention to the different 
forms of freedom in Foucault’s work, I disagree with her account of ontological 
freedom. There are two main arguments for this position: first, ontological freedom 
underdetermines the practice of freedom; second, Oksala’s reading of our point of 
departure quote does not seem to match the text from which it is drawn. 
 If we grant that Oksala’s interpretation of ontological freedom is correct, it 
does not seem to help us towards an account of the practice of freedom. We saw in 
our point of departure quote that ethics is the form that freedom takes when it is 
informed by reflection. However, given Oksala’s account of ontological freedom, it is 
unclear what this means for the practice of freedom. In one section, Oksala writes 
that ‘the subject exercises freedom in withdrawing from itself and problematising its 
behaviour.’ (ibid., 181, emphasis mine) In this statement there is a lack of fit between 
the verb and its object: if freedom refers not to a capacity or an aspect of the subject, 
but to the ontological contingency of our practices, then “exercise” seems to be the 
wrong word to use here.8 This lack of clarity is not merely a grammatical problem, 
however, but a more substantive one. In Oksala’s work, there is significant ambiguity 
 
8 As I understand it, the things that can be exercised tend to have a predisposition to certain kinds of (literal or 
metaphorical) motion, where exercising them means making use of that predisposition. For instance, I can 
exercise my body or I can exercise a right, where rights have a normative force. Contingency, which only 
implies that things can be otherwise, does not seem to be the kind of thing that can be exercised. Imagine 
exercising a rock: the rock can be moved, but we can’t make use of a predisposition to motion. 
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about what exactly it means to practice freedom. Freedom is ‘embedded in critical 
inquiries and practices’; freedom ‘is a practice’; ‘the subject exercises freedom in 
withdrawing from itself…’. (ibid., 181) Given that freedom simultaneously is a 
practice, is embedded in practices, and is something that is exercised, it is unclear 
what exactly freedom is.9 Further, it is not clear what the connection is between 
ontological freedom and the kind of freedom that is being exercised here. Oksala 
argues that freedom aims to develop ‘forms of the subject that are capable of 
functioning as resistance to… normalising power.’ (ibid., 190) But how is the notion 
of resistance to normalising power derived from freedom defined as the contingency 
of our practices? In other words, there is no way for us to ground a fully fleshed-out 
account of the practice of freedom in Oksala’s account of ontological freedom. 
Ontological freedom may make certain critical and creative practices possible, but it 
also leaves open the question of what makes certain practices genuinely critical and 
creative. It also leaves unclear how these practices are possible, what kind of 
agency or freedom they involve, and what allows them to be put into practice given 
the subject’s embeddedness in power relations. Oksala’s concern to keep freedom 
an aspect of practices or discourses leads her to posit an account which is unable to 
explain the possibility of reflective and critical practices of the self. Oksala herself 
seems to recognise this problem, although she casts it as a paradox of Foucault’s 
thought: 
[S]eemingly paradoxically, the subject does not invent itself, but only deploys 
modes of behaviour and forms of thinking of its cultural context… The questions 
 
9 Note the distinction between “exercising” and “practicing”. For instance, we can practice medicine, but we 
cannot exercise medicine. We can exercise our medical skills, but this is rather different from practicing our 
medical skills. In other words, “practice” and “exercise” take different types of nouns. A further discussion of 
this topic would go beyond the scope of our chapter. 
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that follow are questions about the ‘freedom’ of the subject. How can we 
understand the capacity of the subject for critical self-reflection? How is the 
constituted subject capable of engaging in truly critical practices? (ibid., 192) 
Rather than being inherent to Foucault’s thought, this unresolved paradox may be 
the result of Oksala grounding the practice of freedom in a notion of freedom that is 
not embedded in practices. It is possible, therefore, a different conception of freedom 
may allow for a better understanding of this. 
 The greater problem with Oksala’s account is that it does not seem to fit with 
the text of the interview being taken as a point of departure. When Foucault talks 
about freedom in EPF, he does not talk in terms of the contingency of our discursive 
practices; instead, he talks about freedom in relation to power. When discussing the 
Greeks, he talks about freedom in terms of civic liberty or non-slavery; the rest of the 
time, he talks in terms of power relations. Immediately after making the claim that 
“freedom is the ontological condition of ethics”, he argues that ‘In the Greco-Roman 
world, the care of the self was the mode in which individual freedom… was reflected 
as an ethics.’ (EPF 284) Further on, he claims that ‘insofar as freedom for the 
Greeks signifies non-slavery… the problem is already entirely political… in that non-
slavery to others is a condition: a slave has no ethics.’ (ibid., 286) Further, when 
Foucault talks about power relations, he discusses freedom in a way which makes it 
clear that freedom is not a matter of ontological contingency. He says: 
It should also be noted that power relations are possible only insofar as the 
subjects are free. If one of them were completely at the other’s disposal and 
became his thing, an object on which he could wreak boundless and limitless 
violence, there wouldn’t be any relations of power. (ibid., 292) 
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The notion of freedom under discussion here is inconsistent with Oksala’s account. 
Remember that Oksala defined freedom as the ontological contingency of our 
practices. With this definition, freedom should be constantly present as, presumably, 
all our practices are contingent and could be otherwise. This would continue to be 
true in the case where an individual is entirely within another’s power: although the 
individual would have no ability to change the situation, it is not true that the situation 
is ontologically necessary. Therefore, contra Foucault, the individual would still be 
free. Clearly, however, Foucault has a notion of freedom in mind that implies that 
sometimes we can be unfree and, further, that is closely entangled with power 
relations.10  
 Although Oksala does recognise Foucault’s distinctions between different 
forms of freedom in his work, we have shown that her account of ontological freedom 
1) does not seem to match with Foucault’s texts and 2) is not particularly useful for 
determining what the practice of freedom is. We have therefore justified both looking 
at ontological freedom at all and, further, offering a new account of ontological 
freedom. 
 
Ontological freedom, power and violence 
Having justified why we need a new account of ontological freedom, we are now 
going to construct one. Given our critique of Oksala, it is important that we should 
take the text of EPF as our point of departure. The clearest discussion of the 
 
10 It is worth noting that Oksala does recognise a form of freedom which seems closer to the one depicted in 
this quote, which she calls “negative freedom”. However, Oksala maintains that this form only appears in texts 
written by Foucault for American audiences (which I take to refer primarily to “The Subject and Power”, his 
afterwords to Dreyfus and Rabinow’s Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics) and is of little 
importance to his work as a whole, as it was intended to appeal to trends in American political philosophy. 
However, as we have seen, this approach is in fact present in EPF as well. 
25 
 
relationship between power relations and freedom comes in the paragraph we 
mentioned above: 
It should be noted that power relations are only possible insofar as the subjects 
are free. If one of them were completely at the other’s disposal and became his 
thing, an object on which he could wreak boundless and limitless violence, there 
wouldn’t be any relations of power. Thus, in order for power relations to come 
into play, there must be at least a certain degree of freedom on both sides.11 
(ibid., 292) 
As we noted above, there are cases in which an individual is unfree and in those 
situations they cannot be within power relations. We therefore need to discuss 
freedom with reference to two kinds of relations: relations of power and what 
Foucault calls, in ‘The Subject and Power’ (henceforth SP), relations of violence. In 
the following sections, we will begin by examining the relationship between power 
and freedom, and then turn to cases of unfreedom, i.e., relations of violence. 
 
What are power relations? 
When Foucault uses the term “power”, he is not referring to an existing entity. 
Instead, power is a shorthand for “power relations” or “relations of power”. Foucault’s 
understanding of power relations is nominalistic: ‘Power exists only as exercised by 
some on others, only when it is put into action.’ (SP 240) Power relations are not 
general: they are discontinuous, local, specific. More specifically, they are 
 
11 We might wonder whether Foucault here is talking about ontological freedom or the practice of freedom. 
However, earlier in this same interview he clarifies that the practices of freedom can be non-existent within 
situations of domination. Given that “domination” refers to a specific possible state of power relations, it 
cannot be the case that the practice of freedom is a necessary condition for power relations; otherwise in a 
situation of domination power relations would cease to exist and therefore the situation of domination would 
also cease to exist. 
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‘relationship[s] in which one person tries to control the conduct of the other.’ (EPF 
292) In other words, a power relation is a relationship in which one individual is trying 
to cause another to act in a certain way. While power relations are often (if not 
always) accompanied by relations of communications, of production, and so on, they 
are a distinct kind of relation. Next, ‘what defines a relationship of power is that it is a 
mode of action that does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts 
upon their actions: an action upon an action, on possible or actual future or present 
actions.’ (SP 340) Power relations do not involve acting directly on the bodies of 
others, but rather aim to modify the conduct of others.12 Finally, while these relations 
are asymmetrical they are not unidirectional. Power relations can, in principle, be 
reversed and have control exerted in both directions: ‘These power relations are… 
mobile, reversible, and unstable.’ (EPF 292) 
 Power relations, then, are relations between subjects in which they attempt to 
control each other’s behaviour. As we noted, freedom is defined in relation to these 
power relations and this freedom must meet certain conditions. First, if power 
involves acting on actions, free subjects must be able to act; second, if power 
relations are reversible, it must be possible for free subjects to act in such a way as 
to reverse relations of power. When talking about ability to act, “action” here must 
have a specific meaning, as presumably there are some actions which, although we 
can perform them, would be unable to modify a power relation. For instance, 
although there may be cases when small actions are able to modify such relations, 
breathing, blinking, or flexing one’s fingers will normally fail to count as relevant 
actions. Freedom, then, must account for the two conditions we mentioned as well 
 
12 Of course, these actions may indirectly modify the bodies of individuals as in the disciplines described in 
Discipline and Punish, but they do this by changing behaviour. Bodily dragging someone into a cell would not 
be an instance of this kind of relation of power, but using a timetable to cause them to be there at a certain 
time would be. 
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as providing criteria for determining relevant actions.  
 Foucault himself offers the following definition of freedom: 
Power is exercised only over free subjects, and insofar as they are “free.” By this 
we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of 
possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and 
modes of behaviour are available. (SP 342) 
From this we can determine several things about freedom. First, a free subject 
must be able to act in a variety of different ways and is faced with a “field of 
possibilities” for action. To put it another way, a free subject must have two or 
more possibilities for action, as a “field” of possible actions implies the 
existence of at least one alternative possibility.13 Second, the relevant possible 
actions are characterised, not as one-off actions, but as patterns or strategies 
of behaviour: “kinds of conduct”, “ways of reacting,” “modes of behaviour”. 
Foucault’s definition, then, takes us some way towards an account of freedom. 
However, it so far does not tell us what makes these strategies of behaviour 
relevant to freedom, rather than being simply random collections of actions. 
 We noted that power relations are possible only insofar as the subjects 
involved are free, and, further, Foucault also argues that freedom is not simply 
something that power acts on, i.e., it is not simply a field of possible actions, 
rather freedom actively struggles with power: freedom necessarily involves 
resistance. Foucault claims that ‘in power relations there is necessarily the 
possibility of resistance because if there were no possibility of resistance (of 
 
13 Another way to think about this would be to try and imagine a case where an individual only has one 
possible action open to them. However, if an individual has a possible action they can take, they actually have 
a second possibility: to refrain from that first possibility. For an individual to only have one possibility, they 
must be in a situation where they have no choice to take a different action and hence they are not faced with a 
field of actions. 
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violent resistance, flight, deception, strategies capable of reversing the 
situations), there would be no power relations at all.’ (EPF 292) Here Foucault 
gives us several examples of resistance. “Flight” seems to refer to the 
possibility of leaving the power relationship, but the other ones seem to reduce 
to the notion of “reversing the situation”, reversing the power relation. To be 
capable of resistance is to be capable of deploying strategies which could allow 
one to modify, or even fully reverse, the power relationships one finds oneself 
in. In other words, the kinds of conduct or behaviour are possible when an 
individual is free are those which offer resistance, which provide the possibility 
of modifying or reversing power relationships. To be ontologically free, then, is 
to be faced with a field of two or more possible actions which can allow one to 
modify the power relations one is embedded in. 
 This account allows us to offer the beginnings of a response to McNay’s 
critique. Foucault’s account, at least at its foundations, does not rely on a 
sovereign subject. Ontological freedom, the freedom that makes ethics 
possible, is freedom within power relations and to be free is to be faced with a 
field of possible actions that is constituted by power relations. Rather than a 
sovereign subject, the subject is free in the ontological sense insofar as she is 
embedded in a field of power relations. This does not indicate a freedom 
inherent to the subject since, as we shall now explore, the field of possibilities 
can be removed and the subject can become ontologically unfree. This 
discussion will also allow us to answer a further question: namely, does 
freedom mean actually having alternative possibilities, or only understanding 




Relations of violence 
To explore when individuals lack ontological freedom, we first need to introduce the 
concept of a relation of violence. A helpful way to explain relations of violence is in 
comparison with power relations. As we noted earlier, power does not act directly on 
others; rather power functions as a “conduct of conducts” in which a subject acts on 
the field of possibilities of another subject. With violence, however, it is otherwise: ‘A 
relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, 
it destroys, or it closes off all possibilities.’ (ibid., 340) Whereas power modifies a 
subject’s field of possibilities, violence acts directly through the body and, through 
physical coercion, produces its effects. This leads to substantial differences in the 
relationships between individuals in relations of violence and relations of power. An 
indispensable element of a power relation is ‘that “the other” (the one over whom 
power is exercised) is recognised and maintained to the very end as a subject who 
acts.’ (ibid., 340) Violence, by contrast, has no need for a subject and instead 
attempts to destroys them and their field of possibilities. As a result, violence is 
unidirectional and has no room for reversal or resistance: ‘its opposite pole can only 
be passivity, and if it comes up against any resistance it has no other option but to 
try to break it down.’ (ibid., 340) 
 Given that violence eliminates freedom and therefore the possibility of power 
relations, it might seem – counter-intuitively – that violence cannot form part in any 
strategies of government. However, the relationship between violence and power is 
more complicated than this. Foucault writes that: ‘Obviously the establishing of 
power relations does not exclude the use of violence… no doubt, the exercise of 
power can never do without [violence].’ (ibid., 340) This might seem to contradict 
what we said above, but there are several possible explanations. First, we could note 
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that violence can be used as part of a broader strategy of power. For example, most 
governments threaten violence in certain situations: for these threats to carry any 
weight, the government must sometimes display its willingness to use violence. 
Bearing in mind the discontinuity of power relations we discussed earlier, there is no 
contradiction in the establishing of a relationship of violence at one point, followed by 
the re-establishing of relations of power. Second, there are also instances of 
violence which seem to form part of power relations, rather than excluding them, and 
that leave open possibilities of action and resistance. For instance, in Discipline and 
Punish Foucault discusses the institution of judicial torture, where torture was used 
to try and elicit confessions which would then be used as evidence in court. In this 
institution, torture took the form of a “battle” between torturer and magistrate, and it 
was this ‘battle, and this victory of one adversary over the other, that produced truth 
according to a ritual.’ (DP 41) If the accused confessed, the magistrate obtained a 
significant piece of evidence, but ‘if the accused “held out” and did not confess, the 
magistrate was forced to drop the charges. The tortured man had then won.’ (ibid., 
40-14) In this relationship there was therefore at least the possibility of resistance; 
that is, judicial torture seems to be an example of power, even though violence was 
involved. 
 This case indicates that we must be careful to clearly determine what 
constitutes a relation of violence. The presence of physical violence is clearly not a 
sufficient condition for a given relationship to count as a relation of violence. A good 
illustration of the distinction between power and violence can be found in Foucault’s 
Tanner Lecture at Stanford, ‘”Omnes et Singulatim”: Towards a Critique of Political 
Reason’. Foucault explains: 
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The characteristic feature of power is that some men can more or less entirely 
determine other men’s conduct – but never exhaustively or coercively. A man 
who is chained up and beaten is subject to force being exerted over him, not 
power. But if he can be induced to speak, when his ultimate recourse could have 
been to hold his tongue, preferring death, then he has been caused to behave in 
a certain way. His freedom has been subjected to power. He has been submitted 
to government. If an individual can remain free, however little his freedom may 
be, power can subject him to government. (Foucault 2000, 324) 
Here we see a clear contrast case: the person whose conduct is being determined 
“exhaustively or coercively” is explicitly distinguished from a person who can be 
induced to speak. What, here, is meant by coercion? We may at first think it would 
include such cases as being forced to do something at gunpoint. However, given 
Foucault’s account of power, this cannot be part of a relation of violence. Foucault 
argues:  
Even when the power relation is completely out of balance, when it can truly be 
claimed that one side has “total power” over the other, a power can be exercised 
over the other only insofar as the other still has the option of killing himself, of 
leaping out the window, or of killing the other person. (EPF 292) 
Coercion at gunpoint, which would give us the possibility of letting ourselves be shot 
or attempting to grab the gun, would seem to come under the heading of “total 
power”, not of violence. When talking about relations of violence, then, the relevant 
sense of coercion seems to be specifically physical coercion, physically manipulating 
someone’s body to make them carry out an action. Power causes people to do 
things by acting on their actions, while violence causes them to “do” things by acting 
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on their body as upon an object.14 Given this, a person is subject to a relation of 
violence when their field of possible actions has been destroyed, either because they 
have been stopped from carrying out any actions or because they have been 
physically coerced into acting. 
 
Having vs. understanding oneself as having 
As we have argued above, to be ontologically free is to be have two or more 
possibilities of action which would allow one to modify the power relations one finds 
themselves within. Our discussion of relations of violence also allows us to clarify 
what it means to “have” these possibilities. There are two possibilities: first, being 
free in an ontological sense means having the possibilities, as seen from a 
hypothetical objective point of view; second, being ontologically free means 
understanding oneself as having these possibilities. In principle, this means the 
difference between accepting false negatives, cases in which one falsely believes 
oneself to be unfree, and false positives, in which one falsely believes oneself to be 
free. In practice, however, given our definition of relations of violence, it is unclear 
how far the experience and the reality can come apart. 
 In the case of false negatives, the individual must experience herself as 
having no other possibilities, when in fact she does; this does not mean “no viable 
courses of action”, this means “no courses of action whatsoever”. In a relation of 
violence, the agent’s only course of action is the “action” she is being forced to take; 
for instance, being physically dragged into a cell. There may be cases in which an 
individual falsely believes she has no alternative courses of action. Assuming false 
 
14 Think again of the example in footnote 3, of causing someone to be in a cell using a timetable versus 
dragging them there by force. 
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belief rather than delusion, a possible example could be an individual who 
mistakenly thinks she has been paralysed and is therefore unable to resist (perhaps 
she has only been given a sedative but was told otherwise), but these cases are very 
rare. 
 False positives also seem rare, as they would require experiencing oneself as 
faced with possibilities when you have none, not even the possibility of stopping an 
activity. An example, again assuming false belief, might be mistakenly thinking that 
one could break free of a set of restraints, but maintaining that one is choosing not 
to.15 
 These examples seem extremely rare, but insofar as they show anything they 
suggest that the correct way to understand ontological freedom is a understanding 
oneself as having possible actions. In the false negative example, it is unclear how 
the fact that one actually has other courses of action, without realising that one does, 
could possibly be a condition for the practice of freedom: if the practice of freedom is 
about shaping one’s relations to oneself and others, experiencing oneself as 
possibilities seems to be a necessary condition for this activity. Similarly, if one 
falsely believes oneself to have other possibilities, this seems to give oneself leeway 




15 The assumption of false belief rather than delusion seems more important in the case of false positives. If 
we allow delusion or self-deception, then this will lead us to conclude that individuals can practice freedom 
entirely within their own heads, regardless of their external circumstances. For instance, imagine a restrained 
individual who does not even believe herself to be restrained; instead, she is choosing to sit in a very particular 
position as part of a practice of self-constitution. It is unclear to me what conclusion we should reach for such 
deluded individuals; Foucault’s work does not seem to touch on it. However, we will briefly return to this point 
in Chapter 2 in the section titled “Relation to ontological freedom”. 
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Ontological freedom as understanding oneself as having alternative 
possibilities 
We have argued, then, that ontological freedom refers to a subject’s experiencing 
themselves as having a minimal field of actions. Freedom can also be cashed out in 
terms of the types of relations one is subject to. In freedom, the ontologically free 
subject is embedded within relations of power; by contrast, the ontologically unfree 
individual (who is no longer maintained as a subject) is within a relation of violence. 
 We can indicate this distinction by comparing the earlier example of judicial 
torture with a case where an individual is being tortured for torture’s sake. In judicial 
torture, violence – in the everyday sense – was used upon the “patient”. However 
this does not constitute what we referred to as physical coercion: the aim of this 
violence is to induce the patient to act in a certain way and so this counts as a power 
relation. They are faced with a minimal field of possibilities: they can either 1) remain 
silent and hold out, or 2) confess. Both of these options are actions which have an 
effect on the power relation between the patient and the magistrate. 
 We can also imagine an instance of torture where the aim is simply to hurt the 
victim. This would count as a relation of violence where the victim’s body is being 
acted on for its own sake. As there is no attempt to modify the victim’s behaviour, 
there are no options for reversal or resistance as the power relations simply does not 
exist. The victim is not faced with a field of possible counter-strategies and so the 
actions they can perform are arbitrary with regards to power. This is how violence 
works: it destroys the possibility of meaningful action by acting directly on the body 
and treating the individual as an object. As the individual has no meaningful actions, 
there are also no actions for power to act upon and so there is no possible support 





We have established, then, what freedom as the ontological condition of ethics 
consists in: to experience oneself as having options that will have effects on the 
power relations one is within. In other words, to be free is to be within power 
relations, while to be unfree is to be within relations of violence. It is only while we 
are within power relations, while we experience ourselves as faced with a field of 
possible actions, that we have the possibility of practicing freedom informed with 
reflection. 
 This conception of freedom conflicts with both McNay’s analysis of Foucault’s 
underlying understanding of the self and Oksala’s definition of freedom as 
ontological contingency. As we saw above, McNay argued that Foucault’s ethics 
were reliant on a sovereign self with an implicitly masculine agency. However, we 
have now shown that ontological freedom in fact refers to a subject’s having a 
minimal field of actions, where being able to act in the relevant sense does not 
depend on being a certain kind of agent but, rather, on being within relations of 
power. To be free, in this minimal sense, is simply to have options open to one that 
will have effects on the power relations one is within. This notion of agency, then, is 
ungendered. Further, contra McNay’s claim that Foucault’s notion of the self is 
unembedded, the Foucauldian free subjects is necessarily entangle within power 
relations. 
 Our account of freedom also helps us solve the difficulties with Oksala’s 
approach. For Oksala, ontological freedom referred to the fact that our practices are 
contingent, thereby implying that we are always free; however, we have shown that 
there are instances where we are not free in Foucault’s sense. Freedom refers, not 
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to the contingency of our practices, but to our being situated in power relations and 
so, when we exit such relations, we are not free in the relevant sense. Our account is 
also capable of responding to the objection we raised against Oksala, namely that 
there is no clear connection between ontological freedom and the practice of 
freedom. Given that being free means experiencing oneself as having a field of 
possible behaviours, we can see what it would mean to “exercise” freedom: to put 
some of these behaviours into effect. 
 We have determined what freedom as the ontological condition of ethics 
means. However, this form of freedom only represents a very minimal form of 
freedom. To return to the example of judicial torture, the “patient” has two options – 
confess or remain silent – and so she is ontologically free. The torturer, of course, is 
also free in this minimal sense: she is also faced with a field of possible behaviours 
and is taking part in a power relations. Nevertheless, we presumably see a 
difference between the situation of the torturer and the patient: the torturer seems to 
be more free in some sense. What are some of the aspects of this greater freedom? 
First, it is up to the torturer whether the relationship remains a power relation or 
becomes a relation of violence: she could simply stop caring about eliciting a 
response from the patient. The torturer can also choose how and when to end the 
torture. The torturer, then, seems to have more control over the continuation of the 
power relation. Second, with the relationship of power itself, the torturer has more 
power to affect the behaviour of the patient than the patient, both in the sense of 
having more options and in having more forceful options. We could go so far as to 
say that the torturer dominates the patient, that the power relations has become 
irreversible. Third, the torturer seems to have more leeway in the ways in which she 
can relate to her own behaviour: she can understand herself as a discoverer of truth, 
37 
 
an arbiter of justice, a sadist, a technician. The patient’s experience of herself seems 
comparatively limited, in part because of the destructive and violating effects of pain 
and in part because of the fact her responses are limited to two: hold out or give in. 
 The question, then, is what makes the torturer freer than the patient. Is it the 
number of possibilities? Having more possibilities may not make one freer in a 
relevant way: being able to choose from more brands of clothing does not seem to 
make one freer in a way relevant to ethics. Is it having possibilities that the patient 
does not? Having different possibilities from someone else does not necessarily 
make one or the other person freer. Is the relations one can have to one’s 
possibilities? My suggestion is that, on Foucault’s account, this third solution is the 




Chapter 2: A Constitutivist Approach to Freedom 
Introduction 
Our point of departure for this project was a quote in which Foucault made two 
claims: 1) freedom is the ontological condition of ethics and 2) ethics is the reflective 
practice of freedom. In the previous chapter we gave a new account of ontological 
freedom, arguing that to be ontologically free is to be within power relations, rather 
than relations of violence. In power relations, an individual has a field of possible 
actions open to her, and others act on her actions by modifying this field; similarly, 
she modifies the actions of others by acting on their fields. 
 This account, however, could not allow us to explain why some individuals 
seem to be more free than others. For instance, on the ontological account, a victim 
of judicial torture is as free as her torturer as both of them have a field of possible 
actions open to them. The idea that all individuals are equally free within power 
relations is both counter-intuitive and in conflict with Foucault’s own position. For 
example, in EPF Foucault argues that we should attempt to avoid situations of 
domination. (cf. EPF 299) Domination is explicitly contrasted with freedom, yet 
domination designates power relations when they are in certain kinds of states, and 
to be within power relations is to be ontologically free.16 Individuals caught within 
situations of domination are less free than other individuals, but we currently have no 
way of explaining this difference. The next step, then, will be to discuss Foucault’s 
account of freedom that can allow us to do so: the practice of freedom. 
 Before we can give an account of the practice of freedom, however, there are 
 
16 Foucault defines domination as a situation or state in which ‘the power relations, instead of being mobile, 
allowing the various participants to adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen.’ (EPF 283) We 
will return to the subject of domination in chapter 3 in our discussion of resistance to domination. 
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a number of methodological considerations we must attend to. This chapter, then, is 
dedicated to addressing these considerations, while chapters 3 and 4 discuss the 
practice of freedom itself. In this chapter, we begin by giving three criteria of success 
an account of the practice of freedom should meet. We then discuss the question of 
whether Foucault holds a substantive or procedural account of freedom, arguing in 
favour of the latter, and suggest that this account is best understood as a 
“constitutivist” account. Having defined constitutivism, we then argue that constitutive 
aims are necessary and sufficient conditions for an activity, and discuss the manner 
in which constitutivist aims must be held, namely pre-reflectively. 
 
What are practices of freedom? 
The “practice of freedom” is a deceptively simple term: presumably it is simply the 
way in which we put our freedom, i.e., our ontological freedom, the fields of possible 
action we are faced with, into practice. However, it is clear that Foucault does not 
consider every possible way of putting our freedom into practice to be a practice of 
freedom. For instance, a paradigmatic example of the practice of freedom is 
Baudelaire’s account of the dandy, discussed by Foucault in ‘What is 
Enlightenment?’: 
Modernity for Baudelaire is not simply a form of relationship to the present; it is 
also a mode of relationship that must be established with oneself…. To be 
modern is not to accept oneself as one is in the flux of the passing moments; it is 
to take oneself as object of a complex and difficult elaboration: what Baudelaire, 
in the vocabulary of his day, calls dandysme. (WE 311) 
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Dandyism is not merely a collection of actions or a pattern of behaviour; it also 
involves relationships to the present and, more importantly, cultivating a certain 
relationship to oneself. However, it is also not enough to say that practices of 
freedom must involve cultivating relationships to oneself. In one interview Foucault 
references what he calls the ‘Californian cult of the self’, a modern culture of the self 
which is intended to identify one’s true self. Such a “cultist” would seem to be 
establishing a relationship with themselves, and yet Foucault speaks negatively of 
such a movement: ‘not only do I not identify [the] ancient culture of the self with [the 
Californian cult]… I think they are diametrically opposed.’ (OGE 271) Even if we 
would grant that such “cultists” are engaged in the practice of freedom, Foucault 
would presumably want to say that they are less free than the dandy or the Stoic 
sage, which leaves open the question of what exactly makes them less free. 
 Contrary to our original expectations, then, the question of what exactly 
constitutes a practice of freedom is a complicated one; in fact, we will spend the next 
three chapters answering this question. First, however, it would be useful for us to 
set out several criteria which will determine what it would mean for our account of the 
practice of freedom to be successful. 
1) Gradation 
As we have noted, the practice of freedom is what will allow us to distinguish 
between individuals on the basis of how free they are. Freedom, therefore, should be 
conceptualised as an axis running from minimally free to maximally free, rather than 
as a binary opposition between freedom and unfreedom. Foucault’s statements 
confirm that the practice of freedom has this kind of structure. For instance, he says 
that in states of domination ‘practices of freedom do not exist or exist only unilaterally 
or are extremely constrained and limited.’ (EPF 283) Although this implies the 
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possibility of unfreedom where practices of freedom do not exist, it also shows that, 
where there are practices of freedom the amount of freedom can vary, i.e., that 
freedom is a spectrum, not a dichotomy. 
  Given this, a successful account of the practice of freedom must allow for 
gradations in freedom: we must be able, in principle, to distinguish between 
individuals on the basis of how free they are. 
2) Relation to ontological freedom 
It is important that we are able to clearly see how ontological freedom and the 
practice of freedom are related to one another. In the previous chapter, we criticised 
Oksala’s account of ontological freedom because it was not clear how it supported 
her account of the practice of freedom, and so we must avoid this same problem. As 
we saw in our point of departure quote, ontological freedom is a condition of 
possibility for practices of freedom and we should be able to see why this is the 
case. 
  More specifically, this will mean that our account of the practice of freedom 
must connected to an individual’s understanding of their field of possible actions and 
their being within power relations. For instance, we could not offer an account of the 
practice of freedom where an individual could be free within their own head, 
regardless of their experience of the relations they were in, as this would be entirely 
distinct from ontological freedom and it would be unclear why ontological freedom 
should be a condition of possibility for it.17 
 
17 In the first chapter, we raised the possibility of deluded individuals who believe themselves to be 
ontologically free, even though they should have reason to believe they are not: for instance, an individual 
who is restrained, but does not believe themselves to be, or an individual who, having tried and failed to break 
their restraints, still believes they could break free if they really wanted. One possibility was to argue that such 
individuals are not ontologically free. However, if we grant that they are ontologically free because they 
experience themselves as such, our considerations here suggest that they could still be engaging in the 
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3) Connection to ethics 
Given that, as we saw in our point of departure quote, ethics is the practice of 
freedom, our account of the practice of freedom must be recognisable as an account 
of ethics. If our account of the practice of freedom does not have the right kinds of 
normativity, then there is something wrong with our account. 
  An important question here is what exactly we mean by “ethics”. Foucault 
gives “ethics” a distinct meaning in his work, clearly separating it from morality 
understood as moral codes. In the Use of Pleasure, Foucault draws a distinction 
between three different aspects of morality: moral codes, moral behaviours and 
ethics. (UP 25-26) “Moral codes” are the prescriptions and rules which individuals 
are expected to follow; the “morality of behaviours” refers to the extent to which 
individuals’ actions comply with the aforementioned moral prescriptions; “ethics” 
refers to the ‘manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject acting 
in reference to the prescriptive elements that make up the code.’ (UP 26) When we 
say that our account of the practice of freedom must show their connection to ethics, 
then, we are not saying that practices of freedom must provide moral codes. Rather, 
practices of freedom must involve forming oneself as an ethical subject. 
 
Procedural versus substantive accounts of freedom 
In investigating the practice of freedom, we will quickly run into the question of what 
exactly makes a given practice of freedom an example of freedom. Is a practice free 
because its results meet some standard of freedom, or is a practice free because the 
 
practice of freedom. As we will see in chapters 3 and 4, biting this bullet would not necessarily be a problem 
for Foucault. If one believes that one is practicing freedom because one is deluded about one’s situation and 
fails to notice aspects of it, one will be failing to meet at least one part of the constitutive aim: see the section 
on “The Critical Ontology of Ourselves” in chapter 3. 
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practice has been carried out in accordance with certain standards? In other words, 
we are asking whether we are looking at a substantive or a procedural account of 
freedom. 
 Substantial and procedural accounts can be distinguished by whether they 
are evaluated based on outcomes or on the process itself. In substantive accounts, 
the standard is an external one against which the outcomes are measured. Taking 
practical rationality as an analogy, on a substantive account an agent can be 
criticised as irrational for lacking a certain desire ‘whether or not the agent can 
rationally reach this desire from the beliefs and desires’ they have. (Hooker and 
Streumer 2004, 59) For instance, Anscombe gives the example of an agent who has 
a desire to have, but not to do anything with, a saucer of mud. On a substantivist 
account, this noninstrumental desire would be considered irrational even if the agent 
could reason their way to that desire from their other beliefs and desire. (ibid., 67) 
 In a procedural account, however, it is a matter of seeing whether the 
procedures of the activity were carried out in accordance with certain standards. For 
example, on a procedural account an agent is irrational for lacking a desire only if 
they could reason their way to that desire from their current beliefs and desires. 
(ibid., 58) For instance, imagine an individual, Jack, who has a life-threatening 
disease which will kill him in thirty years if he does not take a medicine, with no 
negative side effects, now. On a proceduralist account, Jack can only be open to 
rational criticism if he currently holds beliefs or desires from which he can rationally 
reach a desire to take the medicine. If he cannot reach the desire, then he is not 
irrational if he refuses to take the medicine. (ibid., 58) 
 A substantive account, then, is satisfied if the outcome of a process measures 
up to an external standard which can be applied to any such outcomes; a procedural 
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account is satisfied when the procedures of a process are carried out in accordance 
with an internal standard. 
 
The necessity of a procedural account of the practice of freedom 
There are a number of reasons to think the practice of freedom should be 
conceptualised as a procedural, rather than a substantive account of freedom. First 
of all, even if he wanted to, Foucault could not coherently ground a substantive 
account of freedom with his explicitly nominalist, descriptivist and historicist 
approach. (McCarthy 1994, 272) This is clearest in the various accusations made 
against Foucault of “crypto-normativity”, i.e., the claim that his work makes use of 
normative standards which his approach cannot justify or support.18 However, 
Foucault’s response to such accusations makes it clear that he does not want to give 
such accounts.19 Throughout his work Foucault rejects calls for him to establish or to 
defend normative standards which could be applied to others. In an interview with 
Stephen Riggins, Foucault rejects a ‘call for prophetism’, arguing that ‘people have to 
build their own ethics, taking as a point of departure the historical analysis, 
sociological analysis, and so on that one can provide for them.’ (MF 133) Foucault 
regards it as inappropriate for intellectuals to give moral prescriptions; instead they 
should position their research as a starting point for individuals doing their own 
ethical work. This rejection is not limited solely to ethics: in the introduction to the 
Use of Pleasure, Foucault goes so far as to argue that ‘[t]here is always something 
ludicrous in philosophical discourse when it tries, from the outside, to dictate to 
 
18 Cf. Habermas (1994), Fraser (1994), Taylor (1984). 




others, to tell them where their truth is and how to find it.’ (UP 9) However, while 
Foucault does seem to reject external standards, this does not imply the rejection of 
all normative standards. Foucault engages in a number of critical and analytical 
practices within his work, and these aim to meet standards of internal consistency 
and rigour.20 These considerations suggest that while Foucault does not have, or 
want, a substantive account of the practice of freedom, he does have room for a 
procedural one. 
 Third, Foucault’s account of ethics suggests a procedural, rather than a 
substantive account. For Foucault ethics has four aspects: the “determination of the 
ethical substance”, the definition of the part of the individual which will be the 
material to be worked upon, e.g., feelings, intentions, desires; the “mode of 
subjection,” the way the individual relates herself to the code and understands 
herself as obliged to follow it; the “ethical work”, the practices the individual 
undertakes to bring her actions into line with the code, and to cultivate the relevant 
mode of subjection; and the “telos”, the mode of being that the individual aims to 
attain in and through acting morally. These aspects are capable of generating 
internal standards against which we can measure someone’s ethical self-relations - 
they may be failing to relate to their ethical substance properly, their mode of 
subjection may be underdeveloped, their ethical work may be unsuccessful and they 
 
20 An interesting discussion of the role of norms in non-substantive accounts can be found in Freyenhagen 
(2017). Freyenhagen argues that the strongest form of what he calls “content-neutral” accounts of autonomy 
(a broad category which covers all non-substantive accounts, including procedural ones), which claim to 
contain no normative content, is unworkable:  
None of the supposedly content neutral accounts of autonomy could avoid invoking some normative 
content in characterising the competencies or procedures it requires. Thus, Dworkin lists the ability for 
critical reflection and procedural independence as his supposedly content-neutral conditions on autonomy. 
Neither can be captured in norm-free ways. For example, procedural independence excludes influences 
such as manipulation or coercive persuasion, and these, I take it, are ineliminably normative notions. 
Critical reflection is an ability, which, qua ability, has an in-built standard that one can fall short of, or even 
fail to meet entirely; and to make the possession of this ability a condition of autonomy, is to endorse the 
(contestable) judgement that this norm should be authoritative in a certain context.’ (Freyenhagen: 119) 
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may not be approaching their telos – but these standards cannot be wielded 
externally: for example, a Roman Stoic could not be criticised, in a way they would 
find intelligible, by accusing them of failing to establish a confessional relationship to 
themselves although, if they were transported through time and became a Catholic, 
one could accuse them of acting immorally by failing to attend confession. In other 
words, an ethics only provides internally motivating reasons for doing certain things, 
not externally motivating ones. 21 Foucault’s ethics, therefore, lends itself to 
procedural rather than substantive accounts. We should therefore expect that 
practices of freedom will be best understood as a procedural account. 
 
Introducing our constitutivist approach 
Accepting that we need a procedural account of the practice of freedom, we next 
need to determine what this procedural account will look like. As we discussed 
above, we can understand ethics in terms of certain practices (the ethical work) 
which establish certain relations to oneself (determination of ethical substance), 
certain relations between oneself and moral codes (mode of subjection), and which 
aim at a certain mode of being (the ethical telos). Given that we are talking about 
freedom as a practice, and hence about activities, it seems that we can most 
productively talk about these aspects in terms of the aim of the practice or activity: 
we are talking about practices which aim to constitute certain relationships and 
ourselves in a certain state. What we are looking for, then, is a procedural account 
which takes aims as the source of internal standards. In producing such an account 
for the practice of freedom, I am going to draw on the constitutivist account of 
 
21 Cf. Williams (1999) 
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agency proposed by Paul Katsafanas in his Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. 
  At the core of Katsafanas’ account is the notion of a constitutive aim. He starts 
from the following principle: 
(Success) If X aims at G, then G is a standard of success for X.  
(Katsafanas 2013, 39) 
In other words, by aiming at certain outcomes, actions generate their own internal 
standards of success. For example, if I aim to throw a ball at a target, this aim 
generates a standard of success for my action, namely, whether or not the ball hits 
the target. Katsafanas goes on to distinguish between aims in general and what he 
calls “constitutive aims”. A constitutive aim is one which is intrinsic to the activity in 
which it is pursued: without having this aim, an agent simply fails to be participating 
in the activity.22 Katsafanas gives the example of playing chess. The constitutive aim 
of chess, he argues, is achieving checkmate: 
If you do not have that aim – if you are just moving pieces, without aiming 
to win – then you are not really playing chess. Thus, the aim of checkmate 
is non-optional for chess players: if you are playing chess, then you have 
the aim. (ibid., 38) 
We should note that this account can meet the criterion of gradation we earlier stated 
as necessary for our account of practices of freedom. What constitutes a practice as 
a practice of a certain kind is that it aims at a certain outcome, not that it achieves it: 
 
22 An interesting feature of the constitutive account is that is that constitutive aims leave room for one to have 
other, non-constitutive, aims in the activities one undertakes. For example, when playing chess, one could 
have the additional aim of playing elegantly. This aim would also provide a standard of success, and hence 
normative criteria; however, these aims are also subject to a regulative principle, namely, the normative 
criteria put forward by the constitutive aim. If non-constitutive aims interfere with the achievement of the 
constitutive aim then this counts as a reason to discount the aim. For example, if one’s attempt to play chess 
elegantly causes one to ignore moves which would either checkmate or have furthered the aim of checkmating 
your opponent, then you are either playing chess badly, or possibly, failing to play chess at all. 
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it is the fact that I aim at checkmating my opponent that constitutes my activity as 
playing chess, not that I achieve checkmate. For Katsafanas this aim gives me 
instrumental reasons to take a number of other actions and, insofar as the actions 
are taken with the constitutive aim in sight, they also count as part of the activity. For 
example, in playing chess I may take my opponent’s pawn: this is not checkmating, 
but it contributes towards achieving the aim and therefore counts as part of the 
activity of chess.23 However, all of these actions aim at checkmating the opponent, 
which gives all of them a standard of success, and so, insofar as they contribute 
more or less towards achieving this final aim, they can be rated as better or worse 
actions. This is where the gradation comes in: as long as the constitutive aim is one 
which can be more or less successfully approached, rather than being something 
which is either successfully achieved or failed, this leaves room for gradations of 
success. 
  Given that the account of freedom we are looking at is characterised as the 
“practice” of freedom, constitutivism seems to provide a useful model for 
understanding practices of freedom. Practices of freedom would all share a 
constitutive aim and therefore a standard of success. As this aim could be met with 
more or less success, this would meet our criterion of gradation; as the practice of 
freedom would be engaging with our field of possibilities with a certain aim in view, 
we can see why ontological freedom would be a necessary condition for the practice 
of freedom; finally, depending on the aim of practices of freedom, we can see how 
they could have ethical content. A constitutive account, then, would meet our three 
 
23 That the aim is the important part of the action can be shown by examples like the following. Imagine 
playing an opponent whose only move (after getting to a certain point in the game) is to move their queen 
around the board in a square. They will take any piece which gets in the way of this square path, but otherwise 
will only repeat the same four moves. Now imagine they take one of your pawns which you have moved into 




  The account we will produce could be described as follows: practices of 
freedom have a distinctive structure with a shared constitutive aim, and this 
constitutive aim will allow us to derive normative criteria by which we can evaluate 
the freedom of such practices. 
 
Constitutive aims as necessary and sufficient conditions 
As we have suggested above, holding a constitutive aim is a necessary condition of 
an activity being of a certain type. Katsafanas’ defines a constitutive aim as follows: 
(Constitutive Aim) Let A be a type of attitude or event. Let G be a goal. A 
constitutively aims at G iff. 
  i) each token of A aims at G, and 
  ii) aiming at G is part of what constitutes an attitude or event as a token of A 
(Katsafanas 2013, 39) 
For an activity to be of type A, then, the constitutive aim necessarily must be present. 
However, it is an open question as to whether a constitutive aim is also a sufficient 
condition of an activity being of type A. In his account, Katsafanas only explicitly 
holds the weaker claim, that holding the aim is “part” of what constitutes the activity 
as an activity of type A. It is still possible that there must be some other criterion for 
an activity to be an activity of the relevant type. We could, however, make a stronger 
version of the claim: A constitutively aims at G iff. aiming at G is what constitutes an 
attitude or event as an instance of A. If this claim is true, then constitutive aims are 
necessary and sufficient conditions. 
 The relevant question seems to be how much we are willing to build into the 
constitutive aim. For instance, one could argue that the aim of “achieving checkmate” 
50 
 
only means aiming to bring about the situation where one’s opponent cannot move 
their king out of check. Now imagine that I simply rearranged the board such that you 
were checkmated. This action would satisfy the aim but could not count as an 
instance of playing chess. Therefore, holding the constitutive aim cannot be a 
sufficient condition for playing chess: in order to count as playing chess, one must 
also be playing according to the rules of chess, one must move their knights 
correctly and so on. However, this line of argument seems intuitively flawed: rather 
than arguing that I was aiming at checkmate, but going about it incorrectly, it seems 
more accurate to say that I was not really aiming at achieving checkmate. To aim at 
checkmating your opponent, I would argue, you must be aiming at doing so while 
playing according to the rules of chess, otherwise it is unclear why we should say 
you are aiming at achieving checkmate, rather than giving some other definition of 
your aim. If I act on my aim of achieving checkmate by simply rearranging the pieces 
on the board, you could not only deny that I am playing chess: you could also deny 
that I achieved checkmate.24 In other words, it seems more accurate to maintain that 
the proviso of “playing by the rules of chess” should be understood as built into the 
constitutive aim of chess. Applying this line of argument to all constitutive aims, then, 
we should maintain that holding a constitutive aim is both a necessary and a 
sufficient condition of engaging in an activity. In the following chapters, we will use 
 
24 Imagine that I have set up the board so as to illustrate a particular instance of checkmate. If we take holding 
a constitutive aim to be a sufficient condition for an activity, in setting up the board I was not aiming at 
achieving checkmate and so was not playing chess. On our other account, where checkmating an opponent 
has the minimal content of “having the board arranged such that the king has no legal moves out of check”, in 
arranging the board to illustrate checkmate I was aiming at achieving checkmate, but I lacked necessary 
conditions such as “moving pieces according to the rules of chess” and so was not playing chess. My intuition is 
that the latter usage of “achieving checkmate” does violence to the language: it doesn’t carry the meaning that 
“achieving checkmate” usually would. 
51 
 
this interpretation: holding the constitutive aim of the practice of freedom should be 
both a necessary and a sufficient condition for practicing freedom.25 
 
Holding constitutive aims 
We have specified that holding a constitutive aim is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for engaging in an activity, but it remains unclear what it means to “hold” an 
aim. For our purposes, there are two main questions: 1) how does the agent need to 
understand the constitutive aim?; 2) does the agent need to be reflectively aware 
that they are holding the constitutive aim? The first question can be answered 
relatively quickly. It is clearly not the case that there is one correct formulation of the 
constitutive aim that any given agent must hold in order to count as engaging in an 
activity. For instance, in the chess example, we could imagine a longer formulation of 
the constitutive aim as “to achieve checkmate and, failing that, to achieve stalemate.” 
We can imagine an individual who, if asked to explain the constitutive aim of chess, 
would only say: “to achieve checkmate”. Nevertheless, this individual would still be 
playing chess, as if we were to suggest that they were holding the longer version of 
the aim, they would also be able to recognise this aim as their own. Although the 
 
25 At this point, we might be harbouring some concerns about the usefulness of chess as an analogy for the 
practice of freedom. Chess is an activity which is explicitly characterised by a set of clear rules: how to set up 
the board, how to move the pieces, how the game ends, etc. How far is this situation comparable to the 
practice of freedom? It is very possible that practitioners of freedom are never in a situation of this sort, i.e., 
with a clear aim and clear rules. 
  This objection would be correct if chess were to be understood as a 1:1 analogy for the practice of 
freedom, but we have not been using it in this way. Rather, we have been using chess as an example through 
which to illustrate the properties of constitutive aims: namely that they provide standards of success and 
constitute an activity as an activity of a certain kind. Chess is the example Katsafanas uses, and it is a useful 
example because it gives us particularly clear aims and rules. However, there are any number of examples we 
could choose with less clear aims and rules; for instance, “wooing” someone is an activity that we could 
characterise in terms of a constitutive aim; e.g., to get someone to enter a romantic relationship with you, or 
to fall in love with you, etc. Similarly, “wooing” has certain rules; for instance, the rules around dating in a 
given culture. However, these aims and rules will vary from person to person and are almost never clearly 
stated. Nevertheless, we can still distinguish between “wooing” and other activities on the basis of these aims 
and the rules they imply. (I am indebted to Matt Burch for this example) 
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formulations are different, they are still describing the same activity. 
 This consideration is important as, if individuals had to hold one specific 
formulation, then arguably practices of freedom would only have become possible 
after Foucault formulated the concept: before then, it would have been extremely 
unlikely that anyone would have held the constitutive aim of the practice of freedom. 
Instead, it seems reasonable to argue that an individual holds the constitutive aim of 
an activity if and only if they could be brought to recognise their activity as being in 
line with that constitutive aim. In our chess example above, the chess-player could 
be brought to recognise their chess-playing activity under the longer description of 
the constitutive aim.26 
  Our second question, whether the constitutive aim must be held reflectively, is 
somewhat more involved. Our main example, chess, seems to involve an aim we are 
reflectively aware of holding: when we are evaluating or making a move, we do so 
while keeping in mind the extent to which this move furthers our aim of checkmating 
an opponent. Now, this seems acceptable in the case of chess, but is this the case 
more generally?  
 Katsafanas does not explicitly say whether constitutive aims must be held 
consciously, but we can deduce his position from his broader project. Katsafanas’ 
aim is to argue that action itself has a constitutive aim; regardless of his success in 
doing so, his project implies that he does not understand the holding of constitutive 
aims to be necessarily conscious. If constitutive aims were to be held reflectively, 
then this would interfere with our ability to hold constitutive aims in a variety of 
situations. If Katsafanas wants to argue that action itself has a constitutive aim, this 
 
26 This heuristic has a further implication for our account: if, having determined our constitutive aim of the 
practice of freedom, there are practitioners of freedom who could not recognise their activity as involving the 
holding of our constitutive aim, then our account of the constitutive aim should be rejected. 
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would lead a bizarre doubling effect where every action we take would require we 
reflectively hold two constitutive aims: the constitutive aim of the activity we were 
engaged in and the constitutive aim of action itself. Not only does Katsafanas not 
argue that this happens, this doubling is also experientially inaccurate: when we 
engage in an action, for instance, making a cup of tea, we do not experience 
ourselves as both aiming to act and aiming to make a cup of tea. The constitutive 
aim, then, need not be held consciously. 
  We should note, however, that constitutive aims must be held in such a way 
that they can be brought to consciousness. If we believed we were playing chess 
with someone but, on asking them their aim in engaging in the game, they were 
unable to become conscious of their constitutive aim then we would believe that they 
had not really been playing chess, they had just appeared to be playing it. Such a 
way of holding aims is suggested by the work of Peter Poellner. In a 2015 paper, 
Poellner draws on the phenomenological notion of implicit conscious contents to 
suggest the possibility of having unarticulated conscious attitudes. He notes that we 
can have a conscious attitude towards some content of our experience, without 
being able to articulate what that attitude is. For instance, ‘a person might… be 
undergoing an occurrent emotion towards some object without, at the time, having a 
conceptual grasp of her emotion.’ (Poellner 2015, 204) In the same way, someone 
could be consciously holding an aim without having a conceptual representation of 
that aim. We can understand the holding of constitutive aims as pre-reflective: an 
individual might not be reflectively aware of holding a certain aim, but, with reflection, 





An aside on the reflectivity of practices of freedom 
Given our claim above, that to be holding a constitutive aim requires only that we are  
pre-reflectively aware that we are operating in accordance with a constitutive aim, we 
can briefly turn to an aspect of our point of departure quote that might raise some 
concerns. In EPF, Foucault asks the interviewer the following question: ‘what is 
ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the reflective practice of freedom?’ (EPF 284, 
translation modified) He goes on to explain that ‘[f]reedom is the ontological 
condition of ethics. But ethics is the reflective form that freedom takes.’ (DE IV: 712, 
my translation)27 In other words, Foucault identifies the reflective form of the practice 
of freedom with ethics. Now, the apposition in the first quote is ambiguous: it is 
unclear what “the practice of freedom, the reflective practice of freedom” is supposed 
to imply. One possibility is that Foucault is trying to highlight a subset of practices of 
freedom, namely “reflective practices of freedom”, and claiming that ethics is this 
specific subset rather than all practices of freedom. A second possibility is that 
Foucault is intending to clarify something about practices of freedom, namely that 
they are reflective. In the former case, only some practices of freedom are reflective, 
and these reflective practices are ethics; in the second case, all practices of freedom 
of reflective. This latter case would raise a further possibility: perhaps all practices of 
freedom are reflective because reflection is (part of) the constitutive aim? 
 
Clarifying the apposition 
The first interpretation, that Foucault is highlighting specifically reflective practices of 
freedom, seems to be the correct one. Compare the repetition of “practice of 
 




freedom” to an example like the following: I tell you that I went for lunch with “John, 
my friend John”. The repetition of “John” here seems to imply that I am narrowing 
down the set of Johns to one specific John: “my friend John”, rather than, say, “my 
brother John”. Contrast this with: “I went for lunch with John, my friend.” In this case, 
the apposition conveys more information about John, namely that he is my friend. 
Given this, Foucault seems to be specifying “reflective practices of freedom”, rather 
than other kinds of practice of freedom. 
  In the context of ethics, this specification makes sense. Following Béatrice 
Han-Pile, Foucault’s investigations involve two types of critical questions: “how 
possible” questions, which search for the ‘epistemically enabling conditions’ of a 
state of affairs, ‘what must be the case for the state of affairs under consideration to 
be intelligible,’ and “whether possible” questions, which look for ‘ethically enabling 
conditions’ – such questions ‘tell us what ought to be the case if we are to live our 
lives in the best possible way.’ (Han-Pile 2016, 85-86) If we understand ethics as a 
self-aware investigation into the conditions of the good life, then it makes sense that 
this investigation will be reflective.  
 The further question is whether we would expect all practices of freedom to be 
reflective. One reason to think they might be appears during a discussion of 
“processes of liberation”. Foucault argues that, while processes of liberation can be 
important for removing situations of domination, they are not in themselves ‘sufficient 
to define the practices of freedom that will still be needed if this people, this society, 
and these individuals are to be able to define admissible and acceptable forms of 
existence or political society.’ (EPF 282-283, italics mine) Here Foucault suggests 
that practices of freedom aim to carry out the activity of “definition.” He makes a 
similar claim later on: ‘Isn’t the problem [of sexuality]… that of defining the practices 
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of freedom by which one could define what is sexual pleasure and erotic, amorous 
and passionate relationships with others?’ (EPF 283, italics mine) Again, practices of 
freedom are what allow us to carry out an activity of definition, both of forms of life 
and of objects of experience such as “sexual pleasure.” 
 Now, we might be inclined to understand definition as an inherently reflective 
process. To define something is to determine its boundaries and set it apart from 
other phenomena, either spatially or conceptually. This activity, however, seems to 
imply a corresponding distancing of oneself from the object; for instance, in defining 
a word we “step back” from its use in a specific sentence. We then use the distance 
gained to get a better vantage point on the object to be defined, and use this point of 
view to distinguish the object from other related objects. For example, take the 
experience of struggling to define a word which we are familiar with, but have not 
explicitly thought about, for example, “grievance”: we might think about how we 
would use it in a sentence, we might think about words that could be used instead, 
e.g., “complaint”, and also how it differs from those words, and possibly things like 
the etymology of the word. We use the distance we get from the word to allow us to 
determine its meaning to the best of our ability. 
 This structure is a reflective structure. If we take the concept of reflection 
literally, such as reflection in a mirror, we see a similar dual movement: the object is 
reflected in the mirror, appearing as an image of the object. In the process the object 
is presented as an object for evaluation or appraisal. Taking reflection in a 
conceptual sense, to reflect upon an object is to constitute it as an object of thought, 
and this object is newly opened to evaluation. The work of practices of freedom, 





Practices of freedom as pre-reflective 
However, our above discussion is too quick to assume that definition implies 
conscious reflection. In the discussion above, we offered the example of defining a 
familiar word which we had not thought about before; given that proviso, there would 
be a clear need to undertake reflective activity in order to give a definition. By 
contrast, take the case of defining a familiar word with a clear meaning; for instance, 
imagine you are asked to define a word like “claustrophobia”: a definition like “a fear 
of enclosed spaces” might come instantly to mind with no experience of reflection. 
Giving a definition, then, does not necessarily involve reflection. However, definition 
also cannot simply exclude reflection. To be able to give a definition implies that one 
would be able to reflect further on that definition; if an individual cannot, then it is 
unclear how they could have given the definition in the first place.. 
 In a similar way, practices of freedom do not seem to need to be reflective; 
instead, a number of the examples Foucault gives seem to be pre-reflective. For 
instance, in the 1981 interview ‘Friendship as a Way of Life’, Foucault indicates two 
examples of the practice of freedom which seem to be pre-reflective. The first, a 
clear example of the definition of “amorous and passionate relationships”, is the case 
of gay men of different ages, who lack a way of relating to each other: 
But two men of noticeably different ages – what code would allow them to 
communicate. They face each other without terms or convenient words, with 
nothing to assure them about the meaning of the movement that carries them 
toward each other. They have to invent, from A to Z, a relationship that is still 
58 
 
formless, which is friendship: that is to say, the sum of everything through which 
they can give each other pleasure. (FWL 136) 
It’s important to note that the terms used here lack strong reflective connotations. 
Foucault talks about them “facing” each other, a “movement” towards one another 
and this language of physical proximity and activity suggests that the definition of 
their relationship is more a matter of interpersonal activity than it is thought. The term 
“invent” seems to imply both reflective activity – in terms of coming up with designs – 
but also implies physical activity, in terms of building and testing one’s invention. 
Although this instance of the practice of freedom implies reflection, it seems to 
suggest pre-reflective activity that sometimes rises to the level of reflection. 
  The second, more extreme, example is that of the strong relationships that 
formed between the men in the trenches of World War I: 
One can wonder how, in these absurd and grotesque wars and infernal 
massacres, the men managed to hold on in spite of everything. Through some 
emotional fabric, no doubt. I don’t mean that it was because they were each 
other’s lovers that they continued to fight; but honour, courage, not losing face, 
sacrifice, leaving the trench with the captain – all that implied a very intense 
emotional tie. (ibid., 139) 
Even more so than in the previous example, the men in the trenches were not 
reflectively creating their relationships which each other; in a number of ways these 
relationships were the result of the poor conditions they lived in, however, Foucault 
still suggests that this was an example of the definition of intense relationships with 
one another. 
 Our suggestion, then, is that Foucault maintains that ethics, as a theoretical 
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investigation into the conditions of the good life, is necessarily reflective; practices of 
freedom in general, however, only need to be pre-reflective. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, then, we have identified a number of criteria for our account as well 
as the shape that the account will take. Our account of the practice of freedom will 
be a procedural one, where the status of a practice as a practice of freedom will be 
determined by whether engaging in the practice implies holding the constitutive aim 
of the practice of freedom. A practitioner of freedom need only be pre-reflectively 
aware that they hold the constitutive aim of the practice of freedom, in other words, 
although they may not be immediately conscious that they hold they aim, they must 
be able to become so. Further, they need not already understand their activity in the 
same terms that we give, but, if our account is correct, they must be able to 
recognise their activity in its terms. 
 Further, our account must meet three criteria: first, there must be gradations 
in freedom which can, to some extent, be distinguished between; second, freedom 
must be related to the power relations and fields of possibility of an individual, not 
free-floating; third, the practice of freedom must have ethical content. 
 With these preliminary considerations out of the way, in the next chapter we 




Chapter 3: The Constitutive Aim(s) of the Practice of 
Freedom 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we argued that Foucault has a procedural account of the 
practice of freedom, best characterised by a constitutivist approach in which a 
practice is defined as a practice of freedom by way of its constitutive aim. The next 
step, then, is to attempt to identify the constitutive aim of the practice of freedom. 
Foucault’s later work presents three strong candidates for this aim. In our point of 
departure interview, ‘The ethics of the concern for the self as a practice of freedom’, 
Foucault provides two. First, he suggests that the practice of freedom plays an 
important role in resisting the occurrence of situations of domination, raising the 
possibility that resistance to domination is the constitutive aim. Second, Foucault 
notes that the care of the self was the form in which the Greeks practiced freedom, 
suggesting that taking care of oneself could be the aim.28 Additionally, in the 1984 
article ‘What is Enlightenment?’, Foucault introduces the notion of the ‘critical 
ontology of ourselves’ as part of a broader philosophical attitude and assigns it a role 
in the practice of freedom. All of these activities, then, are either practices of freedom 
themselves or strongly related to practices of freedom; the question is: can one of 
these furnish us with the constitutive aim of the practice of freedom?  
  In this chapter, we begin by arguing that resistance to domination cannot be 
the constitutive aim of the practice of freedom, as taking it to be leads to circularity 
when we attempt to justify why we should practice freedom. Next, we move to the 
care of the self, but conclude that, while care of the self is valuable, on its own it has 
 
28 The French title of the interview, ‘L’éthique de souci de soi comme pratique de la liberté’, leaves it 
ambiguous as to whether the care of the self is a practice of freedom or the practice of freedom. 
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no way of directing itself properly. Finally, we turn to the critical ontology of 
ourselves, but find that, although it gives us a perspective from which to practice 
freedom, it lacks motive force. We conclude that, while these three activities are 
necessary conditions of the practice of freedom, taken individually none of them can 
be sufficient conditions for the practice of freedom and so none of them can be the 
constitutive aim. However, we also suggest the possibility of holding all three 
conditions jointly; a possibility we return to in the next chapter. 
 
Resistance to Domination 
The importance of resisting domination is indicated in a number of places in 
Foucault’s work, both in EPF and elsewhere. In this section we introduce and define 
domination, note that domination seems to be inhibitory of the practice of freedom, 
and investigate whether resistance to domination is the constitutive aim of the 
practice of freedom. We also ask whether there are cases where an increase in 
domination might be desirable for some individual’s practice of freedom. 
 
What is domination? 
In defining domination, we need to recognise an important distinction between power 
and domination.29 While power is something that is exercised in power relations, 
where it refers to attempts to modify the behaviour of others, domination is not 
exercised. Instead, domination refers to a certain state of power relations, a state in 
which ‘power relations, instead of being mobile, allowing the various parties to adopt 
 
29 For much of his career, Foucault did not distinguish clearly between power and domination and 
sometimes used the two interchangeably. By the time of EPF, however, he had began using the two 
differently and in this chapter we shall make us of this distinction. 
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strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen.’ (EPF 283) As we discussed in 
the second chapter, power relations are usually ‘mobile, reversible, and unstable,’ 
(ibid., 292) but in situations of domination this fluidity is imperilled in two ways. First, 
the individuals involved in the power relations are restricted in the strategies they can 
adopt, not only in their possibility for success but also in their diversity. Power 
relations shape the fields of possible action of individuals and situations of 
domination stop these fields from being reshaped. In other words, if you are in a 
power relation which greatly restricts your possible responses, if that relation 
becomes part of a situation of domination then you will not even be able to modify 
the power relation so as to expand your field of responses. Further, as you can no 
longer modify your field of responses, you are no longer able to uncover new 
possible responses that could allow you to reverse the power relation. This leads to 
the second problem: the existing asymmetry in the exertion of power crystallises. In 
other words, the power relation is no longer reversible. For example, in a patriarchal 
marital relationship, whatever options were open to a wife, ‘they were still in a state 
of domination insofar as these options were ultimately only stratagems that never 
succeeded in reversing the situation.’ (ibid., 292) Although the wife had some 
possible responses, none of these options could succeed in reversing the 
asymmetry in the exertion of power.30 
 Although domination does limit the field of possible actions of an individual, it 
should not be confused with what, in the first chapter, we called relations of violence. 
 
30 This is the result of domination being a situation the parties are within, rather than something that is 
exerted. Imagine a wife who, within their relationship, exerts more power over her husband than he 
does over her. Even in this case, the situation is such that her husband can use external means, 
which she has very little ability to resist, to exert control over her. For example, under the legal 
doctrine of coverture the rights of married women were subsumed by their husbands’; as a result a 
husband had legal ownership over his wife’s property and she would have no legal recourse against 
the exercise of this right. 
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In a relation of violence, the victim is entirely deprived of her field of possible actions. 
In a situation of domination, the field of actions is still in place, but it is now fixed and 
cannot be modified. As Foucault puts it: 
When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power 
relations, immobilising them and preventing any reversibility of movement by 
economic, political, or military means, one is faced with what may be called a 
state of domination. (ibid., 283) 
The field of possible actions and the power relations which maintain and shape this 
field are still present, but the power relations, and hence the field of actions, are no 
longer open to change. Next, in relations of violence the aggressor treats the victim 
as an object and attempts to destroy her. In power relations, and hence in 
domination, ‘“the other”… is recognised and maintained to the very end as a subject 
who acts.’ (SP 340) Domination, then, maintains the subject as a subject. However, 
in doing so domination not only locks down fields of action, but also, and as a 
consequence, locks down the subject of power as a certain kind of subject. Given 
that power relations shape the field of action available to a subject and that certain 
subjectivities have certain actions appropriate to them (e.g., the activity of voting is 
appropriate to the democratic subject), if domination locks down a field of possible 
actions, it also locks in the mindset of a subject faced with this field of actions. This 
leads to a positive feedback loop: a certain subjectivity has actions that are 
appropriate to it, and certain actions reinforce our recognition of ourselves as a 
certain subject. By locking down power relations, domination limits both the field of 
possible actions and the possible relations between ourselves and those actions. 
 As this discussion suggests, situations of domination are problematic for the 
practice of freedom. Practices of freedom are involved in the definition of ways of life 
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and the control of new power relations, and so situations of domination, which 
restrict the strategies and actions which individuals can take by freezing the field of 
power relations, will block the practice of freedom: ‘in [states of domination], it is 
certain that practices of freedom do not exist or exist only unilaterally or are 
extremely constrained and restricted.’31 (EPF 283) There is therefore good reason to 
think that resistance to domination is necessary for the practice of freedom. 
Additionally, Foucault explicitly tells us that practices of freedom play an important 
role in resistance against domination: 
The problem in… practices where power… must inevitably come into play is 
knowing how to avoid the kind of domination effects where a kid is subjected to 
the arbitrary and unnecessary authority of a teacher…. I believe that this problem 
must be framed in terms of rules of law, rational techniques of government and 
ēthos, practices of the self and of freedom. (ibid., 299) 
The practice of freedom appears here as one tool among others in the service of the 
minimisation of domination. As we have suggested, then, the practice of freedom 
plays a role in resisting domination and resistance to domination may well be a 
criterion for the practice of freedom; in fact, some resistance to domination seem to 
be necessary if freedom is to be practiced at all. The question, however, is whether 
resistance to domination is the constitutive aim of practices of freedom. We need to 
ask, then, whether aiming at resisting domination is sufficient for the practice of 
freedom. My concern, however, is that maintaining that practices of freedom 
constitutively aim at resisting domination leads to circularity if we ask why we should 
 
31 This raises a question: why would this be a problem for individuals who are favoured by the 
situation of domination? Could such an individual not aim to produce and maintain situations of 




practice freedom. To bring this out, we look at the possible reasons Foucault could 
give for resisting domination. 
 
Why should domination be resisted? 
Foucault clearly takes domination to be something to be resisted, but why? The 
simplest answer would be that Foucault takes domination to be bad. While Foucault 
does not express this so clearly, a number of passages suggest that he negatively 
values domination. For instance, in one passage Foucault responds to accounts of 
human relationships which rely on Habermasian “ideal speech situations” by noting 
that power relations are not something bad in themselves. Instead: 
The problem [of power relations]… is… to acquire the rules of law, the 
management techniques and also the morality, the ēthos, the practice of the self, 
that will allow us to play these games of power with as little domination as 
possible. (ibid., 298) 
Given that power relations only become problematic when they turn into situations of 
domination, the implication is that domination is bad. The same attitude arises 
implicitly in a criticism Foucault makes of ancient Greek ethics: 
The Greek ethics of pleasure is linked to a virile society, to dissymmetry, 
exclusion of the other, an obsession with penetration, and a kind of threat of 
being disposed of your own energy, and so on. All that is quite disgusting! (OGE 
258) 
Greek ethics relies on the maintenance of asymmetrical power relations in which 
some individuals are excluded, in other words, situations of domination in which 
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individuals cannot modify the power relations they are within. For Foucault, such 
situations are not only bad; they are intolerable: 
A system of constraints becomes truly intolerable when the individuals who are 
affected by it don’t have the means of modifying it. (SCSA 147-148) 
As a result, Foucault rejects the possibility of salvaging the Greek ethics of pleasure. 
 There is, then, textual justification for considering domination to be bad and 
therefore worth resisting. However, there is a significant problem with the obvious 
answer: we have previously argued that Foucault cannot have a substantive account 
of the practice of freedom and hence of ethics. To argue that domination is bad as 
such, and so should be resisted, is to introduce a substantive normative claim into 
his procedural account, as move which we want to avoid. 
 
A procedural justification for resisting domination 
We are faced with a significant problem here: we are trying to avoid claiming that 
Foucault makes a substantive claim about the ethical value of domination. On the 
other hand, we also cannot argue that Foucault only considers domination to be 
negative in certain situations; from what we have seen, he is always aiming at a 
minimal incidence of domination.32 The question, then, is whether we can give a 
reason within our procedural account why domination always ought to be resisted. 
Fortunately, it seems we can. As we noted before, situations of domination restrict, 
or even block outright, the practice of freedom and so, if we have reason to engage 
in practices of freedom, then we have reason to resist existing situations of 
 
32 Cf. Patton (1998). Patton defines domination in terms of the removal of effective resistance, but 
argues this is a non-normative concept. Domination, for Patton, is only negative when it is used for 
negative purposes. (Patton 1998, 68) However, Patton misses what we have argued above: namely 
that Foucault considers any situation in which individuals lack effective resistance to be “intolerable”. 
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domination and avoid the formation of new ones. This response, which is motivated 
by considerations internal to our account, would maintain its procedural form and 
explain why Foucault always considered domination to be negative. Support for this 
view can be found in EPF. Foucault draws a distinction between “practices of 
freedom” and “processes of liberation”, where the latter are concerned with 
dismantling fixed power relations and situations of domination: ‘when a colonised 
people attempts to liberate itself from its colonisers, this is indeed a practice of 
liberation in the strict sense.’ (EPF 282) These practices, Foucault says, are 
important for the minimisation of domination and, therefore, for the practice of 
freedom. 
Thus, I agree with you that liberation is sometimes the political or historical 
condition for a practice of freedom… Liberation paves the way for new power 
relationships, which must be controlled by practices of freedom. (ibid., 283-284) 
As situations of domination can block the practice of freedom, processes of liberation 
can be necessary for the opening up of power relations, and the creation of new 
ones, and therefore necessary for the practice of freedom. As a result, if we are 
committed to practicing freedom, we have reason to engage in processes of 
liberation to remove existing situations of domination, and to structure our practices 
so as to minimise future instances of domination. 
 This notion of domination as negative because it blocks the practice of 
freedom seems to be more in keeping with our account.33 However, we should note 
that this approach leads to problems of circularity if we want to argue that the 
 
33 One worry we may have about this account is that it seems to lose some of the normative weight 
that Foucault places on resistance to domination. As we saw, the Greek ethics was “disgusting” and 
situations of domination are “intolerable.” Our reasons to resist domination, then, might look stronger 




constitutive aim of the practice of freedom is the minimisation of domination. We 
might grant the following: 
1. We have reason to resist domination because i) it blocks the practice of 
freedom and ii) we are committed to practicing freedom. 
But why are we committed to practicing freedom? If we grant that the constitutive 
aim is resisting domination, and assume that we are committed to the practice of 
freedom, then this follows: 
2. Being committed to the practice of freedom means being committed to aiming 
to resist domination. 
If we substitute 2) back into 1), we get: 
1*. We have reason to resist domination because i) it blocks the aim of resisting 
domination and ii) we are committed to the aim of resisting domination. 
This circular justification returns us to our original question: why should we seek to 
resist domination? Either we assert that domination is substantively bad, in which 
case we have rejected the possibility of producing a procedural account, or we argue 
that we should resist domination because practicing freedom gives us reason to, in 
which case we fall back into circularity. 
  This analysis suggests that resistance to domination alone cannot be the 
constitutive aim of the practice of freedom. It seems likely that, while practices of 
freedom do involve resistance to domination, there should be some other aims of the 
practice of freedom that would explain why we might be committed to it. The idea 
that aiming to resist domination cannot be a sufficient condition for the practice of 
freedom has already been confirmed by a concept we saw earlier, that of “processes 
of liberation”. These processes aim at dismantling situations of domination, but 
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Foucault notes that they are not instances of the practice of freedom, as processes 
of liberation ‘do not seem… to be capable by themselves of defining all the practical 
forms of freedom.’ (ibid., 283) Practices of freedom are necessary because 
processes of liberation are unable to help us define forms of life; in other words, 
aiming at resisting domination is not sufficient for the practice of freedom. 
 
An aside on the maximisation of domination 
In this section, we proceeded under the assumption that domination obstructs the 
practice of freedom. However, Foucault’s work seems to leave open the possibility of 
a form of domination that still allows the individual with more ability to exert power 
(from here referred to as the “dominant individual” opposed to the “subordinate”)34 to 
practice freedom. This would mean that, on our procedural account, the domination 
would not be blocking their practice of freedom and so they would have no reason to 
resist domination. Aiming to resisting domination, then, would not only be insufficient 
for the practice of freedom: it would also be unnecessary. 
  We earlier noted that Foucault identifies three possibilities for practices of 
freedom in situations of domination: they either ‘do not exist or exist only unilaterally 
or are extremely constrained and restricted.’ (ibid., 283) In looking at cases where a 
dominant individual might have no interest in resisting domination, we can disregard 
the first case, where there are no practices at all, and the third cases, where 
practices of freedom are restricted. We are specifically interested in cases where 
 
34 I am using this language for the sake of clarity, as it is otherwise hard to refer to the individual 
favoured or disfavoured by the situation of domination. However, we should not fall into the trap of 
thinking that the “dominant” individual is dominant because they produced the situation of domination 
or because they are dominating the other individual. Rather, as we have discussed above, situations 
of domination exist on a broader level, and one individual is left in a more favourable position because 
the power relations have become fixed. 
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practices of freedom exist only unilaterally, i.e., where the dominant individual can 
practice freedom, but the subordinate cannot. However, there are two possible ways 
in which we can understand the unilateral practice of freedom:  
1) The practice of freedom of the subordinate is totally blocked, while the 
dominant’s ability to practice freedom is unrestricted. 
2) The practice of freedom of the subordinate is totally blocked, while the 
dominant’s ability to practice freedom is only somewhat restricted. 
In both of these possibilities, freedom is being practiced unilaterally as only the 
individual in the dominant position is able to practice freedom. However, the 
dominant individual in the second case still has restrictions on their ability to practice 
freedom and so, if they were committed to practicing freedom, they would have 
reason to resist domination. By contrast, the dominant individual in the first case, 
who is able to practice freedom without restriction, at least has no reason to resist 
domination. 
  One possible response to this would be to simply bite the bullet: a 
commitment to practicing freedom might give us reason to bring about certain 
situations of domination. We might then be able to offer some pragmatic arguments 
against bringing them about at all: for example, as such situations of domination only 
make up a subset of possible situations of domination, we have reason to avoid the 
establishing of situations of domination as we run the risk of ending up in restrictive 
situations of domination. However, the main problem with this line of response is that 
it is clearly not Foucault’s: in his discussions of domination, he doesn’t give thought 
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to the possibility of embracing certain forms of domination.35 As we saw earlier the 
problem is ‘to play [the] games of power with as little domination as possible.’ (ibid., 
298) Our response, then, must line up with Foucault’s rejection of all domination. 
  Returning to the distinction between unrestricted and restricted unilateral 
freedom, another line of response would be to deny that there are any cases of 
unrestricted unilateral freedom: there are only cases of restricted unilateral freedom. 
To argue for this, we need to look more closely at power relations and how they 
structure fields of action. 
  We noted in the second chapter that power relations involve the modification 
of the field of possible actions of the person over whom power is exercised: 
The exercise of power is a “conduct of conducts” and a management of 
possibilities…. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action 
of others. (SP 341) 
Foucault also draws a distinction between power relations and what he calls 
“relations of confrontation”. In the latter, ‘instead of manipulating and inducing 
actions in a calculated manner, one must be content with reacting to them after the 
event.’ (ibid., 347) In such situations, the two adversaries are merely trading actions 
 
35 To forestall any objections stemming from Foucault’s positive discussions of S&M, we should note 
that, it is always described in terms which make clear that it is not an instance of domination. For 
example:  
the S&M game is… always fluid. Of course, there are roles, but everybody knows very well that 
those roles can be reversed. Sometimes the scene begins with the master and slave, and at the 
end the slave has become the master. (SPPI 169) 
Or: 
What interests the practitioners of S&M is that the relationship is at the same time regulated and 
open. It resembles a chess game in the sense that one can win and the other lose..... This mixture 
of rules and openness has the effect of intensifying sexual relations by introducing a perpetual 
novelty, a perpetual tension and a perpetual uncertainty. (SCSA 151-152) 
S&M, then, is not an instance of “positive” domination. If anything, it looks more like a practice of 




and reactions. In power relations, by contrast, ‘stable mechanisms replace the free 
play of antagonistic reactions. Through such mechanisms one can direct, in a fairly 
consistent manner and with reasonable certainty, the conduct of others.’ (ibid., 347) 
As we said earlier, in relations of power we attempt to govern the conduct of others; 
this governing consists of structuring the field of possible actions of others, allowing 
us to direct their behaviour. What is important to note, however, is that the metaphor 
of power relations as “mechanisms” suggests that, in directing the behaviour of 
others, our own behaviour must fit into this mechanism.36 We can illustrate this by 
way of an example. Imagine an employer who wants to reprimand an employee for 
the quality of their work. The employer is looking for a certain response from their 
employee - better quality work - and so they attempt to restructure their employee’s 
field of possibilities accordingly. The employer has a number of options open to them 
for this restructuring: they could hold a disciplinary meeting, write up the employee 
and so on, with the aiming of modifying the employee’s behaviour. This, however, is 
not their full range of possible responses. They could, for instance, threaten the 
employee with physical harm, key the employee’s car, or have associates assault 
the employee on the way home. Now, these courses of action would probably also 
restructure the employee’s field of possibilities, they would be unlikely to lead to the 
employee carrying out better work; they would be more likely to make the employee 
call the police.37 If the employer wants to shape the employee’s conduct in a certain 
way, then, their possible courses of action are limited. In other words, power 
 
36 In order for a mechanism to go into actions, something needs to interact with it in a way determined 
by the structure of the mechanism. This interaction can take a very specific form, for instance, 
unlocking a door using a specific key, or it can be very general, for instance, using any number of 
objects (a hand, a foot, a stick) to press a button. Either way, the mechanism requires a specific 
interaction, which limits the ways in which it can be interacted with. 
37 This example assumes that this employer/employee relation takes place in situations similar to 
modern Western societies with certain kinds of employment law and so on. However, this will extent 
to situations with fewer safeguards for subordinates, although the field of actions of the individual 
exercising power will be less strictly structured. 
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relations not only structure the field of possible actions of the employee, but also of 
the employer.38 
  This observation, that power relations structure the field of possible actions of 
both participants in the relations, allows us to understand why situations of 
domination restrict the practice of freedom for both the subordinate and the dominant 
individuals. As we have noted before, situations of domination are not features of 
individual power relations and individuals do not bring about situations of domination 
on their own. Rather, domination is ‘the domination of a group, a caste, or a class’ 
which manifests ‘at the level of the whole social body, the locking-together of power 
relations.’ (SP 348)39 Given what we argued above, when relations of power are 
immobilised in situations of domination, this limits the practices of both the subject of 
power – whose field of action is being shaped by the dominant individual - and the 
individual exercising power – whose field of possible actions is being shaped by their 
 
38 One could question whether the employer is truly being restricted, as it is possible they would have 
no interest in these courses of action in any case. Here we’ve used clearly negative examples, but we 
should note that power relations can also restrict more desirable relationships and courses of action. 
For example, power relations can limit the possibility of genuine friendships or consensual romantic 
relationships between dominant and subordinate individuals. For an example from Foucault’s own 
work, parrhesia, frankness in speech, requires a relationship of trust between a superior and a 
subordinate which can be rendered impossible through certain power relations: the recipient of 
parrhesia must be willing to ‘recognise that they have to listen to this person who takes the risk of 
telling them the truth.’ (HS 12) Failure to do this is to the detriment of the recipient. 
39 At a higher level of abstraction, we can take Foucault’s discussion from The Will to Knowledge: 
 
Power relations are both intentional and nonsubjective. If in fact they are intelligible, this is… 
because they are imbued, through and through, with calculation: there is no power that is 
exercised without a series of aims and objectives. But this does not mean that it results from the 
choice or decision of an individual subject;… the rationality of power is characterised by tactics that 
are often quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed… tactics which, becoming 
connected to one another, attracting and propagating one another, but finding their base of support 
and their condition elsewhere, end by forming comprehensive systems. (Foucault 1998, 95) 
 
The suggestion here is that systems of power, and hence also systems of domination, have their 
intelligibility, but this stems from the interlocking of a series of power relations which are locally 
intelligible. In such an account, the strategies which produces such situations take their impetus, not 
necessarily from individuals, groups, or classes, but from the ways in which power traverses social 
relations – or rather, these individuals, groups, or classes draw their inspiration and practices from 
these interlocking power relations. 
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attempt to shape the field of actions of the subordinate.40 It is important to note that 
the relevant aspect is not that the field of actions of the dominant is restricted; rather, 
it is the fact that, in situations of domination, the ability to modify power relations is 
restricted and, therefore, existing limitations to one’s field of actions cannot be 
changed. 
 
Conclusion: resistance to domination is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition 
As we have seen, taking the minimisation of domination to be the constitutive aim of 
the practice of freedom leads us into a number of difficulties. However, it does seem 
to be a necessary condition of the practice of freedom: without meeting this criterion, 
the practice of freedom would not be able to play the role that Foucault ascribes to it 
in resisting situations of domination. That we have instrumental reasons to resist 
domination has support in Foucault’s work: first, as we saw in the discussion of 
practices of liberation, we have reason to resist domination in order to be able to 
practice freedom. Second, in EPF, Foucault suggests that resistance to domination 
derives from another activity, the care of the self: 
 
40 Examples of this can be found in James C. Scott’s Domination and the Arts of Resistance. One 
such example is George Orwell’s autobiographical short story ‘Shooting an Elephant.’ Orwell, serving 
as a policeman in the British colony of Burma, was called on to kill an elephant that had been 
rampaging through the marketplace. When he found it, however, it had calmed down and was now 
docile. Although Orwell wanted to leave it alone, he felt pressured to shoot it by the watching crowd. 
However, they did not pressure him directly: he was instead motivated by the sense that failing to 
shoot would mean failing to play his role, and that the crowd would laugh at him: 
I perceived in this moment that when the white man turns tyrant it is his own freedom that he 
destroys. He becomes a sort of hollow posing dummy, the conventionalised figure of a sahib. For it 
is a condition of his rule that he shall spend his life in trying to impress the “natives,” and so in 
every crisis he has to do what the “natives” expect of him. (Orwell 1962, Inside the Whale and 
Other Essays, 95-96, cited by Scott 1990, 10-11) 
As Scott summarises it: ‘As he experiences it, Orwell is no more free to be himself, to break 
convention, than a slave would be in the presence of a tyrannical master.’ (Scott 1990, 11) 
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In its critical aspect – and I mean critical in a broad sense – philosophy is that 
which calls into question domination at every level and in every form in which it 
exists, whether political, economic, sexual, institutional, or what have you. To a 
certain extent, this critical function of philosophy derives from the Socratic 
injunction: “Take care of yourself,” in other words, “Make freedom your 
foundation, through the mastery of yourself.” (EPF 301) 
Here, Foucault suggests that the task of the critical aspect of philosophy is the 
questioning of domination. We may, therefore, be tempted to read this as 
confirmation that the constitutive aim of the practice freedom is resistance to 
domination. However, if we look more closely, we can see that the minimisation of 
domination is not being posited as the aim; instead, the necessity to critically 
evaluate situations of domination is being derived from another aim, from “the 
Socratic injunction” to take care of the self. This suggests a new possibility for us, 
which we will explore next; perhaps minimising domination is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition of the practice of freedom because it derives from the true 
constitutive aim: to take care of oneself. 
 
The Care of the Self 
What is the care of the self? 
“The care of the self” translates the Greek “epimeleia heautou’, a term which 
Foucault glosses variously as ‘care of oneself, attending to oneself, being concerned 
about oneself,’ (HS 2_ and, in the form of an injunction, as ‘you must attend to 
yourself, you must not forget yourself, you must take care of yourself.’ (ibid., 5) The 
care of the self, then, takes as its starting point an injunction to see oneself as an 
appropriate object of concern and attention, as something that should be kept in 
76 
 
view. This injunction provides the impetus and guiding principle for the use of a set of 
practices that Foucault refers to variously as ‘arts of existence’ and ‘techniques of 
the self.’ (UP 10-11) These are: 
those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves 
rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in 
their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain 
aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria. (UP 10-11) 
In its most minimal form, then, “caring for oneself” denotes an activity in which one 
takes oneself as an object of concern and, through a variety of practices, attempts to 
transform one’s mode of being in line with this concern. 
 This activity implies certain relationships with knowledge. First, attending to 
oneself, not forgetting oneself, requires some form of self-knowledge; one needs to 
be willing to ask the question, “who am I?” and to take the answer to that question 
seriously. Second, if one is to transform oneself, one needs some knowledge of the 
aim and the method the transformation should take. Third, the transformation of 
one’s mode of being produces new knowledge. For example, in EPF, when talking 
about the Greeks, Foucault equates having taken care of yourself with having a 
certain form of self-knowledge: 
If you have taken care of yourself, that is, if you know ontologically what you are, 
if you know what you are capable of, if you know what it means for you to be a 
citizen of a city… if you know all this you cannot abuse your power over others. 
(EPF 288) 
We should note, however, that the knowledge produced is not theoretical knowledge. 
Having taken care of the self means knowing what you should do, not purely 
intellectually, but in such a way that your behaviour should spontaneously follow 
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from the principles you have taken up. This is illustrated by Epictetus’ example of the 
moneychanger: we must play the role of ‘moneychangers of our own 
representations, of our thoughts, vigilantly testing them, verifying them, their metal, 
weight, effigy.’ (TS 240) This should not be confused with Christian self-deciphering, 
with seeing if one’s representations follow from concupiscence; rather, it is a matter 
of bringing to mind the rules which one needs to evaluate one’s representations: ‘For 
Epictetus, the control of representations means not deciphering but recalling 
principles of acting, and thus seeing, through self-examination, if they govern one’s 
life.’ (ibid., 241) What we see, then, is that the care of the self is a way of 
instantiating a mode of being. This mode of being is not generic: it is not an idea of 
how people in general should be behaving. Rather, it is a mode of being that is 
indexed to a certain individual’s ethical principles. Remember that the care of the self 
takes as its starting point the injunction to take care of oneself; the practices of the 
self are related directly to oneself. 
  As well as paying attention to who you are, the care of the self also takes 
direction from who you aim to be. We see this both in the case of Alcibiades, who 
must care for himself due to his political designs, and with Serenus, one of Seneca’s 
correspondents. Serenus had recently arrived in Rome and was looking for 
philosophical advice in much the same way he was looking for political advice: 
Serenus says: I do not really know what philosophy to attach myself to, I feel ill at 
ease with myself, I do not know if I am sufficiently or insufficiently Stoic, what I 
should or should not learn, etcetera. And all these questions are of exactly the 
same type as requests for help: Whom should I approach in court, should I apply 
for this post or others? (HS 115) 
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The care Seneca offers to him is mediated by the situation within which Serenus 
must take care of himself. Seneca’s advice is directed at someone insofar as they 
want to take up political office. 
  The care of the self, then, starts from self-knowledge and an awareness of the 
self, proceeds according to one’s sense of who one should be - with an attitude of 
concern for oneself - and concludes by producing another form of knowledge, not 
theoretical knowledge of what one is, but practical knowledge that spontaneously 
directs a form of life. 
  All three of these forms of knowledge imply relations with others. First, many 
accounts of the care of the self maintain that the presence of a master, or some 
other guiding figure, is a necessary criterion for starting to engage in the practice. In 
Plato’s Alcibiades, it is only when Socrates talks to Alcibiades that the latter is led to 
look at himself and realise his inadequacies: ‘The gnōthi seauton is called upon… to 
encourage Alcibiades to reflect a little more seriously on what he is, what he is 
capable of doing, and the formidable tasks awaiting him when he will have to govern 
the city.’ (ibid., 52) Socrates then leads Alcibiades to see that transformation is 
necessary and shows him the form it needs to take, instructing Alcibiades on what 
the self is and how to take care of it: ‘the dialogue’s game… consists in leading 
Alcibiades to the precept “take care of yourself” and, by developing what this precept 
must be, what meaning it must be given, we discover that “taking care of oneself” is 
to care about justice.’ (ibid., 72) This knowledge, however, is not simply learned. 
Rather, practices of the self are used to integrate this knowledge into our way of 
being and so bring about self-transformation.  
  This model, in which the master is needed to lead the individual to self-
knowledge and the care of the self, is also made visible in the Stoic care of the self 
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through the figure of the stultus, the individual who has never cared for herself. For 
the stultus, ‘there is a disconnection between the will and the self, a nonconnection, 
a nonbelonging characteristic of stultitia, which is its most manifest effect and 
deepest root.’ (ibid., 133) In other words, the stultus not only does not want to care 
for herself, she is structurally incapable of doing so: ‘the care of the self, 
consequently requires… the other’s presence, insertion, and intervention.’ (ibid., 
134) For the Stoics, this intervention meant teaching the stultus a number of 
fundamental principles and rules of conduct: ‘You must proceed in such a way that 
these principles tell you in each situation and, as it were, spontaneously, how to 
conduct oneself.’ (EPF 286) Again, we see the idea that this knowledge must be 
integrated into one’s way of being: it is not enough to know the principles, rather the 
principles must guide your behaviour. The first two forms of knowledge, then, imply 
relations with the master or the guide and oneself; the first form insofar as we are led 
to ask the question “who am I?”, and the second insofar as we are led to ask the 
question: “who do I want to be and how to I become that person?” 
  The third form of knowledge, the self-knowledge generated by the care of the 
self, produces certain relations with others. As we saw above, it is supposed to help 
us avoid abusive relations: ‘the risk of dominating others and exercising a tyrannical 
power over them arises precisely only when one has not taken care of the self and 
has become the slave of one’s desires.’ (ibid., 288) More positively, it allows us to 
engage in correct or “proper” relationships: ‘He who takes care of himself to the point 
of knowing exactly what duties he has as a master of a household and as a husband 
and father will find that he enjoys a proper relationship with his wife and children.’ 
(ibid., 289) However, while the care of the self implies relations with, and even care 
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for others, we should note that this is not primarily what makes it ethical. Foucault 
says: 
I don’t think that we can say that the Greek who cares for himself must first care 
for others. To my mind, this view only came later. Care for others should not be 
put before the care of oneself. The care of the self is ethically prior in that the 
relationship with oneself is ontologically prior.41 (ibid., 287) 
While the care of the self encourages certain forms of relations with others, this was 
as part of the cultivation of an ēthos, a ‘way of being or behaviour… a mode of being 
for the subject, along with a certain way of acting.’ (ibid., 286) 
 
The care of the self as a necessary condition of the practice of freedom 
There seems to be good reason for taking the care of the self to be a necessary 
condition of the practice of freedom. First, taking the care of the self as the 
constitutive aim would explain the relationship between knowledge and the practice 
of freedom. Foucault talks about the role of knowledge for creating an ethics in his 
interview with Stephen Riggins: ‘People have to build their own ethics, taking as a 
point of departure the historical analysis, sociological analysis, and so on that one 
can provide for them.’ (Foucault 1997, 132) What we need, however, is a 
mechanism by which the theoretical knowledge produced by these analyses can be 
transformed into individualised modes of being. Even if these analyses were to 
highlight previously existing modes of being, for example, the Stoic form of life, 
Foucault rejects the possibility of simply taking them up: ‘you can’t find the solution of 
 
41 This should not be taken as saying that there are no forms of care of the self where care for others 




a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other 
people.’ (OGE 256) Given that they are historically located practices, we cannot 
simply take up Greco-Roman forms of life. Take the example of Alcibiades: 
Foucault’s injunction to us cannot be to attempt to transform ourselves into young 
Greek aristocrats with a view to governing the city-state. Rather, practicing freedom, 
when inspired by historical models, requires a moment of reactivation. The 
possibilities made available to us through historical models and historical analyses 
must be taken up in such a way as to make them meaningful possibilities for us: 
The whole Greek experience can be taken up again in nearly the same way by 
taking into account each time the differences of context and by indicating the part 
of this experience that one can perhaps save and the part that one can on the 
contrary abandon. (RM 470) 
This is what the care of the self allows us to do: to index theoretical principles or 
modes of being to ourselves and so instantiate them in our way of life. 
 Secondly, there does seem to be some alignment between the aims of the 
practice of freedom and the aims of the care of the self. Practices of freedom allow 
us to define ‘admissible and acceptable forms of existence’ and to control power 
relations. (EPF 283-284) The care of the self seems to share this goal. Caring for 
oneself means giving one’s mode of being a certain form, one which makes possible 
certain relations with others, and these relations to self and others are characterised 
in ethical terms: for example, Socrates encourages the Athenians ‘to care for 
themselves and their own virtue.’ (HS 6)  
 This ethical aspect has two sides to it. Negatively, the care of the self seems 
to encourage individuals to avoid abusing their power over others: 
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The risk of dominating others and exercising a tyrannical power over them arises 
precisely only when one has not taken care of the self and has become the slave 
of one’s desires. But if you take proper care of yourself… you cannot abuse your 
power over others. (EPF 288) 
The care of the self, then, seems prima facie capable of meeting the negative 
criterion of the practice of freedom, namely that they must aim to resist situations of 
domination. Positively, the care of the self aims allows for the production of modes of 
being that meet certain aesthetic and ethical criteria. As we saw above: 
A man possessed of a splendid ēthos, who could be admired and put forward as 
an example, was someone who practiced freedom in a certain way…. 
[E]xtensive work by the self on the self is required for this practice of freedom to 
take shape in an ēthos that is good, beautiful, honourable, estimable, 
memorable, and exemplary. (EPF 286) 
This, again, fits with the idea that practices of freedom allow us to define both forms 
of life and relations with others. Furthermore, it also accords with Foucault’s 
suggestion that practices of freedom can involve creative attempts to give one’s way 
of life more intensity or beauty: 
At every instant... [living should be problematised as] trying to give a colouration, 
a form and intensity to something that never says what it is. That’s the art of 
living. (Foucault 1996: 317) 
The care of the self can be deployed in a similar way: 
This kind of ethics was only a problem of personal choice…. The reason for 
making this choice was the will to live a beautiful life, and to leave to others 




Sexual austerity in Greek society was a trend or movement, a philosophical 
movement coming from very cultivated people in order to give to their life much 
more intensity, much more beauty. (OGE 261) 
The care of the self, then, seems to be what allows the practitioner of freedom to use 
their knowledge and principles to instantiate an individualised mode of being, and so 
there is good reason to consider the care of the self to be a necessary condition of 
the practice of freedom. Problems arise, however, when we come to suggest that the 
care of the self might be the constitutive aim of the practice of freedom. 
 
The care of the self as insufficient for the practice of freedom 
Problems in taking the care of the self to be the constitutive aim of the practice of 
freedom can be seen in two cases: first, in the Greco-Roman form of care of the self, 
and second, in the general structure of the care of the self. 
 In the previous section of this chapter we introduced resistance to domination 
as a necessary criterion for the practice of freedom: practicing freedom requires that 
we aim to resist existing situations of domination and avoid the creation of new ones. 
We also noted that the care of the self seems to be directed towards the avoidance 
of abusive relations with others, and suggested that this may equate to the criterion 
of resistance to domination. However, this is not the case. While relations between 
men and women varied among the different Greek philosophical schools, the care of 
the self existed, if not happily, then without direct contradiction, alongside the 
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domination of women, children and slaves.42 Foucault himself comments 
unfavourably on this insofar as it plays out in Greek sexual ethics: 
The Greek ethics of pleasure is linked to a virile society, to dissymmetry, 
exclusion of the other, an obsession with penetration, and a kind of threat of 
being dispossessed of your own energy, and so on. All that is quite disgusting! 
(OGE 258) 
Precisely what duties the master of a household has and what the “proper” 
relationship will consist in, then, will be determined by the principles that the 
individual has internalised and the form of life they have instantiated. This suggests a 
problem for the idea that the Greco-Roman care of the self can be a sufficient 
condition for the practice of freedom. Depending on what form of life one is led to 
instantiate, one’s practice of care of the self could result in conformism as one simply 
takes up the same form of life as everyone around them.43 This could lead to a 
failure to resist, or even to the maintenance of, states of domination that 
 
42 There is a question as to whether this is an indication of a failure to resist domination or a failure to 
aim at resisting domination. In the former case, the individual is simply doing a bad job at practicing 
freedom, in the latter, they fail to practice freedom at all. It seems that there are instances of both 
within the Greco-Roman care of the self. For instance, Marcus Aurelius is known to have regularly 
resolved legal cases involving slaves in favour of the slaves, often leading to their release. In 
comparison, Foucault presents a number of examples of Greek advice to husbands which describe 
the husband’s duty to train his wife correctly; for example, Xenophon’s Oeconomicus argues that 
there is a need ‘for the husband to establish relations with his wife that are for the purpose of training.’ 
(UP 154) The existence of cases of both kinds seems to show that the Greco-Roman care of the self 
does not inherently aim at minimising domination. 
43 One could object that this indicates, not only a failure to practice freedom, but also a failure to care 
for the self. If the care of the self means instantiating a form of life which is indexed to oneself, then an 
individual who simply took up the same mode of life as his peers would be failing to care for 
themselves. However, this won’t be enough to get around our objection. We can imagine an individual 
who instantiates a form of life which is suitably indexed to them (i.e., they are not simply imitating their 
peers), but the principles behind it still lead to them maintaining certain situations of domination. For 
example, Diogenes of Sinope may have taken care of himself, but the fact he owned slaves 
(Diogenes Larties 2018, 285) and his attitudes towards women suggest that he still was comfortable 
with some forms of domination: ‘Seeing women who had been hanged from an olive tree, he said, 
“Would that all trees bore such fruit.” ’ (ibid., 284) 
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contemporary forms of life uncritically accept. In a worst-case scenario, one could 
aim to instantiate forms of life which would lead more instances of domination. 
 
Is there a form of the care of the self sufficient for the practice of freedom? 
The Greco-Roman instantiation of the care of the self cannot be the constitutive aim 
of the practice of freedom, as it does not inherently aim at resistance to domination. 
But is this reason enough to reject the possibility that some form of care of the self 
may provide a sufficient condition for the practice of freedom? After all, given that 
there are a variety of forms of the care of the self, can we not find a form which 
would allow us to limit the care of the self to forms of life which to not allow for 
domination? 
 Remember that, by our definition, the care of the self produces an 
individualised mode of being, in line with the principle that one must attend to 
oneself. Inherently, none of this demands that one avoid domination, although 
specific interpretations of “take care of yourself” may. We could, then, argue in 
favour of a form of the care of the self where, acting under the principle “take care of 
yourself,” one will only aim to instantiate modes of being which resist domination. 
The problem, however, is justifying why we should take up this form of care of the 
self over some other which does not resist domination. If we justify this on the 
grounds that we want a form of care of the self that resists domination, then we are 
appealing to an external criterion (that the care of the self should resist domination) 
and therefore the care of the self is not a sufficient condition. Another possibility 
would be to argue that aiming at taking care of oneself gives us instrumental reason 
to resist domination and therefore gives us an internal criterion by which to prefer 
forms of the care of the self that resist domination. However, we have no reason to 
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believe this to be true. The care of the self does not seem to require us to be able to 
modify the power relations we find ourselves within. We said before that the care of 
the self can allow individuals practical knowledge of the duties they have and we can 
imagine a slave who takes care of himself and therefore comes to know his duties as 
a slave.44 To specify that only certain forms of the care of the self resist domination, 
then, is to imply that the care of the self alone is not a sufficient condition for the 
practice of freedom. 
 
Conclusion: the care of the self as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
The care of the self, then, cannot be the constitutive aim of the practice of freedom. 
However, it does seem accurate to maintain that the care of the self is a necessary 
condition for the practice of freedom. The practice of freedom, as we have said 
before, allows for the definition and instantiation of certain forms of life and, hence, 
relations with oneself and others. These forms of life take as their starting point our 
relationship to knowledge. What we need, then, are practices by which we can use 
this knowledge to bring about transformations in our mode of being – and this is 
exactly what the care of the self does. 
  This role of care of the self, however, indicates to us a problem that cannot be 
addressed within the practice. If the care of the self is to be carried out in such a way 
as to resist domination then we must be able to identify and avoid instantiating forms 
of life which will bring about or fail to resist domination. This suggests the need for 
some sort of critical capacity, identifying forms of life that support domination and 
 
44 In fact, there are famous examples of individuals who took care of themselves while enslaved, e.g., Diogenes 
in Corinth: ‘when captured and put up for sale Diogenes was asked what he was good at. He replied, “Ruling 
over men,” and said to the herald, “Spread the word in case anyone wants to buy him a master.” ‘ (Diogenes 
Laertius 2018, 273) 
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seeing how domination can be undone. In fact, at the end of our section on 
resistance to domination, we noted the importance of a critical aspect to the 
philosophical life. In our final section, we will investigate this critical capacity and 
examine its relationship to the practice of freedom. 
 
The Critical Ontology of Ourselves 
As we saw above, the care of the self seems to require some kind of critical moment 
if it is to be able to instantiate principles in modes of being that will avoid or resist 
domination, but such a function seems to be external to the care of the self as we 
have defined it. Foucault, however, does describe such a function elsewhere in his 
work, specifically in the 1984 essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’ In this essay, he 
presents a critical activity which forms part of a ‘philosophical life’ involving ‘a patient 
labour giving form to our impatience to liberty.’ (WE 319) This activity, which he calls 
“the critical ontology of ourselves”, could well be the constitutive aim of the practice 
of freedom. 
 
What is the critical ontology of ourselves? 
In ‘What is Enlightenment?’ Foucault introduces an activity which he refers to, 
variously, as a ‘permanent critique of our historical being’ (ibid., 312, translated 
modified), a ‘permanent critique of ourselves’ (ibid., 313) and the ‘critical ontology of 
ourselves.’ (ibid., 316) This critique takes as its starting point the claim that our mode 
of being, the way we relate to ourselves when we act, is historically contingent. 
Against humanistic accounts which begin with a conception of human nature, this 
critique attempts to discover ‘[i]n what is given to us as universal, necessary, 
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obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the 
product of arbitrary constraints.’ (ibid., 315) The aim of making clear these 
contingencies is to highlight the possibility of change: ‘it will separate out from the 
contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, 
or thinking what we are, do , or think.’ (ibid., 316) The critique, then, is not a matter of 
evaluating our personal habits or practices, or of discovering what we “truly” are. 
Rather, it is a historical ontology, ‘a historical investigation into the events that have 
led us to constitute ourselves and to recognise ourselves as subjects of what we are 
doing, thinking, saying.’ (ibid., 315) The critique starts from what we are now, our 
historically contingent mode of being, and asks what brought us here in order to see 
how we might be otherwise. 
 Foucault tells us that the critical ontology consists of two aspects. First, there 
is a historico-critical side, which takes the form of ‘a series of historical inquiries that 
are as precise as possible,’ oriented towards what Foucault calls ‘the contemporary 
limits of the necessary,’ those historical phenomena incorrectly considered 
necessary for the constitution of ourselves as free beings. (ibid., 313) These inquires 
help us to gain distance from the present in order to see that what currently appears 
as necessary is merely contingent. As Foucault puts it in The Use of Pleasure: 
[T]he object [is] to learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can 
free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently. (UP 
9) 
Note, therefore, that the critique is neither normative nor purely descriptive: it is not 
aiming to pass judgement or to simply clarify what happened. Rather, the critical 
ontology aims to re-problematise these events and show that other possibilities could 
have played out: ‘it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to 
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the undefined work of freedom.’ (WE 316) 
 Secondly, there is a practical and experimental side. Foucault writes that, ‘if 
we are not to settle for the affirmation or the empty dream of freedom… this 
historico-critical attitude must also be an experimental one.’ (ibid., 315) It is not 
enough for the critique to show the possibility of change; rather, it must also ‘put 
itself to the test of reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and 
desirable, and to determine the precise form this change must take.’ (ibid., 316) An 
experimental approach is required because we cannot derive a program of action 
from the historico-critical inquiries. We cannot get a clear overall view of what our 
historical limits are, how they can be changed, and the results of changing them. As 
Foucault says: 
[W]e have to give up hope of ever acceding to a point of view that could give us 
access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our 
historical limits. (ibid., 316) 
It is not possible, then, to carry out a theoretical critique and use that to produce a 
complete program of action, as there is no perspective from which to determine 
everything that can be changed and all the ways it could be changed. Foucault also 
warns against trying to produce even a modest program of action: ‘the idea of a 
program of proposals is dangerous. As soon as a program is presented, it becomes 
a law, and there’s a prohibition against inventing.’ (FWL 139) Given our limited 
perspective, attempts at transformation will sometimes go wrong, resulting in 
domination, and programs limit the experimentation and inventiveness needed to 
respond to these dangers. This does not, however, mean that transformation must 
take place without direction: 
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Without a program does not mean blindness… being without a program can be 
very useful and very original and creative, if it does not mean without proper 
reflection about what is going on, or without very careful attention to what’s 
possible. (SPPI 173) 
The practical critique, then, must take place locally and experimentally, not through a 
global program. 
 
The permanent critique of ourselves 
Due to the experimental nature of the critique and the lack of a complete overview, 
the critique must be a permanent critique, as in always ongoing: ‘we are always in 
the position of beginning again.’ (WE 317) First, every transformation will create the 
possibility of a new transformation: previously hidden constraints will come into view, 
or new methods of transforming old constraints will be discovered. Secondly, the 
critique must be ongoing because there is always the possibility of domination, either 
through transformations which lead to negative outcomes, or, due to the 
appropriation of our modes of being by institutionalised power: 
We can always be sure… that everything that has been created or acquired, any 
ground that has been gained will, at a certain moment be used [as a means of 
social control]. (SPPI 167) 
Finally, we should note the usage of the term “ourselves”, [nous-mêmes] the first-
person plural, rather than “oneself” [soi-même] or “the self”. Although Foucault does 
not explicitly discuss the important of this move, it becomes apparent from his 
examples of desirable transformations. He says: 
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I prefer the very specific transformations that have proved to be possible in the 
last twenty years in a certain number of areas which concern our ways of being 
and thinking, relations to authority, relations between the sexes, the way in which 
we perceive insanity or illness. (WE 316) 
Transformations, such as relations between the sexes or to authority, cannot be 
purely individual: it cannot be enough for me to transform my being while those 
around me remain the same. As we noted in our earlier discussion of domination, my 
field of actions is shaped by the power relations I am within, and this field of actions 
both constitutes and is constituted by my subjectivity. These power relations, 
however, are enacted by the people around me. Changing my mode of being while 
those around me stay the same will, then, limit how far I can actually change, as my 
behaviour will still need to be able to fit into the “stable mechanisms” of power 
relations.45 In other words, part of what constitutes my historical being is the 
constitution of the historical being of others. The practical transformations Foucault 
prefers require that we locate the contingencies - and hence the possibilities of 
change - not only in my mode of being, but also of those around me. 
 
The critical ontology as a candidate for the constitutive aim 
The critical ontology, then, seems to play an important role in the practice of 
freedom. Insofar as the practice of freedom is concerned with defining new modes of 
being and relationships with others, the critical activity involved in the critical 
 
45 Take the example of trying to turn over a new leaf with someone you have previously clashed with 
before. If only you change your behaviour, and the other person continues to act with hostility, you will 
probably get nowhere: either you need to revert to form, they need to change with you, or you need to 
end the interaction. (This is not to say that such a relationship is impossible: for instance, think of the 
Christian injunction to turn the other cheek. However, the failure of the other person to change still 
limits the possible practices you can take up and the relationships you can have. E.g., I am forced to 
turn the other cheek because of the other person’s behaviour towards me.) 
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ontology has a necessary role to play. Additionally, the critical ontology fills gaps 
which we indicated in our discussion of the care of the self. The practice of freedom 
needs a mechanism by which we can produce principles and models of practical 
identity which can be instantiated in acceptable forms of existence and relations with 
others. It also needs a way of critically evaluating those principles and models in 
order to avoid new situations of domination and to help resist existing ones. The 
critical ontology seems able to fill both of these roles and we seem justified in taking 
it to be a necessary condition of the practice of freedom. 
 The critical ontology of ourselves also looks like a promising candidate for the 
constitutive aim of the practice of freedom. While a purely theoretical account of 
critique would clearly not be a sufficient condition for the practice of freedom, the 
critical ontology also has its practical side which ‘put[s] itself to the test of reality.’ 
(ibid., 316) Additionally, claiming that even the theoretical side of the critical ontology 
only produces knowledge would be reductive, as it also aims at transforming our 
relation to knowledge and our limits by making the present appear strange to us. 
 Second, the critical ontology seems to meet our first necessary condition, 
resisting domination. As we noted, the local and ongoing nature of the critique is 
directed towards defusing the possibility of instantiating situations of domination 
which cannot be resisted. Furthermore, the critical ontology is directed towards, not 
only the constitution of oneself, but the constitution of others’ selves, as 
transformation should be a collective and not merely an individual, task. 
 
The critical ontology as insufficient for the practice of freedom 
On closer inspection, however, there are problems with both of these claims. First, 
while there is a practical side to the critical ontology, what exactly this practical side 
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involves remains undeveloped. Foucault tells us that the critique must also be 
practical and then immediately moves to discussing the kinds of transformations that 
this experimentation must focus on: local and specific, rather than global and 
general. What he leaves out, however, is a discussion of the mechanism that would 
allow us to put the products of the theoretical side of the critique “to the test of 
reality”. This seems to suggest that the critical ontology is insufficient and that there 
needs to be a mechanism for taking up and instantiating the products of the critical 
ontology. My suggestion is that the care of the self, as discussed in the previous 
section, is the practice which fills this role. As we saw, the care of the self allows us 
to instantiate principles as modes of being which are indexed to the individual. What 
this means, however, is that the critical ontology of ourselves is not a sufficient 
condition for the practice of freedom, and so cannot be the constitutive aim.  
 Second, even if we were to grant that the critical ontology inherently contains 
or implies some mechanism of carrying out these transformations, it is by no means 
clear that the critical ontology does actually necessitate resistance to domination. 
While the form of the critical ontology under discussion does aim at resisting 
domination, we need to note that we are faced with a similar problem to the one we 
saw with the care of the self: we are looking at a specific instantiation of the critical 
ontology, not a general one. In ‘What is Enlightenment?’, Foucault is not 
dispassionately describing a specific analytic technique; rather, he is describing an 
activity that forms a part of what he calls a ‘philosophical life’ or a ‘philosophical 
attitude.’ (WE 319) By an attitude, Foucault means: 
a mode of relating to contemporary reality, a voluntary choice made by certain 
people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and 
behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and 
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presents itself as a task. No doubt, a bit like what the Greeks called an ethos. 
(ibid., 309) 
The critical ontology, as Foucault describes it, is not standalone. Instead, it forms 
part of a philosophical attitude which already takes as its task to show how ‘the 
growth of capacities [can] be disconnected from the intensification of power 
relations.’ (ibid., 317, translation modified) This orientation explains why the critical 
ontology Foucault discusses resists domination. 
  The critical ontology itself, however, is merely a ‘historico-practical test of the 
limits we may go beyond,’ (WE 316) and what limits we should go beyond, how we 
should go about this, and what outcomes would be desirable, remain undetermined. 
This means we can imagine instances of the critical ontology which are not directed 
towards resisting domination. Imagine a criminologist who carries out a critical 
ontology of the criminal subject, but uses the information gained to reinforce this 
subjectivity. Against such approaches, the critical ontology arguably gives us reason 
to resist domination as situations of domination will limit the practical side of the 
critique: if we can no longer change our practices, we cannot put the critique to the 
test of reality. However, this assumes that critical ontologies must be ongoing. Once 
we move away from Foucault’s form of the practical critique, however, this is no 
longer an obvious assumption: some critiques could have a definitive endpoint.  
  We can derive such an example from one of Foucault’s definitions of 
domination: ‘I would consider domination to be any kind of power relation which, 
regarding its goals and values, can be judged from a rational point of view as 
efficient.’ (Foucault 1996, 417) Here Foucault suggests that power relations which, in 
their exercise, subordinate all other values to efficiency should be considered to be 
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dominatory.46 Imagine a deployment of the critical ontology of ourselves which seeks 
to change the constitution of ourselves in the direction of maximal efficiency in 
certain tasks. Now, it may be argued that such a critique has reason to resist 
domination regardless, as domination would block the critical ontology at a certain 
point. However, for such a critique this is a feature, not a bug: this critique does not 
aim to be permanent. Instead, it aims at a specific endpoint, maximal efficiency, and 
maximal efficiency may well require the removal of the activity of critical reflection.47  
  Given these considerations, then, the critical ontology of ourselves is a 
necessary condition for the practice of freedom, but not a sufficient one. 
 
Conclusion 
Over the course of this chapter, then, we have identified three necessary conditions 
for the practice of freedom: resistance to domination, the care of the self and the 
critical ontology of ourselves. While each criterion is necessary, we can see that, 
individually, they are insufficient. Resistance to domination on its own is without 
content or motivation. The care of the self can lead to the uncritical instantiation of 
modes of life and hence to rank conformism. The critical ontology lacks a 
 
46 This seems to be a different definition of domination from the one we discussed earlier, but we can see 
continuities between the two. For instance, a relationship which is maximally efficient cannot be modified by 
the participants, as any modification will make the exercise of power less efficient. This results in the freezing 
of the power relation by whichever group or institution is enforcing the importance of efficiency. 
47 A science fiction example of this is provided by Nick Bostrom’s work on artificial intelligence. Bostrom asks 
us to imagine a potential future where mass-produced artificial intelligences make up the vast majority, or all, 
of the population. These AIs, however, have been produced purely for efficiency in their assigned tasks and so 
are not conscious or recognisably human. Rather, they take the form of distinct mental modules collected 
together in the most efficient arrays: ‘The bouillon cubes of discrete human-like intellects thus melt into an 
algorithmic soup.’ (Bostrom 2014, 211) Such AIs would have no need for, or even the capabilities to carry out, 
the activities that, for Foucault, make life worth living: ‘to create, with oneself and others, individualities, 
beings, relations, unnameable qualities.’ (Foucault 1996, 317) As Bostrom puts it, ‘It would be a society of 
economic miracles and technological awesomeness, with nobody there to benefit. A Disneyland without 
children.’ (Bostrom 2014, 212) We could imagine a similar, albeit (probably) less extreme, approach being 
taken to the constitution of human beings. 
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mechanism for enacting the insights it generates, and could therefore lead to a form 
of despair, where one can identify the possibility of change while being unable to 
enact it. Alternatively, it can be turned to nefarious ends. 
  There is, however, an alternative approach to the problem which has been 
hinted at above. In our discussion of the necessary conditions, we have suggested 
that the aims might be able to play a role in covering over their individual 
shortcomings. This suggests the possibility of taking all three aims together as 
forming one jointly sufficient constitutive aim. In the next chapter, we will investigate 




Chapter 4: The Creation of Cultural Forms 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we looked at three possible candidates for the constitutive 
aim of the practice of freedom: resistance to domination, the care of the self, and the 
critical ontology of ourselves. Ultimately, however, we concluded that none of them 
could be sufficient conditions. However, we also argued that there is good reason to 
think these aims are necessary conditions for the practice of freedom and, further, 
suggested the possibility that these conditions could, jointly, form the constitutive 
aim. In this chapter, we will investigate the possibility that the constitutive aim of the 
practice of freedom comprises the three necessary aims taken together. We will first 
argue that, jointly, these necessary aims can meet the objections they face 
individually. Next, with the constitutive aim in view, we will discuss what it means to 
engage in the practice of freedom. We will argue that engaging in the practice of 
freedom means holding all three constitutive aims and, further, that we can 
distinguish between different gradations of freedom by looking at success in 
achieving the constitutive aims. Finally, we will investigate the possibility that 
successfully achieving all three aims together can lead to a result that is more than 
the sum of its parts: the creation of new cultural forms. 
 
The constitutive aim of the practice of freedom 
Summarising our necessary, but not sufficient, aims 
In the previous chapter, we identified three necessary conditions for the practice of 
freedom. The first was that practices of freedom must resist, or at least avoid, 
domination. Foucault claims that resistance to domination is a matter, at least in part, 
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of the practice of freedom; for instance: ‘I believe this problem [of abuses of power] 
must be framed in terms of rules of law, rational techniques of government and 
ēthos, practices of the self and of freedom.’ (EPF 299) However, resistance to 
domination alone cannot be sufficient for an activity to count as a practice of 
freedom. First, practices of freedom aim at transformations in our mode of being, 
while practices of resistance do not necessarily do this. For instance, Foucault gives 
suicide as a possible example of resistance (EPF 292), but not all cases of suicide 
count as practices of freedom, even when they are used to escape a situation of 
domination.48 Second, aiming to avoid domination does not necessarily commit us to 
attempting to determine in what way we are being dominated and what methods or 
approaches would allow us to escape it. On its own, then, resistance to domination is 
non-transformative and unreflective. 
 The second condition is “the care of the self”. This activity comprises both a 
principle of taking oneself as a worthy object of concern and a set of practices which 
allow us to carry out transformations in our mode of being in line with this principle. 
Alone, however, the care of the self is insufficient for the practice of freedom. First, 
there is no reason that our self-transformation should be in the direction of greater 
freedom. One could aim to transform oneself in line with one’s understanding of 
oneself as a slave or, for that matter, a slave-owner. Second, aiming at self-
 
48 Arguably the destruction of oneself is a transformation in one’s mode of being, but this doesn’t 
seem enough - at least on its own - to count as a practice of freedom. Certainly Foucault does not 
consider all suicides to be positive; in one interview, entitled ‘The Simplest of Pleasures,’ he 
sardonically remarks: ‘Suicide must not be left to unhappy people who might bungle it or make a 
mess of it.’ (Foucault 1996, 296) Presumably, such individuals would at least fail to meet the 
necessary condition of aiming at the critical ontology of ourselves. However, this interview does also 
raise the possibility of suicide being a practice of freedom: 
We should consider ourselves lucky to have at hand (with suicide) an extremely unique 
experience: it’s the one which above all the rest deserves the greatest attention… so that you can 
make of it a fathomless pleasure whose patient and relentless preparation will enlighten all of your 




transformation does not imply that one reflects on one’s apparent knowledge. One 
could be completely deluded about the way in which one takes oneself as an object 
of concern, what would count as a desirable mode of being, or the transformations 
that would be necessary for such a mode of being, and have no way of determining 
this. 
 Finally, the third necessary aim is an activity that Foucault calls the “critical 
ontology of ourselves” or “the permanent critique of or historical being”. This activity 
consists of a series of inquiries through which we problematise our current mode of 
being, asking what in it is necessary and what contingent, and identifying where 
change is both possible and desirable. These inquiries are intended to give impetus 
and direction to attempts at self-transformation, which thereby provide a practical 
and experimental critique which allows us to see again where change is possible, the 
form this change can take, and the results of this change. However, this alone also 
cannot be sufficient for the practice of freedom. As with the care of the self, it is not 
necessary for these inquiries to be directed towards freedom; we can imagine 
inquiries directed towards creating, or further entrenching, situations of domination. 
Additionally, the critical ontology alone does not contain a mechanism for carrying 
out the transformations it is meant to inform. We can imagine situations in which we 
can successfully determine where transformations might be desirable and possible, 
but lack the capacity to enact them. 
 
Combining the necessary aims 
We have established that these conditions are individually insufficient, but they seem 
to function better together. We can illustrate this by first taking the conditions as 
pairs. Take resistance to domination and the care of the self together: acts of 
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resistance to domination now have the transformative quality we attributed to 
practices of freedom, while care of the self is directed against domination. However, 
the absence of the critical ontology means that the resisting actions and self-
transformations will be unreflective and directionless, as there is no attempt to 
identify whether the transformations we engage in are actually in the direction of 
freedom or whether they are genuine transformations in one’s mode of being. 
 For the pair of resistance to domination and the critical ontology, the agent will 
be engaging in inquiries into one’s mode of being which are directed against 
domination. Additionally, their resistance will be informed by these inquiries and 
therefore feature attempts to determine what the domination is and how it can be 
effectively resisted. However, there will still be no attempt at producing the 
transformations in one’s mode of being characteristic of the practice of freedom. 
 Finally, we have the care of the self and the critical ontology. In this case, our 
attempts at self-transformation feature the kinds of interrogation of one’s self-relation 
and mode of being that could make sure these transformations are truly guided by 
the principle of taking oneself as an object of care. Additionally, the critical ontology 
is being actualised, rather than remaining impotent. However, as before, there is no 
intrinsic reason why these transformations should be directed against domination, 
and so these aims together are insufficient. 
 From the above, we can already see how our necessary aims function better 
together, even just as pairs. The final step is to take all three aims together. In this 
case, all the earlier objections are accounted for: the practices are directed against 
domination, they aim at the requisite transformations in one’s mode of being and 
they involve inquiries into our historical mode of being which allow us to determine 
where changes are both possible and desirable. However, there seem to be further 
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positive features of the practice of freedom which we have not yet discussed, but 
which we must account for. The next question, then, is whether these three aims are 
sufficient to account for these further aspects. 
 
Practices of freedom as collective and creative 
The practice of freedom seems to have other positive features which are not clearly 
accounted for by the criteria we have given. In this section, we will discuss two of 
them – the collective nature of practices of freedom and the creativity involved in 
creating one’s mode of being as a work of art – and attempt to show that our 
approach takes them into account. 
 First, practices of freedom do not seem to be solely individual. Rather, they 
involve the creation or modification of modes of being in concert with others, that can 
be shared with others, and that imply varied relations with those others. As we saw 
in the first chapter, this assertion runs contrary to commentators such as McNay, and 
so requires some justification. 
 A first reason to think of the practice of freedom as not purely solitary is the 
activity involved in caring for oneself. The care of the self is often characterised as 
individualistic; as Foucault himself said about the Greco-Roman form: ‘care for 
others should not be put before the care of oneself. The care of the self is ethically 
prior in that the relationship with oneself is ontologically prior.’ (EPF 287) McNay 
argues that Foucault’s ethics are similarly individualistic: 
The importance that Foucault accords to the paradigm of struggle excludes 
alternative understanding of social relations as structured along the lines of 
normatively generated agreement or according to ties of solidarity, affection or 
tradition. The idea of ethics of the self remains within this agonistic framework 
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prioritising the relation with the self over any form of intersubjective relation. 
(McNay 1994, 152) 
While it may be the case that the relation with the self is prioritised, even in the 
Greco-Roman form the care of the self did not exclude caring relations with others. 
In the previous chapter, we briefly discussed the figure of the “master”, the guide 
needed to bring one to take care of oneself in the first place. Contra McNay, the 
relation between the master and the learner was not one of struggle, but precisely 
one of affection. For instance, in a letter to his tutor Fronto, Marcus Aurelius 
concludes his summary of his day as follows: 
After coming back, before I turn over and snore, I get my task done and give my 
dearest of masters an account of the day’s doings and if I could miss him more, I 
would not grudge wasting away a little more (Marcus Cornelius Fronto 1982, 
183; cited in Foucault 1997, 220. Italics mine) 49  
Far from struggle or agonism, we see instead relations of care, even love.50 Even the 
Greco-Roman care of the self, then, was not a purely solitary activity. 
 Moving beyond the care of the self, there are a number of reasons to see the 
practice of freedom as a non-solitary activity. As we have seen before, practices of 
freedom not only create forms of existence, they also define ‘forms… of political 
society.’ (EPF 283) Such forms, by definition, cannot be the province of the solitary 
individual; while we can independently theorise about the forms a political society 
can take, actually bringing any such society into existence will require interacting 
with others. 
 
49 The point is made even more clearly in an earlier section of the same letter: Marcus Aurelius recounts a 
conversation with his mother in which they jokingly dispute ‘which of us two [Aurelius and his mother] loved 
the one or other of you two [Fronto and Aurelius’ sister] the better.’ (op cit., 220) 
50 Similar sentiments can be seen elsewhere, such as in Foucault’s discussion of the First Alcibiades, where 
Socrates proclaims himself to be Alcibiades’ only true lover. See The Hermeneutics of the Subject. 
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 Even if we look solely at the role of practices of freedom in the definition of 
forms of existence or modes of life, it is still not the case that this activity of definition 
should be taken to be a solitary activity. In one discussion of modes of life, Foucault 
suggests that the definition of forms of existence might require: 
The introduction of a diversification different from the ones due to social class, 
differences in profession and culture, a diversification that would also be a form 
of relationship and would be the “mode of life.” (FWL 137, translation modified) 
By “diversification”, Foucault means the way in which individuals are differentiated 
from one another into categories they share with others. For instance, we can 
differentiate individuals on the basis of their social class. A mode of life, then, is not 
only an individual’s relation to themselves, it is also a way in which sets of individuals 
are distinguished from others. These modes of life ‘can be shared among individuals 
of different age, status, and social activity,’ allowing for transformations of the social 
fabric which were not previously possible. (ibid., 137) Foucault illustrates this with the 
example of the “gay lifestyle”.51 Taking “being gay” as a way of life means creating a 
new diversification that cuts across class and social strata (given that gay people do 
not necessarily come from specific classes, professions and so on): 
Homosexuality is a historic occasion to reopen affective and relational virtualities, 
not so much through the intrinsic qualities of the homosexual but because the 
“slantwise” position of the latter, as it were, the diagonal lines he can lay out in 
the social fabric allow these virtualities to come to life. (ibid., 138) 
 
51 This usage of “gay lifestyle” should be distinguished from “being gay” in a way roughly analogous to the 
distinction between “the LGBT community” and “LGBT people”. In both cases, the former is not merely a 
descriptive label of one’s sexual orientation: it also indicates a certain relationship to one’s orientation. 
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The practice of freedom, then, is not always or solely about individual self-
transformation: it also aims at producing or instantiating these diversifications, 
modes of life that are created and shared with others. The first question, then, is 
whether our necessary conditions can jointly account for this idea of the practice of 
freedom as a non-solitary activity. 
 
The constitutive aim involves collective activity 
We have already shown that the care of the self can require some cooperation with 
others through the figure of the master, the person needed to bring one to care for 
oneself in the first place. However, this does not go far enough. We might grant that 
relations with others are required to begin taking care of the self, while still 
maintaining that the activity could be solitary going forth. Here, then, we should turn 
to our other two criteria. First, the critical ontology has a role to play in the practice of 
freedom. To begin taking care of oneself, the question of the self needs to become 
visible as a problem for us: we need to be able to recognise that our subjectivity has 
a certain form and that it could be different. However, the critical ontology is an 
ontology of ourselves, not of oneself. Integral to the attempt to understand one’s 
mode of being is the recognition that we share much of our mode of being with 
others. Together with the care of the self, the critical ontology leads us to see that 
transformations in our mode of being can lead to transformations in the mode of 
being of others, and vice-versa. As Foucault puts it 
Gay culture will be not only a choice of homosexuals for homosexuals – it 
would create relations that are, at certain points, transferable to 
heterosexuals (STSW 160) 
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The care of the self, then, if reflectively engaged in, must pay attention both to its 
effects on others and the effects the self-transformation of others can have on it. 
 However, a commitment to taking care of oneself and reflecting on the 
relations between our mode of being and those of others does not necessarily 
commit us to working together with others; on the contrary, I could be committed to 
working against them. The care of the self would be social, then, but not necessarily 
cooperative. For example, I may attempt to constitute myself as an employer who 
intimidates his employees in order to make them more productive. Here, then, we 
make reference to the aim of resistance to domination. Recognising that domination 
refers to a situation in which power relations are frozen, resisting at least some such 
situations will require collective action, self-transformation in concert with others. 
Similarly, aiming to avoid bring about situations of domination requires recognising 
the effects of our care of the self on others, and vice-versa. Practices of freedom, 
then, require at least a pre-reflective awareness of our relations with others and the 
ways in which our individual self-transformations will affect these others; in some 
cases, they will also involve collective action. 
 
Creativity in practices of freedom 
The second feature of practices of freedom to account for is the wealth of creativity 
some of them manifest, which is not present in our definition. We noted above the 
idea of practices of freedom as instantiating ways of life, which involves a certain 
inventiveness: the means-end rationality that will allow us to achieve the three aims. 
If we are to reflectively engage in self-transformation, such that we resist or avoid 
domination, we will need some creativity to identity the possible transformations and 
put them into practice. However, the practice of freedom seems to go beyond this. 
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An example of this appeared in the chapter 3, in the Greco-Roman care of the self, 
when we distinguished between the care of the self insofar as it allows us to avoid 
abusive relations with others, and the care of the self insofar as it allows us to 
cultivate an ethos which is beautiful, exemplary and memorable. Foucault suggests a 
similar direction for the contemporary practice of freedom: 
What strikes me is the fact that, in our society, art has become something that is 
related only to objects and not to individuals or to life… But couldn’t everyone’s 
life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object but 
not our life? (OGE 261) 
Foucault is suggesting that not only can the practice of freedom allow us to create 
new modes of life, but these modes of life can also be beautiful, can even be works 
of art. This idea gets its most poetic expression in an interview with the director 
Werner Schroeter: 
The art of living is… to create, with oneself and others, individualities, beings, 
relations, unnameable qualities. If one fails to do that in one’s life it isn’t worth 
living. I don’t distinguish between people who make of their existence a work and 
those who make a work during their existence. An existence can be a perfect 
and a sublime work. (Foucault 1996, 317) 
The question, then, is whether our account can account for this kind of creativity 
involved in the practice of freedom. 
  We can make some progress towards answering this through reference to the 
aim of resisting domination. On occasion, Foucault suggests that novel or especially 
intense modes of being or relations to others serve as a way of resisting domination. 
For instance, he says: 
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We live in a relational world that institutions have considerably impoverished. 
Society and the institutions which frame it have limited the possibility of 
relationships because a rich relational world would be very complex to manage. 
We should fight against the impoverishment of the relational fabric. (STSW 158) 
In other words, given that an enriched relational world would be more difficult to 
manage, engaging in the kind of creation of artistic and intense modes of being we 
mentioned above could be a way of resisting domination. Tying this creativity to 
resistance to domination alone, however, fails to accurately portray Foucault’s 
position, as at times he justifies this creative activity with no reference to domination. 
For instance, he elsewhere says that: 
The relations we have to have to ourselves are not ones of identity, rather, they 
must be relationships of differentiation, of creation, of innovation. To be the same 
is really boring. (SPPI 166) 
While he does elsewhere express worries that taking identity to be paramount might 
lead to an ‘ethics very close to the old heterosexual virility,’ (SPPI 166) at the end the 
justification is aesthetic: “To be the same is really boring.” 
 
Non-constitutive aims of the practice of freedom 
It is possible that we cannot definitively account for this kind of creativity within our 
account. There may well be forms of concern for oneself or the critical ontology 
which take a commitment to this kind of artistic activity as an aim, but it does not 
seem to be the case that they necessarily demand it. However, this is not 
necessarily a problem for us. Returning to Katsafanas, it is not the case that 
constitutive aims are the only aims that can be present in an activity. It is perfectly 
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possible for there to be other, non-constitutive, aims generating their own standards 
of success. For instance: 
Suppose [a chess player] has the aim not only of checkmating her opponent but 
also of enjoying her game. Then we have two standards of success: we can 
evaluate a particular move with regard to whether the move brings her closer to 
checkmate, and whether it makes the game enjoyable. These aims can interact 
with and modify one another: if move A would promote checkmate yet would be 
boring, while move B would be fascinating yet somewhat more risky, then the 
player might have reason to make move B. (Katsafanas 2013, 39) 
Part of the role of the constitutive aim is to act as a regulative criterion for the non-
constitutive aims: if pursuing these aims is blocking off the constitutive aim, then the 
constitutive aim provides reasons to reject or suspend these aims if we want to 
continue in this activity. If the chess player were to follow her aim of enjoyment far 
enough, for instance, by pursuing exciting and dramatic defeats with the result that 
she never achieved checkmate, she would no longer be playing chess; if she wanted 
to play chess, she would have to suspend or modify her aim of enjoyment. 
 My suggestion is that the same might be true of this commitment to avoiding 
boredom or to artistic creativity: it is a non-constitutive aim that can be overruled by 
the constitutive aim. This seems to fit with Foucault’s own work. For instance, the 
interview ‘Friendship as a Way of Life’ ends with the following passage: 
We must make the intelligible appear against a background of emptiness and 
deny its necessity. We must think that what exists is far from filling all possible 
spaces. To make a truly unavoidable challenge of the question: What can be 
played? (FWL 140) 
Although Foucault seems to suggest that we should explore all the possible games 
of power, this cannot be the case as, presumably, some of these possible games 
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and possible spaces would involve situations of domination. I take it for granted that 
Foucault does not intend for us to experiment with domination and abusive power. 
Here, then, the necessary aim of resistance to domination acts to regulate the aim of 
exploring new relations with others. In the case where the new relations are at risk of 
being abusive, the constitutive aim blocks the individual from continuing in that 
experimentation. Our account, then, can account for some creativity and make room 
for the rest: the practice of freedom requires some creative activity – the creation of 
modes of being – and allows for further artistic creation as long as it does not imperil 
the practice of freedom. 
 
What does it mean to hold the constitutive aim of the practice of 
freedom? 
In the previous section, we established that the constitutive aim of the practice of 
freedom is comprised of the three necessary conditions of the practice of freedom. 
Given this, what does it mean to engage in the practice of freedom? The answer is 
deceptively simple, as it appears we just need to return to our definition of 
constitutivism. Remember that, as we saw in chapter 2, an individual counts as 
engaging in an activity iff. they hold the constitutive aim: in other words, holding the 
constitutive aim is a necessary and sufficient condition for engaging in an activity. 
Take the example of chess: to count as playing chess, one must be holding the 
constitutive aim of chess, achieving checkmate. It is not necessary that you achieve 
the aim, or even have significant success in approaching it: it is sufficient that you 
pre-reflectively hold it. The same is true for the practice of freedom: to count as 
practicing freedom, it is sufficient that you hold the constitutive aims of the practice of 
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freedom. Again, you do not need to achieve the aim, merely to hold it. 
  However, further questions can be raised about the way in which you hold the 
aim. First, we should note that “holding” cannot mean something like “entertaining”. 
When you hold the constitutive aim of chess, you are not entertaining the idea of 
checkmating your opponent: you are instead already acting under the idea of 
checkmating them. 
  Next, we have seen that our constitutive aim comprises three necessary aims: 
do all three aims need to be held simultaneously? Or is it enough that they be held 
consecutively? For instance, can I critically reflect on my mode of being, then carry 
out a self-transformation, then engage in an act of resistance, and thereby count as 
practicing freedom? The answer seems to be no. First, Foucault seems to implicitly 
raise and reject this possibility in EPF. There, Foucault draws a distinction between 
practices of liberation and practices of freedom. Practices of liberation seem to be 
activities which solely aim to resist domination, as they are distinguished from 
practices of freedom on the basis that they lack the self-transformative activity and 
creativity that characterises the latter: ‘[processes of liberation] have their place, but 
they do not seem to me to be capable by themselves of defining all the practical 
forms of freedom.’ (EPF 283) While Foucault notes that practices of liberation are 
sometimes necessary for the possibility of practicing freedom, saying that ‘liberation 
is sometimes the political or historical condition for a practice of freedom,’ (ibid., 283) 
if the claim that the aims could be held consecutively was correct, we would expect 
him to see practices of liberation (as aiming at resisting domination) as part of the 
practice of freedom, not prior to and separate from them. 
  Second, allowing the aims to be held separately would seem to reintroduce 
the objections to taking the necessary aims as individually sufficient for the practice 
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of freedom. For instance, if the aim of resisting domination is not held in parallel with 
the other aims, it is again unclear why either the care of the self or the critical 
ontology should be directed against domination. The same is true for the other two 
necessary aims. It seems, then, that all three aims must be held simultaneously for 
an activity to count as the practice of freedom. 
 This claim, however, seems to risk heavily restricting the set of practices of 
freedom, as they would need to be practices in which we simultaneously 1) aim at 
resisting domination, 2) aim at taking care of ourselves, and 3) aim at engaging in 
the critical ontology of ourselves. However, this worry misunderstands what it means 
to hold the constitutive aim. Remember that, in chapter 2, we argued that holding an 
aim does necessarily require that we reflectively or consciously hold the aim. Rather, 
to hold the aim means merely that we hold the aim pre-reflectively, that is, that we 
are already operating in light of the aim and in such a way that we could become 
conscious of holding this aim. As a result, although the set of activities in which we 
could come to see ourselves as operating in light of all three aims will be a 
somewhat limited subset of what we could do, it will not be restricted in the way it 
would be if we needed to be conscious of holding all three aims. 
 
The relationship between ontological freedom and the practice of 
freedom 
As we noted in our discussion of criteria of a successful account of the practice of 
freedom in chapter 2, we should be able to see a clear connection between freedom 
as an ontological condition, and the practice of freedom. Having identified the 
constitutive aims of the practice of freedom and in what sense these aims must be 
held, we are now able to account for this connection. First, note that being within 
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relations of power, and not within relations of violence, is a necessary condition of 
the practice of freedom. In relations of violence, where the individual is forced into 
taking one course of action, there is no possibility of operating with the constitutive 
aim, as the individual is not acting in accordance with their own aims. In power 
relations, by contrast, the individual has the possibility of taking one of several 
courses of action and so the individual has the possibility of acting in light of the 
constitutive aims of the practice of freedom. 
  From this, we can also see that ontological freedom and the practice of 
freedom are closely connected. Ontological freedom consists of experiencing oneself 
as faced with a field of possible actions; the practice of freedom means taking up 
some of these possibilities while holding the constitutive aims. 
  Finally, and somewhat unexpectedly, there is the possibility that ontological 
freedom enforces a boundary on the set of possible practices of freedom. Given that 
ontological freedom is a necessary condition for the practice of freedom, if we are 
committed to practicing freedom then we are necessarily also committed to avoiding 
practices of freedom that might remove ontological freedom. In other words, we have 
reason not to engage in practices of freedom which involve bringing about relations 
of violence, either violence inflicted on ourselves or on others. Given that practices of 
freedom are intended to be permanently ongoing, it could even be argued that 
practices which aim at creating relations of violence, i.e., which aim at blocking the 
practice of freedom, are not practices of freedom at all. 
   
Success in the practice of freedom 
We have identified what it means to engage in the practice of freedom, namely, to 
pre-reflectively hold the three necessary aims simultaneously; in other words, to be 
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already acting in light of them. However, this is not the end of the matter. We can 
distinguish between two questions regarding the practice of freedom: first, what it 
means to practice freedom at all; second, what it means to practice freedom 
successfully. We can draw this out more clearly by analogy with the example of 
chess. To play chess means to hold the constitutive aim of chess; to play chess 
successfully means achieving the constitutive aim, i.e., checkmating your 
opponent.52 Remember that constitutive aims not only provide a regulative criterion 
for an activity, they also provide a standard of success. Therefore, from the structure 
of the constitutivist account, it follows that there are at least two states of success in 
any activity that has a constitutive aim: success and failure.  
 As we suggested in chapter 2, our account of freedom must allow us to 
distinguish between individuals on the basis of their practice of freedom. More 
importantly, we need to be able to distinguish, not simply between unfree and free 
individuals, but between gradations of freedom. As we noted in chapter two, 
Foucault suggests that practices of freedom can be open, or in situations, either 
“restricted” or non-existent. (EPF 283) Cases in which practices of freedom are non-
existent are cases in which individuals cannot hold the three constitutive aims; cases 
in which they are restricted are one in which individuals can practice freedom with 
limited success. The structure of our constitutivist account has taken us part of the 
way towards this, in that it allows us to distinguish between successful and 
unsuccessful practices of freedom on the basis of whether the individual achieves 
the constitutive aim. This gives us gradations within the practice of freedom: not only 
 
52 As chess is a competitive activity, there is an odd disconnect in that playing chess “successfully” is not 
necessarily the same thing as playing “well”. If your opponent is bad enough, you can play poor chess while 
still being successful. If we restrict ourselves to looking at the one player’s performance, however, the 




can we distinguish between practitioners of freedom and individuals who are not 
practicing freedom at all, we can also distinguish between individuals who meet with 
success in their practice of freedom and those who hold all the aims but meet with 
failure. Additionally, an interesting feature of our account takes us even further than 
this: given that our constitutive aim is composed of three necessary aims, we have 
three standards of success for individuals practicing freedom. 
 
A composite aim gives multiple standards of success 
We can illustrate how having multiple parts to a constitutive aim can give us more 
standards of success by complicating our chess example. We previously have 
suggested that we could give a more exhaustive constitutive aim for chess; 
something like: “aiming to checkmate your opponent, and, failing that, to bring about 
stalemate.” This could be broken down into two aims: “to checkmate your opponent” 
and “if checkmate becomes impossible, to stalemate your opponent.” As both aims 
provide standards of success, we can now generate the following distinct states of 
success or failure in chess: 
 Stalemate 
 
 Success Failure 
Success Success, N/A53 Success, N/A 
Failure Failure, Success Failure, Failure 
 
53 Note that, as the stalemate aim is conditional on checkmate becoming impossible, it becomes irrelevant in 













This gives us further gradations for evaluating chess play: assuming the opponent 
remains the same, a player who successfully checkmates played better than one 
who achieves stalemate, who played better than a player who failed to achieve 
either. The case is similar for the practice of freedom, but instead of two axes we 
have three, and hence 8 different states: 
Resistance to 
Domination (RD) 
Care of the Self (CS) Critical Ontology of 
Ourselves (COO) 
Successful aims 
F F F None 
F F S COO 
F S F CS 
F S S CS, COO 
S F F RD 
S F S RD, COO 
S S F RD, CS 
S S S RD, CS, COO 
 
We could categorise these states under four different heading: 
1) Complete practices of freedom: {RD, CS, COO} 
2) Uncritical practices of freedom: None, {RD}, {CS}, {RD, CS} 
3) Unresistant practices of freedom: None, {CS}. {COO}, {CS, COO} 
4) Non-transformative practices of freedom: None, {RD}, {COO}, {RD, COO} 
We should bear in mind that these incomplete practices of freedom are different from 
the cases we described earlier in the chapter, where an individual only hold one or 
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two of the necessary aims. In those cases the individual failed to practice freedom at 
all, while in these cases the individual holds all three aims, but does not successfully 
achieve all of them. 
  While this table shows us a range of gradations of success in practicing 
freedom, this is still not enough for our purposes. First, we have no real way of 
distinguishing between these gradations. While a complete practice of freedom ({RD, 
CS, COO}) will be freer than any of the others, there is no way we can in principle 
distinguish between {CS, COO} and {RD, COO}. Second, while this shows a wide 
variety of gradations in what we could call “incomplete” practices of freedom, 
Foucault’s work seems to suggest that there can be gradations within complete 
practices of freedom. For instance, in the introduction to the Use of Pleasure, he 
says the following in a discussion of his own philosophical activity: 
Did [my efforts] actually result in a different way of thinking? Perhaps at most 
they made it possible to go back through what I was already thinking, to think it 
differently, and to see what I had done from a new vantage point and in a clearer 
light. Sure of having travelled far, one finds that one is looking down on oneself 
from above. The journey rejuvenates things, and ages the relationship with 
oneself. (UP 11) 
The activity described here looks to be a practice of freedom. However, note that 
Foucault questions the scope of this transformation. In response to his own question, 
he begins with “perhaps at most…”. The implication here is that a greater 
transformation would have been possible, even though he had some success.54 
Even within complete practices of freedom, then, there are still gradations of 
 
54 As Foucault puts it himself, his aim writing the book was ‘to learn to what extent the effort to think one’s 
own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently.’ (UP 8) 
Presumably, making more progress towards this aim would have made his activity more successful. 
117 
 
freedom. This suggests that we next need to determine what a completely 
successful practice of freedom is and, further, what the gradations within this 
category look like. 
 
Gradations of success and failure in practicing freedom 
What do we mean by gradations or degrees of success and failure? Remember that 
a constitutive aim provides a standard of success for an activity. Now, for some 
activities, it is possible to determine not only whether or not you succeeded in an 
activity, but how close you came to success or how well you succeeded. For 
instance, take chess. Imagine that Alice and Bob play chess against the same 
person. Alice plays a long, drawn-out game in which she takes a number of her 
opponent’s pieces, puts her opponent in check several times, but eventually loses; 
Bob, by contrast, loses 4 moves in to “Scholar’s Mate.” While both players failed to 
achieve the constitutive aim, Alice came closer to achieving the constitutive aim than 
Bob.55 By contrast, if your aim was to turn off a light switch, it doesn’t seem to matter 
how close you came to success: either you succeeded or you failed.56 The question, 
then, is what kind of aims our three axes are: do they have gradations on both 
sides? Neither? Only on one? In this section, we will look at the three axes and 
argue that they should be conceptualised as having both degrees of success and 
degrees of failure, examining both separately. 
 
55 Note that the relevant factor is not the length of the game: you could play an incredibly long yet terrible 
game of chess. What matters is that Alice came closer to winning the game: she came close to winning at 
times, while Bob lost to an easily blocked opening. 
56 Note that I specified turning off the switch: if the example were turning off a light, there are different 
degrees of failure, given that I could turn off the light switch but have the light fail to go out due to faulty 
wiring, me hitting the wrong switch, and so on. The switch example is - of course - also simplified: what if the 
switch was broken and would not switch the whole way off? 
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Gradations in resistance to domination 
First, take resistance to domination. Presumably if there are degrees of failure, they 
will be found in actions which aim to avoid or displace situations of domination but 
fail to do so; gradations, then, will be in terms of how close an action comes to 
meeting this aim. There do, therefore, seem to be degrees of failure. For instance, 
an industrial strike which just falls short of changing a situation of domination is more 
successful than one which is crushed immediately.57 However, as this axis is 
concerned solely with resistance to domination, we have the counter-intuitive 
consequence that a comparatively small-scale action which comes closer to success 
would be ranked as a better practice of freedom than a large scale one that met with 
abject failure.58 
   Additionally, beyond failing to disrupt situations of domination, there seems to 
be a further category of failure, namely attempts at resisting domination which either 
create new situations of domination, or further entrench existing ones. For instance, 
imagine a revolution which brings a totalitarian party or dictator into power.  
  On the side of success, we could distinguish between actions based on how 
far they disrupt the previously existing structure of domination. Acts of resistance 
which only disrupted the structure of domination in a minor way would be towards 
the lower end, while actions which complete dismantled the situation of domination 
would be towards the higher end. 
 
 
57 Note that we are not arguing that mutatis mutandis, a long strike is more successful than a shorter one. Like 
in the chess example, an act aiming at resistance could be very long lived without coming anywhere near to 
being successful. 
58 At least by the standards of this axis. It is possible that they would rank differently on the other two axes. 
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Gradations in the care of the self 
Second, the care of the self. On the side of failure, we first have attempts at self-
transformation that fail to lead to a transformation in line with the principle of caring 
for oneself. This category seems like it can be divided into two subcategories. First, 
there are attempts at self-transformation which fail to bring about either any 
transformation at all or any meaningful transformation. For an example of the latter, 
imagine that, in an attempt to change your self-relation, you changed your wardrobe 
from mostly dark colours to mostly pastel colours. While this could arguably be an 
attempt at self-transformation, it does not seem to involve a meaningful 
transformation in your mode of being.59 Second, there are attempts at self-
transformation which unintentionally bring about transformations opposed to the 
principle of caring for oneself. For instance, maybe you accidentally constitute 
yourself as a less empathetic person. My suggestion is that, as these 
transformations take you in the opposite direction from the driving principle of the 
practice of freedom, such transformations should be seen as worse failures than 
failing to transform oneself at all. 
  On the side of success, we have already seen the possibility of degrees of 
success in our discussion of the passage from the Use of Pleasure. Cases in which 
our relation to ourselves changes only minimally, e.g., getting a new perspective on 
our way of thinking, would be lower degrees, while greater transformations - e.g., 
entirely changing our way of thinking - would be higher. 
 
 
59 This kind of example is complicated by the question of what a “meaningful” transformation is. One possible 
response is to note that one thing Foucault finds valuable in transformations in one’s mode of being is the new 
values and new relations with others they make possible. A change of wardrobe does not generally do this. 
120 
 
Gradations in the critical ontology of ourselves 
Finally, let’s look at the critical ontology of ourselves. This an activity in which one 
undertakes historical inquiries into the events which constituted our mode of being. A 
second aspect of this activity is that the inquiry has both theoretical and practical 
sides: the results should be put to the test of reality. Success, then, presumably 
means carrying out these investigations in such a way that we come to recognise 
points of possible and desirable change. These investigations should also be into our 
historical modes of being: they should be reflections, not on personal psychological 
flaws, but on aspects of our constitution shared with our contemporaries. 
Furthermore, the results of these investigations should be put into action. 
  Like with the care of the self, it seems that we can distinguish multiple 
different categories on the side of failure. First, there are attempts at the critical 
ontology which, although they produce results, do so in such a way that we are 
unable to integrate them into our activity - for instance, perhaps they are too vague. 
Second, there are attempts at the critical ontology that simply fail to produce results: 
either they fail to identify possible changes in our mode of being, or they fail to 
identify desirable ones. Third, there are attempts which, while producing results, 
produce incorrect ones. For instance, we might misidentify an undesirable change as 
a desirable one (or vice-versa). Although the ordering of these outcomes is not 
exactly clear, my intuition is that it can be worse to have bad information than to 
have no information. 
  By contrast degrees of success will be determined by how far we produce 
knowledge of where our mode of being can be changed in desirable ways. 
Presumably we could distinguish between these outcomes on the basis of the 
distinctions we drew in Chapter 3. For instance, we argued that the COO must be 
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precise and directed towards specific, rather than global, transformation. They might 
also fail to be directed properly to our shared modes of being, overly focusing on our 
individual psychology. Knowledge which was overly vague, overly self-focused, or 
which only identified undesirable changes (when there were more desirable 
alternatives) would be a lower degree of success, while more specific, actionable, 
and desirable results would be of a higher degree. 
 
The array of possible gradations 
We should note that these distinctions we have identified above are at times rather 
vague, especially within the success and failure categories, and that we cannot 
abstractly determine the cut offs. This is not to say that distinctions cannot be drawn, 
but that they can only really be drawn on a case-by-case basis, not abstractly and 
generally. For instance, we might not firmly be able to distinguish between minorly 
and majorly successful attempts to resist domination in the abstract, but we can tell 
that a class of school children refusing to attend detention - if successful - would fit 
into the former category, while a revolution overthrowing a totalitarian government 
and replacing it with an equitable society would fit in the latter. 
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This diagram shows the broad range of possible values for the practice of freedom. 
Not only are there the 8 combinations I discussed above, but within each of these 
combinations, there are further degrees of differentiation. For instance, we might 
succeed to a high degree at resisting domination, fail to a minor degree at the care of 
the self, and succeed at a lower degree in the critical ontology of ourselves. (We 
might have carried out a revolution which achieved our aims, but due to our vague 
understanding of our historical mode of being, failed to enact any real change in our 
mode of self-relation. 
 
Minimally versus maximally successful practices of freedom 
We have, then, our image of the different degrees of success and failure for each of 
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our three necessary aims. The next question, then, is: what counts as a successful 
practice of freedom? The obvious starting position is to claim that anything with a 
maximally failed aim cannot be a successful practice of freedom. A practice in which 
one brings about a situation of domination, transforms oneself in a way opposed to 
the care of the self, or engages in the critical ontology producing undesirable results 
cannot be a successful practice of freedom. Similarly, at least some of the minor 
failures must be rejected. A practice of freedom which fails to produce a 
transformation in one’s mode of being is an unsuccessful practice of freedom; so is 
one which fails to identify possible desirable changes or to reduce domination. My 
suggestion, then, is that for a practice of freedom to be a successful practice of 
freedom, there must be at least minor success on all three axes.60 This might seem 
to be a high bar, but remember that this is not a criterion for determining whether we 
are practicing freedom; it is a bar for determining where the standard of success 
lies.61 In other words, holding the constitutive aim of the practice of freedom means 
aiming at membership of the category of activities denoted by this standard. 
  So what does this category look like? At the most minimal level, it contains 
activities which 1) partially disrupt previously existing situations of domination and 
avoid the creation of new ones; 2) involve minor changes in our mode of being; and 
3) get their impetus from critical reflections which are somewhat vague, suboptimal, 
or overly self-directed. All activities which meet these criteria, then, are successful 
 
60 A possible exception might need to be made for resistance to domination. In the hypothetical case where 
there is no domination to resist, this would seem to indicate that this aim cannot be successfully achieved. We 
might either leave this as an exception, or maintain than successfully avoiding the instantiation of situations of 
domination should also be counted as a success. 
61 Specifically, the standard of success understood strictly with reference to the constitutive aim of the activity. 
There is the odd fact that successfully meeting a constitutive aim does not necessarily mean that you 
performed the activity well. As we have said before, you can checkmate your opponent without having 
necessarily played good chess. 
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practices of freedom. However, there are also superlative practices of freedom, in 
which all the aims are met to their highest degree. In these practices: 1) situations of 
domination are all but completely removed, and 2) there are major transformations in 
one’s mode of being, and these outcomes stem from 3) precise, specific reflections 
which apply to the modes of being of both oneself and others. 
Minimally Successful Practices of 
Freedom 
Maximally Successful Practices of 
Freedom 
Partial removal or disruption of 
situations of domination 
 
Minor transformations of one’s mode of 
being 
 
Vague or overly self-directed critical 
reflections 
Complete disruption or removal of 
situations of domination 
 
Major transformations in one’s mode of 
being 
 
Precise reflections directed towards the 
modes of being of oneself and others 
 
Paradigmatically successful practices of freedom 
We have, then, a clear view on what successful practices of freedom consist in. 
Beyond this, however, I believe that we have a view of a qualitative difference within 
the category of the practice of freedom. Remember that, earlier in this chapter, we 
discussed the idea that the practice of freedom was a communal, rather than a 
solitary activity. Part of our argument for this claim was that practices of freedom play 
a role in the creation of cultural forms, diversifications which allow us to distinguish 
between groups of people. Now, one question is whether the practice of freedom 
simply allows us to modify already existing cultural forms, or whether it allows for the 
creation of new cultural forms. Certainly, we have established that it can modify 
already existing modes of being, but at times Foucault seems to make more extreme 
claims. For instance, in one discussion of the gay mode of life, he says: 
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The fact of making love with someone of the same sex can very naturally involve 
a whole series of choices, a whole series of other values and choices for which 
there are not yet real possibilities. It’s not only a matter of integrating this strange 
little matter of making love with someone of the same sex into pre-existing 
cultures: it’s a matter of constructing cultural forms. (STSW 157) 
The construction of cultural forms does not seem to be a matter of producing forms 
of life from older, previously existing ones. Rather, it means ‘inventing ways of 
relating, types of existence, types of values, types of exchanges between individuals 
which are really new and are neither the same as, nor superimposed on, existing 
cultural forms.’ (STSW 160) This certainly doesn’t seem to be something that the 
minimal practice of freedom can support. 
  However, my suggestion is that the maximally successful practice of freedom 
is qualitatively, not merely quantitatively, different from the minimally successful 
practice of freedom. In the maximally successful practice, there is a synergy between 
the necessary aims which makes the result greater than the sum of its parts. We can 
see this by thinking about what it would mean to maximise the aims individually. If it 
is possible to completely remove situations of domination, this will require both 
reflection both our mode of being and the mode of being of others; it will also require 
and lead to transformations in these. Complete transformations in our mode of being 
will also require the removal of situations of domination, the recognition of how these 
changes can be brought about and the cooperation of others. Reflection on our 
shared modes of being will require enough disruption of domination to make space 
for this reflection, and care of the self in concert with others. It seems to me that 
practices of freedom, driven by a precise and actionable inquiry into our shared 
modes of being, which result in 1) major transformations in our mode of being and 2) 
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almost total disruption of domination must result in the creation of new modes of 
being, not only for ourselves, but also for those whom we act in concert with when 
we take care of ourselves. If our relations with them stayed the same, it is unclear 
how domination would have been completely removed; if their modes of being did 
not change, it is unclear how we would have enacted the results of the critical 
ontology of ourselves. The suggestion is that, in the highest form of the practice of 
freedom, the activity goes beyond the modification of our current mode of being into 
the creation of new diversifications, new cultural forms. 
 
Conclusion 
In the previous chapters, we have introduced and investigated a procedural account 
of practices of freedom according to Foucault. We identified three necessary aims for 
the practice of freedom – resistance to domination, the care of the self, and the 
critically ontology of ourselves – showed how they fit together, and concluded that 
when they are achieved with a high degree of success, they lead to the creation of 
new cultural forms. 
  With our framework in place, the next step is to test its application to actual 
cases, to see how well the framework works and identify any problems. The next two 
chapters, then, will be close engagements with historical figures drawn from 
Foucault’s own work. First, we will look at a paradigmatic example of a practitioner of 
freedom. As we have noted in this chapter, the bar for successfully practicing 
freedom has been set rather high and we therefore want to test if any individuals 
actually can reach it. We will therefore spend the next chapter examining Socrates’ 
philosophical activity, to see if he would count as a practitioner of freedom according 
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to Foucault. We are working with the logic that, if even Socrates cannot reach the 
bar, the bar is probably set so high as to be impractical.  
 Second, we will be looking at a quite different example. From our very first 
chapter, we have maintained that our account of the practice of freedom should be 
able to provide a rebuttal to the claim that Foucault’s ethics requires a hyper-active 
subject. In our final chapter, then, we will go some way to respond to this by 
engaging with the Irish author and playwright Oscar Wilde. Although Wilde began as 
a fairly conventional practitioner of freedom, during his life he underwent a 
transformation through which he stopped seeing the practice of freedom as an active 
undertaking, towards seeing it as a “middle-voiced” process going on within and 
through him. In looking at Wilde, we investigate both epoch’s of Wilde’s practice of 
freedom and argue that, even during the latter part of his life, he was continuing to 
practice freedom. This, therefore, has interesting implications for how we understand 




Chapter 5: Socratic Parrhesia as a Practice of Freedom 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we took the three necessary aims we identified in Chapter 
Three and argued that, taken together, they compose the constitutive aim of the 
practice of freedom. We also showed that it is possible to distinguish between failed 
and successful practices of freedom and, furthermore, that, beyond minimally 
successful practices, there are superlative practices of freedom which can be 
characterised as the creation of new cultural forms. 
 We will now apply our model of the practice of freedom in close engagements 
with two historical figures in order to test the usefulness and accuracy of the account. 
In this chapter, we take Socrates - as he appears in Plato’s dialogues - as our 
example, for a number of reasons. First, Socrates seems like he should be a 
paradigmatic example of the practice of freedom. He is a pivotal figure in the history 
of philosophy, with his use of the elenchus and his way of life simultaneously 
distinguishing him from the pre-Socratics and the Sophists and providing a model for 
the Hellenic schools, especially the Stoics and the Cynics.62 Furthermore, according 
to Foucault his philosophical activity inaugurated at least two distinct forms of care of 
the self: the “metaphysics of the soul” that runs through the neo-Platonists into 
Christianity, and the “art of life” that runs through the Cynics. (CT 127) These 
considerations show that Socrates was engaged in the creation of new cultural 
forms, which would imply that he is a superlative practitioner of freedom. 
  Second, Foucault’s final lecture courses focus heavily on Socrates’ 
philosophical activity, specifically his practice of parrhesia, as allowing for the 
 
62 See, for instance, Long (1996) p.28 
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production of new modes of being. Foucault sees a thread running from Socratic 
parrhesia, through Cynic parrhesia, which connects to what he calls “the critical 
attitude”; in fact, in Fearless Speech a stated aim of the seminar is ‘to construct a 
genealogy of the critical attitude in Western philosophy.’ (FS 171) We saw this 
critical attitude in ‘What is Enlightenment?’, where it was strongly connected to the 
practice of freedom. This, then, suggests that Foucault himself sees Socrates as a 
practitioner of freedom. 
 
Socrates as a parrhesiast 
In this chapter, we will be focusing solely on Socrates as a practitioner of a certain 
form of truth-telling or, to use Foucault’s term, veridiction. In The Courage of the 
Truth, Foucault distinguishes between four different modes of veridiction associated 
with four different types of truth-teller: the sage, the prophet, the technician or 
teacher, and the parrhesiast. (CT 28) While Foucault grants that Socrates at times 
plays all of these roles, his emphasis is on Socrates as a practitioner of parrhesia, of 
free or frank speech. In our study of Socrates, we will follow Foucault in this regard. 
Although there are disagreements within the secondary literature as to whether the 
Socratic elenchus can be accurately described as parrhesiastic, or whether 
Foucault’s account of parrhesia accurately captures all of Socrates’ philosophical 
activity, these questions are outside the scope of this study.63 Instead, we take up 
the Foucauldian view of Socrates as primarily a parrhesiast for three reasons. First, 
we are attempting to understand Foucault’s account of the practice of freedom and 
so using a view of Socrates shaped by his own reading allows us to avoid 
 
63 See, for instance, Atack (2019), Bourgault (2014). 
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unnecessary complications. Second, using a Foucault-inspired reading of Socrates 
lets us use Foucault’s own readings of the dialogues as points of departure or 
discussion. In this chapter, our aim is not to critique or push back against Foucault’s 
reading, but instead to show that our account of the practice of freedom can be 
applied to Socrates as Foucault understands him. Generally, then, we will be 
discussing Foucault’s Socrates.64 Finally, on Foucault’s account, the innovations 
Socrates produces are in the realm of parrhesia: Socratic parrhesia, which then 
gives rise to Cynic parrhesia. If we are looking at Socrates as a practitioner of 
freedom, then, this suggests we should be looking at parrhesia. 
  In this chapter, we will be analysing Socrates’ parrhesiastic activity as a 
practice of freedom. We will begin by explaining Foucault’s account of parrhesia and 
illustrating Socrates’ use of parrhesia in the example of the Apology. We will then go 
on to evaluate Socrates’ parrhesiastic activity using the necessary aims we 
established in previous chapters. This will mean showing, firstly, that Socrates holds 
the necessary aims of the practice of freedom - resisting or avoiding domination, 
taking care of the self, and critiquing one’s mode of being - and secondly, that he 
meets success in these aims. 
  The first task raises the question: how far do we need to show that Socrates 
holds these aims? If we need to show that Socrates explicitly and consciously holds 
these aims, we will have some difficulty: it is hard, for instance, to find places where 
he explicitly endorses an aim to resist domination. However, as we suggested in 
Chapter Two, this is not the only way in which one can hold an aim. Constitutive 
aims need only be held pre-reflectively, i.e., such that they could be articulated 
 
64 The exception to this comes in our discussion of the Laches, where I suggest that Foucault has 
misinterpreted the way Socrates has directed the dialogue.  
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through reflection. It would therefore be sufficient to show that Socrates is acting in 
accordance with such an aim, even if he is doing so implicitly. 
  Finally, after showing whether Socrates is successfully practicing freedom, we 
will approach the relationship between parrhesia and the practice of freedom from 
the other side, asking whether there are important aspects of parrhesia that the 
practice of freedom fails to account for, suggesting shortcomings in our account. 
 
What is parrhesia? 
In his Berkeley lectures, Foucault first introduces parrhesia in a general form largely 
associated with democratic political “parrhesia”, usually translated as frank or free 
speech. In democratic Athens, there were two distinct understandings of parrhesia: 
negative and positive. The negative sense, often used by critics of democracy, was 
‘a pejorative sense of the word not very far from “chattering,” and which consists in 
saying any- or everything one has in mind without qualification.’ (FS 13) In the 
democratic setting, the negative view of parrhesia developed from “saying anything” 
to “saying whatever is necessary to persuade the demos” and became associated 
with flatterers and demagogues.65 
  In contrast to this, there is a positive notion of parrhesia, a speech activity in 
which an individual tells the truth to others in a certain kind of relationship to 
themselves and to those others, in order to persuade them.66 In his Berkeley 
lectures, Foucault identifies five characteristics of good parrhesia. First, parrhesia 
involves frankness: ‘The one who uses parrhesia… is someone who says everything 
 
65 See, for instance, GS 182 
66 At GS 174-180, Foucault gives Pericles as an example a practitioner of good democratic parrhesia. 
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he has in mind: he does not hide anything, but opens his heart and mind completely 
to other people through his discourse.’ (FS 12) Unlike the bad parrhesiast, the good 
parrhesiast knows when to be quiet, but when he practices parrhesia he attempts to 
convey to his audience exactly what he thinks.67 Furthermore, he doesn’t attempt to 
obscure what he says using rhetorical flourishes: ‘instead, the parrhesiastes uses the 
most direct words and forms of expression he can find.’ (FS 12) This frankness has 
the result of tying the parrhesiast to his statements, as he is explicitly confirming that 
he is saying precisely what he believes: ‘The specific “speech activity” of the 
parrhesiastic enunciation thus takes the form: “I am the one who thinks this and 
that.”’ (FS 13) 
  Second, the parrhesiast tells the truth. Foucault’s formulation of this is rather 
odd: ‘The parrhesiastes says what is true because he knows that it is true; and he 
knows that it is true because it is really true.’ (FS 14) We should avoid the conclusion 
that Foucault is equating opinion and truth.68 Rather, he is attempting to point to a 
model of truth rather different from our own: ‘In the Greek conception of parrhesia, 
however, there does not seem to be such a problem about the acquisition of truth 
since truth-having is guaranteed by the possession of certain moral qualities: when 
someone has certain moral qualities, then that is the proof that he has access to 
truth - and vice-versa.’ (FS 15) In parrhesia, then, the truth of one’s utterances is 
 
67 Some commentators, for instance Bourgault (2014), have suggested that in his emphasis on frank speech 
and saying everything, Foucault brushes aside the importance of silence for philosophy. However, while 
Foucault does seem to see parrhesia as involving frankness, it is important to note that parrhesia - taken as a 
specific form of truth-telling - is not exhaustive of philosophy. It is therefore not inconsistent to maintain 1) 
that frankness is important in parrhesia and 2) that there is a role in philosophy for silence and introspection. 
In fact, he elsewhere explicitly discusses the value in silence:  
Young Romans or young Greeks were taught to keep silent in different ways according to the people with whom they were 
interacting. Silence was then a specific form of experiencing a relationship with others. This is something that I believe is 
really worthwhile cultivating. I’m in favour of developing silence as a cultural ethos. (Foucault 1997, 122) 
68 Cf. Bourgault 2014, 80: ‘The word “truth” therefore seems to become almost interchangeable with the term 
“opinion” - as repeatedly suggested by Foucault in Fearless Speech and Le gouvernement de soi.’ 
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guaranteed by the moral qualities that allow the individual to practice parrhesia in the 
first place.69 Foremost among these qualities, Foucault suggests, is courage, the 
courage to tell the truth. 
  The necessity of courage stems from the third criterion, danger or risk. 
Someone is using parrhesia only if they are in a situation where telling the truth puts 
them at risk. This risk can range from the risk of death to the risk of angering a 
friend: ‘In such a case, you do not risk your life, but you may hurt him by your 
remarks, and your friendship may suffer for it.’ (FS 16) The broad range these risks 
can take is, in fact, part of what makes a given speech activity an instance of 
parrhesia. Normally, Foucault says, a performative utterance has a codified, 
predictable effect; in parrhesia, however, the utterance opens up the situation and 
makes possible unknown effects: ‘[p]arrhesia does not produce a codified effect; it 
opens up an unspecified risk.’ (GS 62) These risks are what link courage and 
parrhesia: ‘it demands the courage to speak the truth in spite of some danger.’ (FS 
16) This acceptance of risk, Foucault says, also means taking up a specific 
relationship to yourself: the parrhesiast ‘prefers himself as a truth-teller rather than 
as a living being who is false to himself.’ (FS 17) 
  The fourth criterion is criticism. The risk incurred in parrhesia derives from the 
type of interaction with the interlocutor; namely, in telling the truth to them there is 
the possibility of hurting or angering them. The other side of this risk is something 
Foucault calls the parrhesiastic pact: being the recipient of parrhesia means 
accepting that you risk being hurt or offended and restraining yourself from taking 
 
69 In GS, Foucault suggests two other guarantees for the truthfulness of specifically philosophical parrhesia: 
first, speaking frankly means that one will be speaking “logos etumos”, true speech, in line with ‘the idea that… 
[simple] words and phrases have an original relationship with truth’ (GS 314); second, in the discussion of the 
Gorgias, he suggests that the criterion of truth is homologia - the ability of two individuals, approaching one 
another with knowledge, friendship and frankness, to speak the same discourse. (GS 373-374) These criteria 
can both be understood in terms of the moral qualities of the individuals involved. 
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revenge on the parrhesiast.70 The parrhesia involved might be a criticism of the 
interlocutor’s actions or beliefs, advice on how he should behave, or even a 
confession of the faults of the parrhesiast. ‘[T]he function of parrhesia is not to 
demonstrate the truth to someone else, but has the function of criticism: criticism of 
the interlocutor or of the speaker himself.’ (FS 17) Furthermore, Foucault claims that 
this criticism must be made from a position of inferiority with respect to the 
interlocutor: ‘The parrhesiastes is always less powerful than the one with whom he 
speaks.’ (FS 18) It is not parrhesia, for instance, when a father criticises his child.71 
  Fifth, the parrhesiast must be acting from a sense of duty. For truth-telling to 
count as parrhesia, it must be compelled by the speaker’s own sense of what is right, 
not external compulsion: ‘To criticise a friend or sovereign is an act of parrhesia 
insofar as it is a duty to help a friend who does not recognise his wrongdoing, or 
insofar as it is  a duty towards the city to help the king to better himself as a 
sovereign.’ (FS 19) As such, parrhesia is related to both freedom and morality. 
 
Socratic parrhesia 
Distinct from this more general account of parrhesia, Foucault defines a specifically 
 
70 See GS 177-179 for the pact in democratic parrhesia, and GS 203 for the same in parrhesia towards a prince 
or sovereign. 
71 There is some controversy over this requirement. First, although Foucault introduces this requirement in 
Fearless Speech, in The Government of Self and Others one aspect of the democratic parrhesia of Pericles is 
“ascendancy,” being a prominent or superior citizen who can persuade and exercise command over others. 
Second, as Carol Atack (2019) argues, Socrates’ parrhesia rarely takes the form of an inferior speaking to a 
superior. Instead, ‘[p]ower relationships within the Socratic elenchus… suggest that Socrates is not the weaker 
figure speaking “truth to power,” but a forbidding questioner… who can rely on the powerful position of his 
superior epistemic status, confirmed by the oracle.’ (Atack 2019, 27) Responding to these worries is beyond 
the scope of this chapter, but one possible line of response could begin from recognising the differences 
between the relationship between Pericles and the demos, where parrhesia is possible, and a king and his 
advisors, where - on Foucault’s account - it is not. Pericles, it seems to me, can put himself at risk in a way the 
king cannot, given that the demos can take legal action against him. 
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Socratic philosophical form which differs in several ways.  
  First, the relationship between the parrhesiast and the interlocutor takes on a 
different form. Whereas the democratic parrhesiast, such as Pericles, can talk to a 
crowd of people, Socratic parrhesia takes place in a ‘personal, face-to-face 
relationship.’ (FS 96) Furthermore, the Socratic parrhesiast addresses the 
interlocutor as a different kind of subject with a different aim in view. Rather than 
addressing a political subject in order to persuade him to take a certain course of 
action, the Socratic parrhesiast addresses a private individual in order to persuade 
him to take care of himself. (GS 345-346) This difference in aim requires a difference 
in the activity of the interlocutor; rather than listening and seeing if he is convinced, 
‘the listener is led by the Socratic logos into “giving an account”... of “himself, of the 
manner in which he now spends his days and of the kind of life he has lived 
hitherto.”’ (FS 96, citing Laches 187e-188a) 
  Finally, there is a further elaboration of the relationship to the self of the 
Socratic parrhesiast. The Socratic parrhesiast is able to practice parrhesia because 
of an adequation between his rational account of his way of life, his logos, and his 
actual way of life, his bios. In Socratic parrhesia, the harmony between logos and 
bios is the condition of possibility for parrhesia, is what the parrhesiast manifests in 
his parrhesia, and is what is under investigation when the interlocutor gives an 
account of himself: ‘On the philosopher’s side, the bios-logos relation is a Dorian 
[i.e., courageous] harmony which grounds Socrates’ parrhesiastic role, and which, at 
the same time, constitutes the visible criterion for his function as… [a] touchstone. 
On the interlocutor’s side, the bios-logos relation is disclosed when the interlocutor 




  We could summarise Socratic parrhesia as follows: a speech activity in which 
the speaker, who manifests a courageous harmony between his words and deeds, 
puts himself at risk by subjecting his interlocutor’s account of his way of life to a 
critical investigation, with a view to helping the interlocutor to bring his logos and bios 
into accord. 
 
The Apology as an illustration of Socratic parrhesia 
The Apology provides an excellent example for illustrating Socrates’ use of parrhesia 
as there 1) Socrates discusses his manner of speaking, 2) he discusses both his 
philosophical activity and his motivations for engaging in philosophy and 3) there is 
an example of his parrhesia in action in the interactions with Meletus. 
  The Apology begins after Socrates’ accusers, Meletus, Anytus and Lycon, 
have already given their speeches and it is now Socrates’ turn to respond. He tells 
the audience that his accusers have falsely represented him as a good speaker, 
when in fact he is not. Instead, he points out that he has never been to court before 
and so does not know how to speak in the appropriate way. He will speak, instead, 
like a stranger to the lawcourts. In his discussion of the Apology, Foucault identifies 
three reasons why Socrates’ speech is foreign, xenos: first, it is the language he 
uses every day in the market square; second, rather than using rhetorical artifice, 
Socrates speaks the words that occur to him in the order they occur to him; third, 
Socrates will say what seems right to him, what he believes. (GS 313) In other 
words, Socrates will speak frankly and without adornment, he will say everything that 
comes to mind, and he will say what he believes to be true: the mode of speech he is 
describing, then, meets the first two criteria of parrhesia. 
  After explaining his manner of speech, Socrates claims that, before 
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responding to his present accusers, he must respond to his “first accusers,” who 
have persuaded the people of Athens that he claims to knowledge, that he makes 
the worse argument the strong and that he accepts payment for teaching these 
things to others. As part of his defence against these accusations, Socrates tells the 
story of how he came to engage in his philosophical activity. The oracle at Delphi 
claimed that no man was wiser than Socrates and Socrates, disbelieving this, set out 
to test this claim by examining those reputed to be wise. He goes onto characterise 
his activity as demanded of him by the god:  
So even now I continue this investigation as the god bade me - and I go around 
seeking out anyone, citizen or stranger, whom I think wise. Then if I do not think 
he is, I come to the assistance of the god and show him that he is not wise. 
(Apology 23b) 
Socrates’ philosophical activity, which is to critique those who consider themselves 
to be wise, is experienced by him as a moral duty stemming from the god: this meets 
our fourth and fifth criteria of parrhesia. Furthermore, Socrates’ activity has put him 
at risk, as evidenced by the very trial he is currently undergoing. He suggests that his 
three accusers represent the three groups he offended by questioning their wisdom: 
Meletus for the politicians, Anyton for the poets, and Lycon for the craftsmen. (23e) 
  After he has defended himself against his first accusers, Socrates turns to 
refuting his current accusers, which he does by way of a dialogue with Meletus. In 
taking Socrates to court for corrupting the youth of Athens, Meletus seems to be 
demonstrating a serious concern for the wellbeing of the city. However, when 
Socrates asks him who improves the youth of the city, Meletus is led to argue that 
every single person except Socrates improves them, while Socrates alone corrupts 
them. Socrates says that this is clearly false and, furthermore, illustrates an ethical 
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failing on Meletus’ part: ‘You have made it sufficiently obvious, Meletus, that you 
have never had any concern for our youth; you show your indifference clearly; that 
you have given no thought to the subjects about which you bring me to trial.’ (25c) 
  There are two further exchanges, one which concludes that, if Socrates was 
corrupting the youth, he was doing so unintentionally and Meletus was wrong to 
bring him to court rather than advising him privately (26a) and one which concludes 
that Meletus was wrong to charge Socrates with atheism. (27d-28a) These 
exchanges, Socrates claims, show that Meletus has failed to take any of these topics 
seriously. Not only do these exchanges give us examples of criticism, they also 
demonstrate the criteria we discussed under the heading of philosophical parrhesia. 
First, Socrates engages with Meletus, not as the democratic parrhesiast addressing 
the citizens, but in a face-to-face relationship where he speaks to Meletus as a 
private individual. Second, in this relationship, he is not attempting to persuade a 
silently listening Meletus. Instead, Meletus is led to give the rational account that is 
supposed to be underlying his behaviour: he has supposedly taken Socrates to court 
because he is seriously concerned with the wellbeing of the city, and genuinely 
believes Socrates to be intentionally corrupting the youth and disbelieving in the 
gods. Socrates then shows the disharmony between Meletus’ logos and his bios: he 
is shown to have failed to think about these matters at all. 
  With an illustration of Socratic parrhesia in view, we are now well placed to 
analyse Socratic parrhesia through the lens of practices of freedom. 
 
Socratic parrhesia as a practice of freedom 
So far, we have given Foucault’s definition of Socratic parrhesia and illustrated it 
further using the example of the Apology. The thesis of this chapter is that Socrates 
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is engaged in the practice of freedom and, furthermore, that he is successful in his 
practice. Establishing this will require 1) showing that Socrates holds the three 
necessary aims of the practice of freedom, whether reflectively or pre-reflectively, 
and 2) showing that he successfully achieves these aims. Now, in order to establish 
this, we are going to take three Platonic dialogues which allow us to demonstrate 
that Socrates does hold these aims and that he is successful in achieving them. This 
approach has several benefits. First, by looking at dialogues, rather than simply 
amassing evidence, we can avoid cherry-picking contextless quotes in order to make 
our point: taking specific dialogues means that we have to look at Socrates’ 
parrhesiastic activity as part of his broader activity. This is important, as we 
established in the previous chapter that simply entertaining the aims is not enough: 
they need to be held as part of an ongoing activity. Second, using dialogues in this 
way means allows us to engage with Socrates in a more broadly useful way: not only 
are we testing the model of the practice of freedom, but we can also check that it 
actually has some explanatory value when applied to individuals and their practices. 
  In choosing dialogues, I have prioritised ones Foucault himself looked at: this 
serves the dual purpose of 1) being sure that we are looking at good - by Foucault’s 
standards - examples of Socratic parrhesia and 2) giving us access to Foucault’s 
analysis of the dialogues where applicable. We will begin by briefly returning to the 
Apology for evidence that Socrates holds the aim of taking care of the self, and 
cursory assurance that we are justified in thinking he might hold the other aims. We 
will then turn to a possible counterexample to the claim that parrhesia is a practice of 
freedom at all, Callicles, in the Gorgias, who some commentators have argued fits 
Foucault’s criteria for parrhesia. Next, we look at the First Alcibiades for evidence 
that Socrates’ holds the aim of a critique of one’s mode of being, and to the Laches, 
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to investigate the aim of resisting or avoiding domination. Finally, we turn to 
Socrates’ defence of the laws in the Crito, examining it as a possible objection to the 
claim that Socrates aims to avoid domination. 
 
The Apology 
The Apology gives a good overview of parrhesia in that it shows Socrates’ parrhesia 
from various sides: we have both Socrates’ own description and justification of his 
activity, as well as a demonstration. This also makes this a useful dialogue for 
examining whether we have good reason for thinking that Socrates might be 
engaged in the practice of freedom. We will begin by looking at the strong evidence 
in the dialogue that Socrates explicitly and reflectively holds the aim of taking care of 
himself and then turn to the weaker evidence that suggests it might be possible to 
see him as holding the other two aims. 
  In our earlier discussion of the Apology, we discussed the moral duty 
Socrates had been assigned by the god, although we only characterised it in terms 
of examining whether other people were wise. Later in the dialogue, however, 
Socrates gives a much clearer image of what his task is. He tells his judges: ‘I was 
attached to this city by the god… as upon a great and noble horse which was 
somewhat sluggish because of its size and needed to be stirred up by a kind of 
gadfly’; (Apology 30c) his role, which he claims he never ceases to fulfil, is to 
persuade everyone to take care of themselves: ‘I went to each of you privately and 
conferred upon him what I say is the greatest benefit, by trying to persuade him not 
to care for any of his belongings before caring that he himself should be as good and 
as wise as possible.’ (36b) This is explicit evidence that, in his parrhesiastic activity, 
Socrates aims at leading others to take care of themselves. However, this doesn’t 
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necessarily imply that Socrates takes care of himself.  
 There is, however, some implicit evidence that Socrates does take care of 
himself. First, in his introductory discussion of the way he will talk to the lawcourt, we 
can see that he is taking care to conduct himself in the way he thinks is right. He tells 
the judges to concentrate, not on his manner of speech, but on the justice of what he 
says, ‘for the excellence of a judge lies in this, as that of a speaker lies in telling the 
truth.’ (17d-18a) His judgement on how a speaker should behave lines up with his 
claim that he will tell the audience ‘the whole truth’ (17c); he is not concerned with 
rhetoric or even winning his case, but with the truth. We see the same concern for 
himself again when he discusses the common practice of supplicating the jury, using 
begging or tears to gain votes: ‘I do not think it right to supplicate the jury and to be 
acquitted because of this, but to teach and persuade them…. We should not 
accustom you to perjure yourselves, nor should you make a habit of it. This is 
irreverent conduct for either of us.’ (35c) Socrates has clear principles on correct 
conduct, he has clearly made some effort to bring himself into line with these 
principles, and he seems to have had some success. 
  Finally, there is some explicit evidence that Socrates does aim to take care of 
himself. After his conviction, when he is proposing a penalty for himself, Socrates 
raises the possibility of giving up philosophy. He claims that this is impossible, but 
that it is hard to convince the jury of this as he is hard to believe when he says the 
god has commanded him to practice philosophy. Furthermore: ‘if I say that it is the 
greatest good for a man to discuss virtue every day and those other things about 
which you hear me conversing and testing myself and others, for the unexamined life 
is not worth living for men, you will believe me even less.’ (37e-38a) This quote 
provides two reasons to conclude that Socrates’ activity is not only taking care of 
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others, it is also taking care of himself. First, Socrates claims that discussing virtue 
every day is the greatest good for a man, while earlier he told the judges that the 
“greatest benefit” is to be persuaded to care for oneself, suggesting that to discuss 
virtue is either to be persuaded to care for oneself, or is actually caring for oneself. 
Second, Socrates describes his parrhesiastic activity as “testing himself and others.” 
In these conversations, then, it is not the case that he is only testing his interlocutor 
and leading them to take care of themselves; he himself is also being tested. His 
philosophical activity, then, is not only caring for others: it is also caring for himself. I 
conclude that these passages provide strong evidence that Socrates holds the aim 
of taking care of oneself - not only entertaining the aim, but acting in light of it - and 
that he has met with success in this endeavour. 
  Next, we turn to the aim of the critical ontology of ourselves. The Apology 
provides both implicit and explicit evidence that Socrates holds the aim of critiquing 
one’s mode of being. First, we see some evidence of this in the sections we 
mentioned above, when Socrates talks to the judges about the correct modes of 
being for judges and for speakers. Second, there is Socrates’ interaction with 
Meletus where, rather than simply attacking Meletus’ arguments, Socrates criticises 
Meletus’ way of life. More explicitly, there is the statement Socrates makes when 
discussing the impossibility of his giving up philosophy; he tells the judges: ‘the 
unexamined life is not worth living.’ (38a) This suggests that Socrates explicitly and 
reflectively holds the aim of carrying out a critique of one’s mode of being, but we 
need further evidence. 
  Finally, there is some weak evidence that Socrates could be operating, pre-
reflectively, with the aim of resisting domination. When describing his philosophical 
activity, Socrates claims that he is willing to talk to anyone at all: ‘I shall treat in this 
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way anyone I happen to meet, young and old, citizen and strangers, and more so the 
citizens because you are more kindred to me.’ (29e) Although he does suggest that 
he has more concern for citizens, Socrates presents himself as willing to talk to 
anyone at all. This impression is only strengthened by a similar sentiment he offers 
in his discussion of the afterlife: ‘What would one not give, gentlemen of the jury, for 
the opportunity to examine the man who led the great expedition against Troy, or 
Odysseus, or Sisyphus, and innumerable men and women one could mention.’ (41c) 
Given the gender relations of the time, a commitment to practicing parrhesia with 
both men and women could be suggestive of some commitment to avoiding 
domination.  
  Additionally, throughout the Apology Socrates rejects any attempt to give him 
epistemic authority. He rejects the characterisation of him as a teacher: ‘I have never 
been anyone’s teacher…. I cannot justly be held responsible for the good or bad 
conduct of these people, as I never promised to teach them anything and have not 
done so. If anyone says that he has learned anything from me, or that he heard 
anything privately that the others did not hear, be assured that he is not telling the 
truth.’ (33a-b) He also denies that the proclamation of the oracle means that he has 
any special knowledge; he recognises, for example, that the craftsmen know more 
than him: ‘In this I was not mistaken; they knew things I did not know, and to that 
extent they were wiser than me.’ (22d) He is wiser than them, however, because he 
has knowledge of his own ignorance. This image of Socrates, as refusing to be 
credited with special knowledge, refusing to act as a teacher to anyone, and willing 
to talk to any- and everyone, could imply a pre-reflective commitment to resistance to 
domination, although is probably not enough to establish this. 
  The Apology provides us with good reason to maintain 1) that Socrates holds 
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the necessary aim of taking care of oneself and 2) that he has met with success in 
this. It also gives us justification to continue with our examination: there is some 
reason to think that he might hold the other two aims. Before we turn to other 
dialogues to look at these aims in more depth, however, we need to deal with a 
possible counterexample to the idea that Socratic parrhesia is a practice of freedom. 
 
Callicles as a parrhesiast(?) 
In a 2014 paper, Sophie Bourgault argues that Callicles, as portrayed in the Gorgias, 
satisfies Foucault’s account of parrhesia. She points to Foucault’s apparent 
admission of this: ‘he suggests that Callicles possesses true “parrēsia socratique,” 
while quickly acknowledging that Socrates’ parrhesia is not that of Callicles.’ 
(Bourgault 2014, p.71n25) Furthermore, she suggests that, by Foucault’s own 
criteria Callicles counts as a parrhesiast:  
First, he dares to speak with a brutal sincerity. Moreover, he defends with ardour 
the primacy of courage - not only when he describes the true statesman primarily 
with reference to courage, but also when he claims that an excess of philosophy 
will lead to cowardice. Finally, Callicles courageously stands by (almost all) his 
positions, and he seems to be ready to put his definition of justice into action. 
Just like Thrasymachus in the Republic, Callicles demonstrates - in words and 
deeds - a violent courage and an erotics of risk. (ibid., 84-85) 
Callicles’ sincerity implies that he is meeting the criteria of frankness and truth; his 
criticism of Socrates’ philosophical activity and his willingness to tell Socrates how to 
live seems to satisfy the criteria of criticism and risk. Bourgault also maintains that he 
demonstrates an adequation between his logos and his bios: ‘What various dramatic 
elements of the dialogue also reveal is that Callicles is capable of putting into action 
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his thoughts and his words - there is a harmony between his logos (violent and 
tyrannical) and his ergon (violent and tyrannical).’ (ibid., 72) 
  Now, if Bourgault is correct, this leads to problems for our account. Callicles, 
while possibly a Socratic parrhesiast, is certainly not a practitioner of freedom: his 
commitment to the domination of the superiors over the many violates one of the 
necessary criteria. If Callicles is a Socratic parrhesiast, then, parrhesia can only be 
contingently a practice of freedom: resistance to domination cannot inherently be a 
part of it. In that case, it is not Socrates’ engagement in parrhesia alone that makes 
him a practitioner of freedom; instead, there must be additional factors which 
distinguish Socrates from Callicles and make the former free and the latter not. 
However, while I think Bourgault is right to suggest that Callicles speaks with 
frankness, it seems incorrect to maintain that Callicles manifests a harmony between 
logos and bios. There are several points in the dialogue highlight this lack of 
harmony. First, Socrates himself illustrates the mismatch between Callicles’ words 
and his actions. Pointing to Callicles’ love for the demos and for Demos, the son of 
Pyrilampes, Socrates notes that Callicles constantly changes what he says in order 
to be in accord with what they want to hear. (Gorgias 481d-482a) If he cannot refute 
Socrates’ argument, Socrates warns: ‘Callicles will not agree with you, Callicles, but 
will be dissonant with you all your life long.’ (482b) Socrates’ here explicitly accuses 
Callicles of disharmony with himself. 
  Second, Callicles argues that superior men are greater than the many and so 
should rule over them and have a greater share. Callicles clearly considers himself 
one of the superiors and yet instead seems to be in a subordinate position to the 
many, forced to follow their laws and agree with their opinions. Bourgault notes that 
Callicles expresses an ethos of violence, aggression and domination, and argues 
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that he exhibits this ethos in the dialogue, but it bears remembering that he only 
enacts this ethos in this private encounter with Socrates. The rest of the time, then, 
there is a disharmony between his logos and his bios. Moreover, this harmony is not 
even maintained for the entire dialogue. Callicles entered the dialogue with the 
implication that, unlike Gorgias and Polus, he would not be cowed by shame. (482d-
e) However, when Socrates argues that Callicles’ hedonistic view leads to the life of 
a catamite, he responds: ‘Aren’t you ashamed, Socrates, to bring our discussion to 
such matters?’ (494e) 
  A possible alternative would be to argue that Callicles’ actual logos is not 
shamelessness or strength, but is instead demonstrated by the advice he gives to 
Socrates: to prioritise personal safety and survival. Callicles attacks Socrates for his 
lack of rhetorical skill and his inability to defend himself in court. (486a-c) He also 
agrees that you should use these skills to live as long as possible: 
[Socrates:] Or do you think that a man ought to make sure that his life be as long 
as possible and that he practice those crafts that ever rescue us from dangers, 
like the oratory that you tell me to practice, the kind that preserves us in the law 
courts? 
Callicles: Yes, and by Zeus, that’s sound advice for you! (511b-c) 
Seeing Callicles’ true logos as being survival at any cost explains some of his 
behaviour better, but there is still disharmony here. Socrates notes that, if Callicles 
wants power in the city, he should be making himself as much like the Athenian 
people as possible: 
If you think that some person or other will hand you a craft of the sort that will 
give you great power in this city while you are unlike the regime… then in my 
opinion, Callicles, you are not well advised. You mustn’t be their imitator but be 
147 
 
naturally like them in your own person if you expect to produce any genuine 
result toward winning the friendship of the Athenian people. (513a-b) 
Callicles, however, is clearly not doing this: his discourse of the domination of the 
superiors puts him at odds with the demos and so puts him at risk. Socrates’ original 
claim was correct: there is no harmony between Callicles and Callicles, and so none 
between his logos and his bios. Callicles, then, is not a Socratic parrhesiast and so 
doesn’t provide a counterexample to the claim that Socratic parrhesia is a practice of 
freedom.  
 
The First Alcibiades 
There are two sections we should examine in the First Alcibiades. First, there is the 
section in which Socrates reveals Alcibiades’ lack of education, showing him that he 
needs to take care of himself, aiming to establish that Socrates is operating with the 
aim of the critique of ourselves. Second, we should look at the image of the eye 
discussed as part of the care of the self. 
 
The historical critique of our mode of being 
The dialogue begins with Socrates talking to a young Alcibiades for the first time. He 
leads Alcibiades to state his ambitions of being an influential political figure; to begin 
this project of governance, Alcibiades will soon present himself before the Assembly 
and attempt to impress them by giving advice. Socrates, however, notes that 
Alcibiades has only been taught three things: writing, wrestling and the lyre. After 
clarifying that Alcibiades does not intend to advise the assembly on any of these 
things, Socrates observes that if the Assembly need advice on construction, 
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shipbuilding and so on, they will ask a relevant expert. Eventually the two of them 
conclude that Alcibiades will give the Assembly advice on matters of justice and 
injustice. But, Socrates asks, how does Alcibiades know what justice is if he hasn’t 
been taught it? Alcibiades offers two responses. First, he suggests that he may have 
learned it himself; second, he suggests that he may have been taught it in the same 
way as everyone else. 
 In responding to the first claim, Socrates argues that, in order to go about 
learning something for yourself, you must first think that you don’t know it. However, 
Alcibiades has always thought that he knows what justice is; Socrates mentions 
having seen him playing knucklebones and other games with the other children and 
accusing them of cheating them and being unjust, ‘not at all like someone who was 
at a loss about justice and injustice.’ (Alcibiades 110b) If Alcibiades has knowledge 
of justice, then, it cannot be because he investigated the matter himself. 
 Alcibiades concedes this to Socrates, but then claims that he must have 
learned what justice is ‘in the same way as other people,’ by being taught by ‘people 
in general.’ (110d) Socrates responds that, in crediting people in general, he is 
‘falling back on teachers who are no good.’ (110e) He argues that they are terrible 
teachers, who can’t even teach you trivial matters. Alcibiades counters that they 
successful taught him to speak Greek, but Socrates argues that they can teach this 
because they know Greek well. People in general, however, do not know what 
justice is, as is evidenced by the extreme disagreements over the just: 
Socrates: Are we to say that people understand something if they disagree so 
much about it that in their disputes with each other they resort to such extreme 
measures? 
Alcibiades: Obviously not. (112c-d) 
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Alcibiades therefore concedes that he cannot have learned what justice is. 
  What is interesting about these exchanges is that, while Socrates is putting 
Alcibiades’ mode of being to the test, he is not doing it by having Alcibiades explicitly 
give his logos, his account of his way of life. Rather than having Alcibiades give an 
account of what justice is and then refuting it, he is asking Alcibiades about the 
conditions of possibility of his bios, how he could have acquired his logos. Alcibiades 
is claiming that his mode of being is such that he is qualified to instruct the Assembly 
on matters of justice and injustice, but Socrates shows Alcibiades, not that his 
account is wrong, but that he cannot have acquired a correct account. My suggestion 
is that this shows an implicit, pre-reflective commitment to the critical ontology of 
ourselves: he is asking Alcibiades to investigate and evaluate the events through 
which he acquired his mode of being. We can also see from the fact that Socrates is 
able to guide Alcibiades through this process that he is capable of engaging in this 
activity with some success.  
 
The care of the self as carried out with others 
As we said in the previous section, we have good reason to think that Socrates holds 
the aim of the care of the self. Further evidence for this is given by Socrates’ advice 
to Alcibiades, that he must take care of himself. Of interest, however, is the relations 
with others implied by the care of the self, as illustrated by the metaphor of the eye. 
When explaining to Alcibiades the meaning of the Delphic inscription, “know thyself,” 
Socrates tells him to imagine that similar advice had been given to our eye: “see 
thyself.” Socrates suggests that the eye would need a mirror and that the best mirror 
would be another eye, specifically the part of the eye that is used for seeing: ‘So if an 
eye is to see itself, if it must look at an eye and that region of it in which the good 
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activity of an eye actually occurs, and this, I presume, is seeing.’ (133b) In the same 
way, the soul must “see” itself reflected in the divine region of the soul if it is to see 
itself.  
 On Foucault’s reading, the image of the eye tells us that the care of the self 
involves looking into one’s own soul, ‘the soul’s contemplation of itself in the mirror of 
its divinity.’ (CT 160) However, the image Socrates gives us suggests, not a solitary 
practice of reflection, but one carried out together with others, as the eye needs to 
see itself in another eye. Furthermore, in order to clearly see your eye reflected in 
the eye of another person, you would have to be stood very close to them, face-to-
face. In this context, it seems relevant that the relationship between Alcibiades and 
Socrates is one of love: Socrates claims to be Alcibiades’ first and only lover 
(Alcibiades 131e). By analogy the care of the self not only requires a relationship 
with another person, it must be a close relationship. Now, this is interesting for our 
investigation, as this version of the care of the self - carried out in concert with others 
- is something we previously associated with the exemplary practice of freedom, 
where there was success on each of the three activities. This provides further 
evidence that Socratic parrhesia is an exemplary practice of freedom. 
 
The Laches 
My aim in looking at the Laches is as an example showing that Socrates is operating 
in accordance with a pre-reflective aim of resisting domination. The Laches shows 
Socrates giving a great amount of leeway to his interlocutors in how he interacts with 
them, only turning to parrhesiastic criticism when they show a determination to 
persist in the topics under discussion. In arguing this, however, I run contrary to 
Foucault’s reading of the dialogue, which sees Socrates as using an apparent shift 
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from a political to a technical mode of discourse to lead Nicias and Laches into a 
parrhesiastic relationship with him. 
  The Laches begins with Lysimachus and Melesius, mediocre sons of famous 
citizens who are looking for good teachers to educate their sons, asking Nicias and 
Laches, two Athenian generals, for their opinions on a demonstration of fighting in 
armour. When Nicias and Laches are unable to agree, they ask Socrates for his 
input. Socrates notes that what is really under investigation is the teaching of virtue 
and suggests that they should look for an expert at teaching virtue, in order that he 
might instruct the sons. The group agrees that there will be two characteristics of a 
good teacher: first, they will be able to point to multiple examples of people they 
have made good, and second - unless they taught themselves - they will be able to 
point to their own good teachers. (Laches 185e-186a) Socrates therefore puts the 
following task to the group: 
If we say we have teachers to show... [we should] point out… the ones who in 
the first place are good themselves and have tended the souls of many young 
men, and in the second place have manifestly taught us. Or, if any one of us 
says that he himself has had no teacher but has works of his own to tell of, then 
he ought to show which of the Athenians or foreigners, whether slave or free, is 
recognised to have become good through his influence. But if this is not the case 
with any of us, we should give orders that a search be made for others and 
should not run the risk of ruining the sons of our friends and thus incurring the 
greatest reproach from their nearest relatives. (186a-b) 
Socrates immediately discounts himself, claiming that he has never had a good 
teacher. 
 Now, Nicias, Laches and Foucault all interpret this task as Socrates asking 
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the two generals to give an account of their way of life. Nicias says that anyone who 
comes into conversation with Socrates is ‘led about by the man’s arguments until he 
submits to answering questions about himself concerning both his present manner of 
life and the life he has lived hitherto.’ (187e) Laches also agrees to take part in this 
style of conversation. As for Foucault, he reads this section as showing a feigned 
shift from the political style of discourse Laches and Nicias had been engaging in, 
where speakers gives speeches and responses, to a technical mode of discourse in 
which you need to show your qualifications as an expert. (CT 134-135) In fact, 
Foucault argues, Socrates is actually shifting to a parrhesiastic domain in which your 
mode of life is the qualification of the discourse you give. 
 However, this interpretation seems to be untenable if we look at the actual 
questions Socrates has asked of Nicias and Laches. Look again at the criteria of a 
good teacher: first, that, unless they learned it themselves, they should have had 
good teachers; second, that they should be able to point to examples of people they 
had made virtuous. Giving an account of your mode of being is only able to meet the 
first criterion if you taught yourself to be virtuous; it is completely unable to satisfy the 
second. This problem is further highlighted by the specific responses Socrates asks 
Nicias and Laches for. First, he asks:  
Each of you tell us who is the cleverest person with whom you have associated 
in this matter of educating young men, and whether you acquired your 
knowledge of the art from another person or found it out for yourselves, and, if 
you learned it from someone, who were your respective teachers, and what other 




If you yourselves have been the discoverers of such an art, give us an example 
of what other person you have already made into fine men by your care when 
they were originally worthless. (187a-b) 
The responses Socrates asks for cannot be satisfied by an account of one’s mode of 
being; he is asking for specific things - their teachers and their students - which are 
not satisfied by the parrhesiastic discussion.72  
 So what are we to make of this passage? My suggestion is that, rather than 
seeing Socrates as tricking Nicias and Laches into entering a parrhesiatic 
relationship, he should instead by understood as offering them a way out. Socrates 
has the group agree to the criteria of a good teacher; he then shows the possibility of 
admitting that one does not meet the criteria by himself dropping out. Furthermore, 
even if Laches and Nicias do believe themselves to be qualified as teachers, he 
gives them the option of naming their own teacher - as Nicias will later do with 
Damon - rather than putting themselves forward. However, not only do they ignore 
the possibilities he leaves open to them, Laches and Nicias - who see themselves as 
qualified teachers - instead interpret Socrates as asking to examine their ways of life. 
They therefore present themselves for examination, failing to notice that they are not 
answering his questions in doing so. Socrates, thus called upon to engage in 
parrhesia, then does so, but only after making a comment showing that this was not 
what he had in mind; he says, ironically: ‘We certainly can’t find fault with you for not 
being ready both to give advice and to join in the common search.’ (189c) The 
meaning of this is clear: Laches and Nicias are failing to join the common search for 
good teachers, instead preferring to offer advice as if they were qualified to do so. 
 




 What we see here is a Socrates who is very careful with how he engages in 
certain kinds of relationships with other people. Rather than entering into the 
discussion and forcing people into a parrhesiastic relationship, Socrates leaves his 
interlocutors with substantial leeway in how they interact with him. In fact, he only 
enters into a parrhesiastic relationship with Laches and Nicias when they literally ask 
him to, after ignoring the opportunities he provided them to recognise their ignorance 
on their own. 
  This refusal to force specific kinds of relationships with others is again 
illustrated at the end of the dialogue. Having disabused Laches and Nicias of their 
confidence in their knowledge of courage, Lysimachus asks Socrates if he would be 
willing to teach his and Melesius’ sons. Socrates responds:  
If in the conversations we have just had I had seemed to be knowing and the 
other two had not, then it would be right to issue a special invitation to me to 
perform this task; but as the matter stands, we were all in the same difficulty. 
Why then should anybody choose one of us in preference to another? What I 
think is that he ought to choose none of us. (200e) 
Although he agrees to help Lysimachus in searching for a good teacher (201a-c), 
Socrates refuses any kind of position of epistemic authority. The Socrates of the 
Laches, then, refuses to be seen as a figure to be deferred to and also attempts to 
leave his relations with others open. The diffuseness of the power in these relations 
seems to be a necessary condition of his parrhesiastic activity as, as we have 
suggested before, parrhesia cannot be practiced from a position of superiority. Now, 
my claim is that Socrates’ activity in the dialogue is indicative of a pre-reflective 
commitment to avoiding domination. Domination is a situation in which power 
relations are frozen, but we see Socrates intentionally doing the exact opposite: he 
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destabilises attempts to set him up as an epistemic authority and leaves others 
freedom in how they engage with him. That he meets with success in this aim is 
illustrated by his ability to engage in parrhesia. 
 
The Crito: A possible counter-example 
Although we have established that Socrates is operating with a pre-reflective 
commitment to avoiding domination, there are instances in Plato’s dialogues where 
Socrates seems to act contrary to such an aim. In this section, we will take the Crito 
as an example, looking specifically at Socrates’ claim that it is unjust to break the 
law. 
 
The events of the Crito 
The Crito follows on around a month after the conclusion of the Apology. Socrates 
has been imprisoned awaiting his execution, which cannot occur until after the 
Athenian state galley returns from its religious mission to Delos. On the day the 
envoy is expected to return, Crito bribes his way into Socrates’ cell in order to 
convince him to escape into exile with the help of his friends. In responding to Crito’s 
arguments, Socrates turns to the question of whether breaking the law can ever be 
just. Conjuring the laws themselves as an imaginary interlocutor, Socrates argues on 
their behalf that breaking the law is always unjust, as the laws themselves are 
responsible for every individual’s life, firstly because they bring about marriages 
(Crito 50d) and secondly because they are responsible for the raising and education 
of children. (ibid., 50d-e) Furthermore, in choosing to live in the city - and to even 
have children there - rather than choosing to leave, Socrates has shown that he 
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consents to the laws. (ibid., 52a-c) It would, therefore, be unjust for him to break 
them. Crito gives no response to this argument. 
 
Supporting domination? 
Socrates’ position looks to be in tension with a commitment to avoiding domination. 
He argues that it is always unjust to break the law, even if one has been falsely 
sentenced or the laws are unjust, and portrays the laws as having inviolable authority 
over the citizens. In the voice of the laws, he asks: 
Could you, in the first place, deny that you are our offspring and servant, both 
you and your forefathers? If that is so, do you think that we are on an equal 
footing as regards the right, and that whatever we do to you it is right for you to 
us?... Do you think you have this right to retaliation against your country and its 
laws? (50e-51a) 
The implied answer is “no.” The authority of the laws is such that ‘You must either 
persuade [your country] or obey its orders, and endure in silence whatever it 
instructs you to endure, whether blows or bonds, and if it leads you into war to be 
wounded or killed, you must obey…. It is impious to bring violence to bear against 
your mother or father; it is much more so to use it against your country.’ (51b) The 
source of the laws is, at least in part, religious: the laws tell Socrates that, if he 
breaks them ‘we shall be angry with you while you are still alive, and our brothers, 
the laws of the underworld, will not receive you kindly, knowing that you tried to 
destroy us as far as you could,’ (54c) showing kinship between the laws of the city 
and the laws of the gods. Socrates, then, is arguably forbidding resistance against 
unjust laws handed down by the gods; his position, for instance, would imply that it is 
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wrong to carry out actions like freeing slaves. Therefore, there seems to be a tension 
between Socrates’ position and the aim of resisting domination. 
 
Socrates as not defending domination 
There are two responses we can give to this counterexample; 1) we can note that by 
Foucault’s account, Socrates cannot be seen as supporting domination; 2) with a 
deeper look at the Greek understanding of the law, we can see that Socrates is 
actually acting to defend, rather than block, freedom. 
  First, returning to our definition of domination, domination describes a 
strategic situation in which a group or individual succeeds in freezing a field of power 
relations such that they can no longer be reversed. While Socrates is defending the 
Athenian laws as they currently exist, he is by no means advocating for their being or 
becoming frozen. Instead, as we saw above, Socrates suggests that there are two 
responses to the laws. One is obedience, but the other is to persuade the country 
that the laws are unjust: ‘You must either persuade [your country] or obey its orders;’ 
(51b) ‘one must obey the commands of one’s city and country, or persuade it as to 
the nature of justice;’ (51b-c) ‘we give two alternatives, either to persuade us or to do 
what we say.’ (52a) The possibility of “persuading” the laws is the result of the 
Athenian understanding of the laws as deriving their justification both from divine 
sources and from the demos.73 This double nature of the law - that it is both 
democratically determined and given by mandate - is made clear in the laws’ 
discussion of the wrongs of breaking them: ‘We say that the one who disobeys does 
 
73 See Harris (2006b), p.51: ‘According to Demosthenes, the law derives its legitimacy from several sources: 1) 
the will of the gods, 2) human reason, 3) moral improvement, and 4) the agreement of the community…. A law 
in the fullest sense of the word was not only passed by the Assembly, which granted the approval of the 
community, but also sanctioned by the gods.’ 
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wrong in three ways, first because in us he disobeys his parents, also those who 
brought him up, and because, in spite of his agreement, he neither obeys us nor if, 
we do something wrong, does he try to persuade us to do better.’ (51e-52a, 
emphasis mine) As the laws are partially the product of the demos, disobeying the 
laws means disobeying those who came before and endorsed and consented to the 
laws, in addition to disobeying the gods. 
  This endorsement of persuasion as a method for changing the laws means 
that Socrates cannot be read as supporting situations of domination. Foucault 
himself makes clear that an important feature of such situations is that they are not 
open to being changed:  
The important question… [is] whether the system of constraints in which a 
society functions leaves individuals the liberty to transform the system. 
Obviously, constraints of any kind are going to be intolerable to certain segments 
of society…. But a system of constraint becomes truly intolerable when the 
individuals who are affected by it don’t have the means of modifying it. (SCSA 
148) 
In a situation of domination, the ability to change the situation is taken away from the 
individuals within it. Socrates, however, is presenting and endorsing the possibility of 
changing the situation by persuading the laws.74 He is not, therefore, contradicting 
 
74 Socrates’ endorsement of the possibility of changing the laws forms an interesting contrast with the 
sometimes extreme distaste many Greek communities had for such changes. Harris (2006a, p.23-24) notes 
that ‘The Greeks saw changes in the law not as a sign of legal progress or as a healthy adaptation to new 
realities, but as a symptom of disorder.’ (ibid., p.23) He notes the praise given to communities like the 
Spartans, who reportedly had the same laws for 400 years, and gives a number of examples of entrenchment 
clauses found in Greek legal codes which criminalised changing, or even proposing to change, laws. For 
instance, a property law from Halicarnassus has the clause: ‘If anyone wishes to destroy this law or propose a 
vote to annul it, let his property be sold and dedicated to Apollo and let him go into exile. If it (i.e., his 
property) is not worth ten staters, let him be sold into slavery abroad and let there be no (possibility of) return 
to Halicarnassus.’ (Koerner (1993), #84, lines 32-41, cited in Harris (2006a), p.23) 
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the aim of avoiding domination. 
  Second, as we said above, Socrates’ defence of the law can actually be 
interpreted as defending freedom, rather than restricting them. In contrast to a liberal 
understanding of law as placing limits on the actions of individuals, the Greek 
lawgivers saw themselves as preventing tyranny and thereby opening up a space for 
freedom. In his paper, ‘Solon and the Spirit of the Law in Archaic and Classical 
Greece,’ Edward Harris argues that the Greeks did not understand the problem of 
governance in terms of a simple dichotomy between bad lawlessness and good law-
and-order. Instead, Greek lawgivers such as Solon saw a lawful society as carrying 
its own threats in the form of tyranny, the autocratic rule of one man: 
By the powerful men a city is destroyed, and into the slavery/of a single ruler the 
people falls through its folly./Once you raise a man up too high, it is not easy to 
restrain/Him later; right now you must heed this advice. (Solon fr. 9, Harris’ 
translation, cited in Harris 2006a, p.10) 
Good governance, then, was a matter of having the proper balance between the 
people and their leaders, and in their lawgiving activity, men like Solon attempted to 
achieve this balance in several ways. For instance, Solon divided power not between 
individual men but between boards of magistrates. Harris describes Solon’s activity 
as follows: 
Solon sees the rule of laws as an alternative to the rule of one man and does not 
use the law to seize power as a tyrant. In his opinion, the rule of law should 
serve to liberate the community as well as to bring order. The greatest threat to 
freedom is the greed of those in power. To preserve freedom, therefore, the 
lawgiver should restrain the leaders of the people. (Harris 2006a, p.14) 
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In this light, then, we can see that Socrates defence of the laws is not a defence of 
domination; in fact, it is a defence of freedom. The Greeks understood the laws as a 
defence against being ruled by the whims of powerful men and, in encouraging 
Socrates to break the laws of the city, Crito is encouraging just such behaviour. 
Against this, Socrates argues for the importance of the laws, that which holds open a 
space for men to live freely. 
 
Socrates as a successful practitioner of freedom 
We have demonstrated, then, that Socrates holds the three necessary aims of the 
practice of freedom and, therefore, that his parrhesiastic activity was a practice of 
freedom. We have also answered the question of how successful he was in each of 
the three aims. First, he was clearly successful in the care of himself, as evidenced 
through the harmony between his logos and his bios. Second, he had clear success 
in the critical ontology of ourselves; this is evidenced partly through Socrates’ own 
self-knowledge and how this is manifested in his singular mode of being, and partly 
through his demonstrations of this on others: he is clearly capable of identifying not 
only the mode of being of others but also the source of that mode of being. Third, 
Socrates has some success in resisting domination, in that he avoids instantiating 
new situations of domination. We can conclude, then, that according to the criteria 
derived from Foucault’s work Socrates practices freedom with success. 
  Beyond this, Socrates seems to have achieved the superlative form of the 
practice of freedom that we have previously referred to as the creation of new 
cultural forms. Not only did Socrates successfully take care of himself, he created a 
new mode of being, that of the Socratic philosopher or parrhesiast, which formed a 
new diversification in the social fabric. This is particularly evident through the 
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importance Socrates held as a model for later Hellenistic movements in philosophy 
such as Stoicism and Cynicism. 
  This suggests an amendment to our earlier discussion of the creation of 
cultural forms. We suggested that carrying out this practice would require one have 
significant success in each of the three aims but, while Socrates achieves this in the 
care of the self and the critique of ourselves, he only seems to be minimally 
successful at resistance to domination: he avoids the creation of new situations of 
domination, but does not demolish existing ones. It seems, then, that while it is 
possible for resistance to domination to involve removing situations of domination, 
this is not necessary for a practice of freedom to be superlatively successful. This 
also suggests that the aim of resisting domination is more like a regulative criterion 
than a positive one. 
 
Can the practice of freedom take anything from parrhesia? 
Now, we’ve established that, using our account, Socratic parrhesia can be analysed 
as a successful practice of freedom. There is a further question, however: can 
everything important in Socratic parrhesia be accounted for by our account? Are 
there aspects of Socratic parrhesia, which seem to be important aspects of the 
practice of freedom, yet which cannot be accounted for on our model? In this 
section, I want to look at three aspects of parrhesia which seem to be important for 
its effects and ask whether our model can account for them: the importance of 
practicing parrhesia in face-to-face relationships with private individuals; the 
adequation between one’s bios and one’s logos; and the role of courage. 
  The shift from political parrhesia in which the crowd are addressed as a 
private individual as citizens, to Socratic parrhesia in which the interlocutor is 
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addressed as a private individual, is important in that it makes it possible to test the 
mode of being of the interlocutor. Furthermore, Foucault claims that not only does 
parrhesia require these face-to-face relationships, in discussing the Gorgias he 
suggests they must be friendly relationships: a productive parrhesiastic relationship 
requires knowledge, frankness and friendship. (GS 365) 
 Now, can our account of the practice of freedom explain this kind of detail? To 
answer this, we need to reintroduce the distinction between mere practices of 
freedom and successful practices of freedom. We can note that there doesn’t seem 
to be any contradiction between holding the necessary aim of the practice of 
freedom and failing to have close relations with others: as long as you aren’t aiming 
to bring about situations of domination, there doesn’t seem to be a specification for 
the kinds of relationships you should have. However, it is also possible to have 
abortive attempts at parrhesiastic relations. Foucault argues that the Laches shows 
us a ‘good, wholly positive game of parrhesia’, implying that there can be negative 
examples. (CT 143) If we are right to read Socrates attribution of friendship to 
Callicles as ironic, then the Gorgias - which ends with Callicles refusing to continue 
speaking freely - would provide just such an example. Now, if close relationships are 
a necessary condition for successful parrhesia, this suggests that we should be 
looking at successful practices of freedom rather than all practices of freedom. In this 
case, we can account for the close relationships involved in parrhesia. We noted in 
the previous chapter that successful instances of the practice of freedom imply 
carrying out the care of the self and the critique of ourselves in concert with others, 
as the practitioner is aware of the effect of their mode of being on the modes of being 
of the others around them and vice-versa. Such relationships would require some 
degree of closeness and good-will (or at least respect) to allow for such coordination 
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without domination. Our account can therefore account for the close relations 
between the parrhesiast and their interlocutors. 
  Second, there is the role of courage in parrhesia. Although courage was not 
given as one of the criteria of parrhesia, we should note that it operates as a kind of 
ethical condition of possibility of engaging in parrhesia: parrhesia requires the 
courage to speak frankly, to risk retribution, for engaging in critique, to choose an 
ethical rather than a safe version of oneself. However, it is unclear that our account 
of the practice of freedom does, or even can, account for this. Wouldn’t requiring 
certain moral characteristics of the practitioner require a substantive, rather than a 
procedural, account of the practice of freedom? 
  This isn’t quite correct. Our account of the practice of freedom is a 
constitutivist one and, as we have noted before, a constitutive account allows us to 
derive normative content from a procedural account. For instance, in playing chess, 
successfully achieving the aim of checkmating your opponent implies a need for 
certain cognitive capacities and ethical characteristics; perhaps the courage to make 
a risky move. In the same way, our account of the practice of freedom leaves room 
for practitioners to require certain ethical virtues. 
  Finally, the most important aspect of Socratic parrhesia seems to be the 
adequation between logos and bios, the concordance between the rational account 
one gives of one’s mode of being and one’s mode of being itself. This adequation is 
both the condition of possibility for the parrhesiast’s engaging in parrhesia and what 
is being put to the test in parrhesia. 
  It seems to me that we can account for this aspect through the necessary aim 
of taking care of the self. First, we noted before that Socrates considers his 
parrhesiastic activity to be, not only a way of encouraging others to take care of 
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themselves, but also of his care of himself. (Apology 37e-38a) Second, in the 
previous, we already saw that the care of the self should be understood as the 
recognition of oneself as an appropriate object of concern and the attempt to 
transform one’s way of life in line with this concern. The successful practice of the 
care of the self, then, will result in an adequation between one’s logos - that one 
should have a certain mode of being - and one’s bios, one’s mode of being. 
  We can conclude, therefore, that although there are aspects of Socratic 
parrhesia that are important for the practice of freedom, these aspects can be 
accounted for within our model. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have applied our model of the practice of freedom to Socrates’ 
parrhesiastic activity and shown, firstly, that Socrates holds the three necessary aims 
of the practice of freedom, secondly, that he successfully engaged in the practice of 
freedom and, thirdly, that our model of the practice of freedom can be applied to real 
life examples. Socrates’ superlative practice of freedom has suggested a small 
amendment to our account of the practice of freedom, namely to note that we may 
have overstated the amount of success at resisting domination required for a 
superlative practice of freedom: Socrates does not seem to have removed existing 
situations of domination, but only to have avoided the creation of new ones.  
  Although we have shown that our constitutivist account of the practice of 
freedom can be applied to real individuals, it is worth noting that our only example is 
of the Greco-Roman form of care of the self. As we saw in chapter 1, this form of 
care of the self is often considered to involve a hyper-active conception of agency, a 
contention we wanted to defuse. Next, then, we will examine an example of the 
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practice of freedom where the practitioner underwent a transformation in their 





Chapter 6: Oscar Wilde, Fine Liars and Humble Individualists 
Introduction 
This chapter is our second engagement with a practitioner of freedom. The previous 
one, with Socrates, took him as a paradigmatic example of a practitioner of freedom. 
In this chapter, we turn to a figure who, although also a practitioner of freedom, is 
primarily of interest because of a transformation he underwent in his experience of 
the practice of freedom. This figure is Oscar Wilde, the 19th Century poet, author, 
playwright and aesthete. 
 Wilde has several points in his favour. First, he appears a very likely 
candidate for the practice of freedom, given his clear attempts to make his mode of 
being into a work of art. Second, although Foucault never wrote about Wilde directly, 
as we saw in our discussion of the critical ontology he did write about the 
Baudelairean dandy who attempts ‘to make of his body, his behaviour, his feelings 
and passions, his very existence, a work of art.’ (WE 312) Wilde was clearly 
influenced by both dandyism and by Baudelaire; the latter influence can be seen in 
his admiring discussions of Baudelaire in works including ‘The Decay of Lying’ and 
‘The Critic as Artist’. Third, Wilde wrote a number of texts explaining his views on 
aesthetics and art and, importantly for our purposes, he wrote a text in prison 
extensively detailing a crisis he experienced in his practice of freedom and the 
transformation he underwent in response. 
 It is this final aspect – Wilde’s transformation – that makes Wilde such an 
interesting figure to engage with. His transformation is not only in his practice itself, 
but in the experience of agency that accompanies it. Our previous discussions of the 
practice of freedom may have given the impression of an active and deliberate 
activity: the practitioner deliberately shapes her life in a certain way while viewing it 
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from a critical distance. Wilde initially held to a similar model, but, after a period of 
crisis leading up to and including his imprisonment, he came to understanding the 
practice of freedom as involving an experience of the unfolding of a process within 
oneself in which he, nevertheless, was participating. In short, Wilde’s texts show a 
transformation between understanding the practice of freedom as an autonomous 
activity and an experience of the practice of freedom as involving what Béatrice Han-
Pile has recently called a “middle-voiced” experience of agency. Approaching Wilde 
through this lens will not only allow us to give a fuller account of his activity of self-
expression; it will also allow us to provide a response to critiques of Foucault, such 
as those we saw in the first chapter from Lois McNay, that see his account of ethics 
as overly active and privileging a masculine-coded view of the agent. 
 This chapter begins with a short definition and discussion of the middle-voiced 
experience of agency. Next, we will bring out Wilde’s earlier understanding of the 
practice of freedom using three texts he wrote before his conviction. We will then 
examine Wilde’s letter from prison, De Profundis, to show Wilde’s new 
understanding of the practice of freedom and how the experience of agency 
changed. Finally, we will conclude by discussing the implications of this experience 
of agency for our account. 
 
Middle-voiced agency 
In her paper ‘‘The Doing is Everything’: A Middle-voiced Reading of Agency in 
Nietzsche,’ Béatrice Han-Pile identifies an experience of agency distinct from either 
the experience of being an active agent carrying out actions and the experience of 
being passively acted upon. In this experience, the “middle-voiced” experience, the 
agent experiences herself as both participating in and being the medium for the 
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unfolding of a process which she did not initiate and which she does not have control 
over. One way of bringing out this experience is by comparing the linguistic active 
voice and the middle voice. English lacks a middle-voice, but Han-Pile draws 
illustrative examples from ancient Greek. For instance, compare the Greek active 
‘πολέμον ποίεῖ’ (polemon poiei) which means ‘he makes war’ in the sense of starting 
the war, e.g., by declaring it, with the middle-voiced ‘πολέμον ποίεῖται’ (polemon 
poieitai), which means ‘he is making war’ in the sense of fighting in it. (Han-Pile 
2020, 53) In the latter case, the soldier is participating in the process to the extent 
that he is fighting in the war – it is not the case that the war is something that is 
simply happening to him. However, it is also not the case that the war is something 
over which he has reflective control: he did not choose to start the war. 
 Middle-voiced activities have this same basic experience. Han-Pile identifies 
three phenomenological criteria for the middle-voiced experience: i) the agent comes 
to recognise that they are engaged in a process they did not initiate; ii) the agent 
experiences themselves as responding to this process, whether pre-reflectively or 
reflectively; iii) the agent does not have, and does not experience themselves as 
having, reflective control over the process.75 (ibid., 57) Take the example of trying to 
sleep. First, there is the process unfolding within us: i.e., falling asleep. Falling 
asleep is not something that simply happens to us, but rather is a process we 
participate in. Second, we respond to this process; pre-reflectively, we might 
unreflectively allow our attention to relax and so on; reflectively, we might attempt to 
stop thinking, to engage in activities that distract our attention (e.g., counting sheep), 
etc. Third, we do not have reflective control over the process: we cannot simply 
choose to fall asleep. Note that in either kind of response, pre-reflective or reflective, 
 
75 Note that this is not experienced as a lack of reflective control, only an absence. 
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the response aims to allow the process to manifest itself. The claim in this chapter 
will be that, first, Wilde’s second model involves a middle-voiced experience of self-
expression, and second, that this model constitutes a practice of freedom. 
 
Pre-prison Wilde: Fine Liars and the practice of freedom 
In his works written before his imprisonment, Wilde holds to a model of artistic 
activity which should be understood as an instance of the practice of freedom. This 
model is a model of the artistic mode of life in which the artist, as well as their other 
work, also creates their own life as a work of art. For reasons that will become 
apparent, I will refer to this model as the Fine Liar model. 
 In summary, in the Fine Liar model the artist takes their everyday existence as 
the subject matter for criticism and artistic creation. They select the aesthetically 
pleasing aspects of their existence and exaggerate them, transforming the everyday 
events of their life into an artistic work, a mode of existence that conforms with their 
aesthetic values. In this activity, the Fine Liar is not concerned with giving a truthful 
representation of their life, but rather with giving themselves pleasure through 
producing the representation. Further, this activity is carried out self-consciously and 
deliberately. Finally, the activity of the Fine Liar puts them at odds with any social 
order which attempts to direct their behaviour. 
 To elucidate this model, we will turn to three texts Wilde wrote around 1890: 
‘The Decay of Lying,’ ‘The Critic as Artist’ and ‘The Soul of Man under Socialism.’ 
These texts will allow us to show that Wilde holds this model and, furthermore, to 




An aside on Wilde’s dialogues 
We should briefly note that two of these texts – ‘The Decay of Lying’ (DL) and ‘The 
Critic as Artist’ (CA) – are written as dialogues. Given the various forms and uses 
dialogues can have, we should be cautious about attributing the opinions expressed 
in the dialogues to Wilde himself. However, two considerations support such an 
attribution. First, the dialogues make interventions into contemporary debates where 
they seem to represent Wilde’s actual opinions. As Richard Ellman points out in his 
biography of Wilde, ‘The Decay of Lying’ serves to criticise the realism of Zola 
(Ellman 1987, 285) while ‘The Critic as Artist’ directly attacks the negative view of art 
criticism held by Wilde’s sometime-friend James Whistler and Matthew Arnold’s 
claim that criticism should show us its object as it really is. (ibid., 285) These 
interventions in contemporary discussions suggest that Wilde held the opinions of his 
primary speakers. 
 Finally, in ‘The Critic as Artist’ Gilbert seems to explicitly state the purpose of 
the dialogue. His interlocutor, Ernest, criticises Gilbert for his own use of the dialogue 
form, leading to the following exchange: 
Ernest: By… means [of the dialogue]… [the author] can invent an imaginary 
antagonist, and convert him when he chooses by some absurdly sophistical 
argument. 
Gilbert: Ah! It is so easy to convert others. It is so difficult to convert oneself. To 
arrive at what one really believes, one must speak through lips different from 
one’s own. (CA 99) 
Ernest’s criticism equally applies to Wilde, as over the course of the dialogue Ernest 
is easily converted by Gilbert. This suggests that Gilbert’s response is also Wilde’s. 
The aim of the dialogue, this implies, is for Wilde to determine his own true beliefs. 
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The interesting thing about this approach is that it foreshadows Wilde’s later 
transformation in his experience of the practice of freedom. Wilde here seems to be 
use writing as a middle-voiced way of uncovering his beliefs: he is participating in a 
process of belief expression that is already going on through him, but this is not a 
process over which he has reflective control, otherwise he could simply express what 
he believes. If we grant that Wilde had some success in this activity, then we should 
conclude that the beliefs expressed by his dialogues are his true beliefs.  
 These considerations, I argued, give us reasonable justification to attribute the 
beliefs expressed by the primary interlocutors to Wilde. 
 
‘The Decay of Lying’: the Artist as a Liar 
‘The Decay of Lying: An Observation’ is a dialogue with two participants, Cyril and 
Vivian. Their discussion centres on an article written by Vivian called ‘The Decay of 
Lying: A Protest’, parts of which he reads aloud. This dialogue introduces several 
aspects of the Fine Liar model: i) that the artist is not concerned with representing 
the truth; ii) that the artist is concerned with their own pleasure; iii) that artistic activity 
is a matter of selection and exaggeration. Although the dialogue mostly focuses on 
artistic creation, its claims can also be applied to the creation of one’s life as an 
artistic work. 
 In his article, Vivian suggests that lying itself is an art: 
People have a careless way of talking about a “born liar”, just as they talk about 
a “born poet”. But in both cases they are wrong. Lying and poetry are arts – arts, 
as Plato saw, not unconnected with each other – and they require the most 
careful study, the most disinterested devotion. (DL 7) 
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Vivian provides no reference for this claim about the connection between poetry and 
lying, but one possible source would be Book X of the Republic. Socrates argues 
that poetry is merely the imitation of activities that the poet does not know how to 
perform, and therefore should be excluded from the ideal city as harmful. (Republic 
595-602) One way of reading this would be to see poetry as a kind of lying. 
However, Vivian turns this evaluation on its head. The connection between poetry 
and lying is to the benefit of both: as both are arts, both require care and 
commitment.76 The connection between art and lying leads Vivian to the thesis of his 
article: modern literature, he claims, has become boring, and a major cause of this is 
the ‘decay of Lying as an art, a science and a social pleasure.’ He continues: ‘the 
ancient historians gave us delightful fiction in the form of fact; the modern novelist 
presents us with dull facts under the guise of fiction.’ (ibid., 6) Lying, Vivian claims, is 
an art which is essential to the practice of other arts, and revitalising lying means 
learning to lie again: ‘What we have to do, what at any rate it is our duty to do, is to 
revive this old art of lying.’ (ibid., 33)77 
 
Lying for its own sake 
Vivian gives us a variety of examples of lying: 
 
76 We will see an echo of this reversal in ‘The Critic as Artist’ when Gilbert argues that it is more difficult to 
write history than to make history. Contrast with The Republic (599b): 
If [the poet] were in truth a knower of these things that he also imitates, he would be far more serious 
about the deeds than the imitations and would try to leave many fair deeds behind as memorials of himself 
and would more eager to be the one who is lauded rather than the one who lauds.  
77 Given our subject for this chapter, Wilde’s practice of freedom, the re-appearance of this structure of the 
voluntary choice that becomes a task or duty should be of interest. As we noted in our earlier chapters, this 
structure is common in practices of freedom. 
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Lying for the sake of gaining some immediate personal advantage. 
Lying for the sake of the improvement of the young. 
Lying for the sake of a monthly salary. (ibid., 33-34) 
Although he attributes some positive value to all these forms of lying, he doesn’t 
consider them above reproach; for instance, lying for a salary is common in 
journalism ‘but it is said to be a somewhat dull occupation.’ (ibid., 34) There is one 
kind of lying, however, the Vivian considers unblemished: “Lying for its own sake.” 
This is a kind of lying that is engaged in solely for the pleasure of telling the lie. Now, 
it is important not to confuse this with forms of lying where the results of the lie give 
us pleasure. For instance, if you lie to someone to hurt them and gain a malicious 
pleasure through doing so, this was not lying for its own sake. However, if you told a 
lie for the pleasure of telling the lie and this happened to hurt someone else (for 
instance, if they discovered your lie), this would be lying for its own sake.78 
 For Vivian the paradigmatic example of lying for its own sake comes in what 
he calls “the fine lie”: 
How different [is the temperament of the lying] politician from the temperament of 
the true liar, with his frank, fearless statements, his superb irresponsibility, his 
healthy, natural disdain for proof of any kind! After all, what is a fine lie? Simply 
that which is its own evidence. If a man is sufficiently unimaginative to produce 
evidence in support of a lie, he might just as well speak the truth at once. (ibid., 
5) 
 
78 For an illustrative example, imagine that someone is telling you a story from their life. You assume the story 
to be true and that the events they told you about took place in the way they described. Later, however, you 
find that they have embellished aspects of the story, not so as to make themselves look better, etc., but in 
ways which made the story more pleasurable to tell. In this case, they have lied for the sake of the pleasure of 
telling the lie; you may well be hurt by finding out that you have been lied to but, as this is not their intention, 
their lie remains an instance of “lying for its own sake”. 
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The fine lie is delivered boldly, with no attempt at justification, because it is so 
compelling that it is its own justification.79 In other words, the fine lie cannot be 
simply plausible. It cannot be something that an audience would hear and think “that 
seems about right” or “that’s what the evidence suggests.” If we tell plausible lies, the 
pleasure derived from them comes not from the telling of the lie itself, but from our 
own cleverness in deceiving others. For an illustration of a fine lie, Vivian gives us 
this image of the first liar: 
He… who first, without ever having gone out to the rude chase, told the 
wondering cavemen at sunset how he had dragged the Megatherium from the 
purple darkness of its jasper cave, or slain the Mammoth in single combat and 
brought back its gilded tusk… was the true founder of social intercourse. (ibid., 
19-20) 
The first liar is not telling lies that have strong evidence or that are simply plausible – 
in fact, they seem easily disproved – instead he is telling beautiful lies, lies that his 
audience wants to believe and that he enjoys telling. It is also worth noting what 
Vivian is doing in this passage. He illustrates the beauty of the first liar’s lies through 
his use of imagery: the Megatherium lies in “purple darkness” in a “jasper cave”, the 
Mammoth’s tusk is “gilded.” It is because these lies are beautiful that they ‘charm,’ 
‘delight’ and ‘give pleasure’. (ibid., 20) However, Vivian is also himself engaging lying 
for its own sake. This image of “the first liar” is itself a false image, but Vivian makes 
it seem true precisely through the way he tells it. This passage, then, both presents 
an example of a fine lie and is such an example. 
 
79 Compare this with a style of lying common in politics, which we could call “lying with evidence.” A political 
figure or activist might produce a case for a false position while (mis-)using statistics or studies to support their 
point. For instance, a common tactic among climate change deniers is to ignore long-term trends of falls in the 
size of glaciers, in favour of studies which show short-term growth. 
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 The true liar, then, lies for the pleasure of telling a fine lie. And, Vivian notes, 
‘the highest development of this is… Lying in Art.’ (ibid., 34) 
 
Art as a form of lying 
As well as suggesting a vital role for lying for its own sake in art, Vivian can be read 
as suggesting that art itself is a form of lying. He makes this most explicit in a 
passage which imagines a time when society becomes bored of realism in art and 
welcomes the return of the liar: 
Nor will [the liar] be welcomed by society alone. Art… will run to greet him, and 
will kiss his fake, beautiful lips, knowing that he alone is in possession of [her] 
great secret… that truth is entirely and absolutely a matter of style.’ (ibid., 20) 
This fits with what we said before, that the liar lies in such a way as to make his lies 
self-evidently true. Further, if only the liar is in possession of the secret of Art, then 
either all artists are also liars, or artists are not in possession of the secret of Art. It 
seems likely that Wilde would consider artists in the latter category not to be true 
artists, and so the conclusion would be that all true artists are true liars. If lying for its 
own sake is at the core of art, then all art is an attempt to produce a lie about the 
world that is self-evidently true. 
 We can see what Vivian means by this if we turn to the criteria he gives for 
art. First, Vivian maintains that the artist must be indifferent to the subject-matter of 
art. 
The only beautiful things… are the things that do not concern us…. To art’s 
subject-matter we should be more or less indifferent. We should, at any rate, 
have no preferences, no prejudices, nor partisan feeling of any kind. (ibid., 13) 
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When Vivian talks about indifference, he cannot mean aesthetic indifference, given 
that we are talking about beautiful things. Instead, he means that we should not have 
moral feelings, political biases; subjects for art should not be things that are 
necessary for us. The liar, similarly, only concerns himself with the subject-matter of 
his lies insofar as they have or lack the qualities that make them suitable to be fine 
lies: he lies for the pleasure of lying and the beauty of the lie. 
 Second, Vivian claims that: 
Art itself is really a form of exaggeration; and selection, which is the very spirit of art, 
is nothing more than an intensified mode of over-emphasis. (ibid., 16) 
Artistic creation is a matter of selecting the aesthetically pleasing features of one’s 
subject-matter and exaggerating them. Again, this activity is the same as that of the 
true liar. The liar exaggerates the beautiful and pleasurable features of his subject 
until it becomes self-evidently true. 
 The fine lie, then, meets both criteria for art. Note, however, that the converse 
is also true on Vivian’s account. If a work of art is defined by indifference and 
exaggeration, then all art will also be a “fine lie”. On Vivian’s account, then, Art is a 
form of lying for its own sake. In his own words: ‘Lying, the telling of beautiful untrue 
things, is the proper aim of Art.’ (ibid., 37) 
 
Living a lie 
Vivian’s discussion suggests that not only are all artists liars, the liar is an artist in 
her own right. In such cases, the artist takes her own life as her subject matter. We 
saw this in the figure of the first liar: perhaps he found a mammoth tusk, or saw a 
Megatherium, and his lie followed from there. 
 We should note that, given our criteria of art, this activity leads to an odd 
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detachment from one’s own life: if the artist must be indifferent in certain ways to her 
subject-matter, then the artist who makes her life into a work of art must be 
indifferent to her own lived experience. She must approach her life without 
‘prejudices, preference, partisan feelings of any kind.’ (ibid., 13) The liar has critical 
distance from her own life: she evaluates it without prejudice, looking for elements 
which can be exaggerated to produce a beautiful lie. 
 We can see a clear example of this mode of being in Wilde himself. In 1877, 
Wilde went on holiday to Greece where he visited the excavations at Olympia. Later, 
he told a friend he had seen part of a statue of Apollo being discovered: 
[D]uring the excavation I was present when the great Apollo was raised from the 
swollen river. I saw his white outstretched arm appear above the waters. The 
spirit of the god still dwelt within the marble. (cited by Ellman 1987, 69) 
However, Ellman notes: ‘In fact the head of Apollo, not his arm, had been found, but 
on dry land, and some days before Wilde got there.’ (ibid., 69) Wilde himself 
engaged in the activity we discussed above: taking up an attitude of indifference to 
one’s own life and exaggerating the beautiful aspects of it. 
This view of the artistic mode of life, then, entails certain of the features we 
discussed in our introduction: the artist is concerned not with representing the truth, 
but in giving pleasure to themselves. Artistic activity is a matter of selection and 
exaggeration. Finally, this activity of selection is carried out actively and deliberately. 
 
‘The Critic as Artist’: Criticism and Creation 
This text, like ‘The Decay of Lying’, takes the form of a dialogue with two 
participants: Gilbert and Ernest. In the dialogue, Gilbert defends art criticism from 
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Ernest’s Whistlerian objections and argues that criticism is itself a form of artistic 
creation. 
 For our purposes, this dialogue repeats the idea that art is a matter of 
selection and exaggeration, although here this activity is put under the heading of 
criticism rather than lying. Gilbert also suggests that criticism can be applied to one’s 
own life, highlighting the kind of critical self-transformation that we have argued is 
central to the practice of freedom. Finally, Gilbert explicitly argues that this artistic 
activity is reflective and suggests that critical activity is superior to and more free 
than other types of activity. 
 
What is criticism? 
‘The Critic as Artist’ begins with a discussion of criticism which, to a significant 
extent, parallels the discussion of lying we saw in ‘The Decay of Lying.’ First, Gilbert 
argues that criticism is an art. He maintains that: 
The critic occupies the same relation to the work of art that he criticises as the 
artist does to the visible world of form and colour, or the unseen world of passion 
and thought. (ibid., 88) 
This has implications for criticism and art. If the critic has the same relationship as 
the artist, his role cannot be merely destructive. Instead, the critic must also be 
engaged in a kind of creative work. Further, given that Gilbert rejects Arnold’s view 
that the role of the critic is to see the work as it truly is (ibid., 70), if the critic is doing 
something other than re-presenting the work of the artist, then the artist must be 




Why should [criticism] not be [art]? It works with materials, and puts them into a 
form that is at once new and delightful. What more can one say of poetry? (ibid., 
69) 
Both criticism and art do not merely represent their subject-matter, they transpose it 
into a different medium and a more beautiful form. As in with Vivian in ‘The Decay of 
Lying’, Gilbert does not stop here, and goes on to argue that all art is criticism. 
Criticism, he maintains, is an essential part of all artistic activity, and without it ‘there 
is no artistic creation at all worthy of the name.’ (ibid., 58) This all parallels the 
discussion of lying, with the same result. Ernest, agreeing with Gilbert, says: 
[T]he function of [art] is to create from the rough material of actual existence, a 
new world that will be more marvellous, more enduring and more true than the 
world that common eyes look on. (ibid., 67) 
One brief but important part of this account is that Gilbert explicitly mentions the 
possibility of applying criticism to one’s own life, and thereby making it into an artistic 
creation. Gilbert claims that two ‘highest and supreme arts’ are ‘Life and Literature.’ 
Although Gilbert leaves the art of Life to one side, noting that ‘the principles [of the 
art of Life], as laid down by the Greeks, we may not realise in an age so marred by 
false ideals as our own.’ (ibid., 52) Although the art of Life of the Greeks may no 
longer be practical, the art of Life does exist. Given what we have seen, Life as an 
art must involve taking some material, perhaps the events of one’s life, as the 
starting point for a new creation to be transformed into a beautiful mode of life. 
 
Criticism as autonomous activity 
The importance of criticism for Gilbert becomes apparent when he draws a 
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distinction between artistic and non-artistic activities. He argues that ‘it is very much 
more difficult to talk about a thing than to do it’, and, further, that ‘Anybody can make 
history. Only a great man can write it.’ (CA 62) Non-artistic, and hence non-critical 
activity, is easy, Gilbert argues, because it is unfree: 
[Action] is a blind thing dependent on external influence, and moved by an 
impulse of whose nature it is unconscious. It is a thing incomplete in its essence 
because limited by accident, and ignorant of its direction, being always at 
variance with its aim. (ibid., 62) 
Action is directed, not by the agent, but by the ‘scientific laws that govern life’; for 
instance: ‘the scientific principle of Heredity has… shown us that we are never less 
free than when we try to act.’ (ibid., 90) Criticism, however, offers us the possibility of 
freedom, presumably because it makes sure that our behaviour is in line with our 
aims, rather than those of biological impulses. All artistic work is of this type, 
according to Gilbert: 
All fine imaginative work is self-conscious and deliberate. No poet sings because 
he must sing…. A great poet sings because he chooses to sing. (ibid., 58) 
For Gilbert, artistic work – which is carried out critically and deliberately – is distinct 
from other forms of activity, which are directed by blind impulse. 
  The ‘Critic as Artist’, then, supports our model of the Fine Liar. It reiterates the 
idea of artistic creation as involving selection and transformation; it shows that we 
are justified in arguing that these ideas around artistic creation can be applied to the 
creation of one’s life as a work of art. Finally, it clearly shows that Wilde sees the 




‘The Soul of Man under Socialism’: Freedom from Compulsion 
‘The Soul of Man under Socialism’, unlike the previous texts, is an essay written in 
Wilde’s own voice. In this essay, Wilde argues in favour of a very loosely defined 
socialism on the grounds of self-interest for people in general and the artist in 
particular. More specifically, Wilde gives two arguments: first, the suffering incurred 
by others distracts us from our proper work and socialism is the best way to stop this 
suffering; second, conceptualising socialism as an absence of coercion, Wilde 
maintains that socialism is the only acceptable form of government for artists, as 
artists must not be subject to coercion if they are to produce art. In reading this text, I 
will not concern myself with the details of Wilde’s account of socialism (which seems 
to be roughly: everyone will be provided for and there will be no compulsion), but 
rather focus on what he says about the artist. 
 For our purposes, this text reiterates the idea that the artist must produce art 
solely for her own pleasure (as we saw in ‘The Decay of Lying’) and, further, shows 
the necessary conflict between the artist and any external attempt to direct their 
mode of life. 
 
Sympathy for others 
Wilde notes that there is a great deal of suffering in the world and argues that this 
leads to most people having to concern themselves with others, rather than 
concerning themselves with themselves. The suffering that surrounds us in life 
compels us to want to do something about it and leads us to live, not for ourselves 
and our own pleasure or development, but for others. Suffering therefore leads 
artists astray for reasons we have already seen. As Vivian argued in ‘The Decay of 
Lying’, it is important that we are indifferent to the subject-matter of art. If the artist 
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creates art that aims, for example, to change the condition of sufferers then, for 
Wilde, they are not creating true art: 
[A]lone, without any reference to his neighbours, without any interference, the 
artist can fashion a beautiful thing; and if he does not do it solely for his own 
pleasure, he is not an artist at all. (ibid., 252) 
Suffering, if it distracts the artist, stops her from creating art. If, as Wilde maintains, 
socialism will end human suffering, then the artist should be a socialist. 
 
The absence of coercion 
Wilde also envisions socialism as a form of government which minimises compulsion 
over individuals and maximises their ability to act voluntarily. For instance, he 
maintains that socialism would end the ‘Tyranny of want’ that forces people into 
unpleasant and undignified labour with the threat of starvation. (ibid., 237) Under 
socialism, these individuals will no longer be compelled to work, and will be able to 
live for themselves: 
Every man must be left quite free to do his own work. No form of compulsion 
must be exercised over him. If there is, his work will not be good for him, will not 
be good in itself, and will not be good for others. And by work, I simply mean 
activity of any kind. (SMS 240, emphasis mine) 
Clearly, it is not only the needs of survival that Wilde thinks must be eliminated; 
instead, Wilde writes, ‘authority and compulsion are out of the question. All 
association must be voluntary.’ (ibid., 241) If this is true for people in general, it is 
especially true for artists. Given Wilde’s account of artistic creation, any compulsion 
over artist will stop them from producing art at all: 
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It is evident, then, that all authority in [artistic practices] is bad. People 
sometimes inquire what form of government is most suitable for an artist to live 
under. To this question there is only one answer. The form of government that is 
most suitable to the artist is no government at all. Authority over him and his art 
is ridiculous. (ibid., 265) 
It is only when the artist works for the pleasure of creating beautiful things that she is 
truly engaged in art. If authority is exercised over her, then she will not be working 
solely for her own pleasure; therefore, the artist must be opposed to all authority and 
compulsion. 
 
Art is opposed to society 
Wilde further suggests that, not only does art require freedom from social 
compulsion, but the production of art places the artist in opposition to society. The 
public are opposed to art, Wilde claims, on the grounds that it is morbid. They are 
wrong however, as morbidity is ‘a mood or emotion or a mode of thought that one 
cannot express.’ (ibid., 256-257) Rather, it is the public who are morbid, while the 
artist can express everything. Due to this, however, the public are right to distrust art: 
Art is Individualism, and Individualism is a disturbing and disintegrating force. 
Therein lies its immense value. For what it seeks to disturb is monotony of type, 
slavery of custom, tyranny of habit, and the reduction of man to the level of a 
machine. (ibid., 254) 
Society requires that individuals take their places within it; Art, however, attempts to 
destabilise society as it currently exists, because it is concerned with the creation of 
new idiosyncratic modes of life. Insofar as the current social order limits the 
possibilities of self-development it must be opposed by the artist. 
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In this text, then, Wilde reiterates the idea that artists must produce art solely 
for the pleasure they get from creation. Furthermore, he argues that artists must be 
fundamentally opposed to compulsion and to a social order that attempts to direct 
people’s lives and self-development. 
 
The Fine Liar as a practitioner of freedom 
From the three texts we have examined we have successfully reconstructed Wilde’s 
account of the artistic mode of life, what we have referred to as the Fine Liar model. 
On this account, the artistic mode of life involves an activity of selection and 
exaggeration of the aesthetically pleasing elements of one’s day-to-day existence, 
transforming it into an artist work. This activity must be carried out solely for the 
pleasure it gives the Fine Liar and therefore brings her into conflict with attempts to 
govern her life. Our next step must be to confirm that the Fine Liar is a practitioner of 
freedom by comparing the model to our three necessary criteria for practices of 
freedom. 
 
Resistance to domination 
As we saw in our discussion of ‘The Soul of Man under Socialism’, the Fine Liar is 
firmly committed to avoiding situations of domination. First, if the artist is to engage 
in art at all, they must be engaging in artistic activity with the sole aim of their own 
pleasure. Insofar as compulsion or government would disrupt them in this activity, 
they must oppose these forces. Furthermore, if the Fine Liar is producing their own 
life as a work of art, they cannot be opposed to compulsion only as it is directed 
towards art (e.g., censorship), but whether it affects their life at all. Now, as power 
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relations are any relationship in which someone’s behaviour is being modified, the 
artist must chafe against all power relations. Given that domination is a situation in 
which power relations have become frozen and cannot be changed, this means that 
the artist must oppose all domination, as it will stop them from changing the power 
relations they are subject to. 
 Second, the Fine Liar is committed to trying to produce a beautiful mode of life 
for themselves, which leads to them opposing social forms which try to limit this kind 
of self-expression. Given that one feature of domination is that, through freezing 
power relations, domination limits possible forms of the subject, the Fine Liar, again, 
must oppose domination. 
 
Care of the Self 
The Fine Liar aims to transform her everyday existence into a mode of being which 
meets certain aesthetic criteria. Given that she must be indifferent to the subject-
matter and guided by her own pleasure, the Fine Liar’s mode of being will be an 
expression of her aesthetic values. This, then, seems to meet our criteria for the care 
of the self as the attempt to transform one’s mode of being in line with one’s values. 
One possible worry is that this transformation might sound overly superficial, akin to 
a change of wardrobe. However, Wilde does see even transformations in one’s 
appearance as ways to express deeper values. In a letter to the Daily Telegraph, he 
writes: 
The coat… of next season, will be an exquisite colour-note, and have also a 
great psychological value. It will emphasise the serious and thoughtful side of 
one’s character. One will be able to discern a man’s view of life by the colour he 
selects. The colour of the coats will be symbolic…. The imagination will 
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concentrate itself on the waistcoat. Waistcoats will show whether a man can 
admire poetry or not. That will be very valuable. (Wilde 1962, 284) 
This view, that one’s external appearance can be used to express one’s values 
bears a strong resemblance to a passage of Baudelaire’s cited by Foucault. 
Baudelaire is talking about the modern painter who is capable of representing the 
spirit of the age. Of modern dress, he comments: 
The dress-coat and frock-coat… [possess a] poetic beauty, which is an 
expression of the public soul – an immense cortège of undertakers’ mutes…. We 
are each of us celebrating some funeral. (cited by Foucault 1997, 310) 
For Baudelaire, the modern painter is the one who can show this poetic beauty in 
modern dress. In a similar way, for Wilde, the Fine Liar is capable of expressing their 
personality and their values through their mode of being. 
 
The critical ontology of ourselves 
As we discussed at length in the ‘Critic as Artist’, the Fine Liar’s work relies on her 
use of the critical faculty to identify the aspects of her subject matter that are suitable 
for exaggeration and transformation. When the Fine Liar turns her critical faculty on 
herself, as she must in self-transformation, then she will engage in a critique of her 
mode of being. We should also note that, in the same way that we said that the 
critical ontology is concerned with how one’s mode of being came about and hence 
with finding what is contingent in it, artistic criticism us also concerned with the 





In this section, we have examined three of Wilde’s pre-prison texts in order to 
reconstruct the account of the artistic mode of life he then held. In ‘The Decay of 
Lying’, we saw that artistic activity is a form of what Wilde called ‘Lying for its own 
sake’ and was an activity of selection and exaggeration which attempted to produce 
self-evidently true fictions. In ‘The Critic as Artist’, we again saw that the artist was 
engaged in an activity of selection and transformation, here conceptualised as 
criticism rather than lying. Further, we saw that Wilde considered this critical activity 
to be autonomous. Finally, in ‘The Soul of Man under Socialism’ we saw again the 
insistence that the artist must work for their own pleasure and, furthermore, that this 
implies an opposition to social formations which would attempt to direct their activity. 
 We then read Wilde’s model of the Fine Liar in the light of our three necessary 
criteria for the practice of freedom, showing that all three are held and, therefore, that 
Wilde’s conception of artistic activity is a practice of freedom. Wilde, then, before his 
prison term, endorsed a practice of freedom understood as a self-conscious, 
deliberate, and autonomous activity carried out by the artist. 
 However, Wilde would later undergo a significant change in how he 
understood the artistic mode of life, coming to see it not as a deliberate activity but 
as a middle-voiced process going on within and through the person of the artist. We 
now turn to Wilde’s De Profundis in order to sketch this new understanding. 
 
Wilde in prison: De Profundis and the Humble Individualist 
In this section, we turn to Wilde’s De Profundis in order to investigate the change he 
underwent in his understanding of the artistic mode of life. I will argue that, although 
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there are similarities between his pre- and post-arrest understandings, Wilde 
underwent a dramatic shift in his experience of artistic creation. I will refer to his new 
model as that of the “Humble Individualist”, due to the emphasis on humility and self-
expression. First, there are changes in the activity involved. While artistic 
transformation previously included careful selection of subject-matter, in De 
Profundis the role of selection drops out: the artist now takes up all their experiences 
- positive or negative, beautiful or ugly - as material for transformation. Second, the 
transformation involved is no longer the exaggeration of aesthetically pleasing 
elements. Now it is more akin to the biological process of digestion: the artist 
internalises and incorporates experiences into herself and then expresses them in an 
idiosyncratic form. Third, the artistic activity is no longer directed by pleasure, but is 
the result of a process that was already going on with and through the artist. This 
third aspect highlights the most significant change in Wilde’s model: how it is 
experienced. Rather than experiencing artistic self-creation as reflective and 
autonomous, the Humble Individualist experiences it in a middle-voiced way, as a 
process that goes on simultaneously within and through her being. 
 We will begin this section with a brief overview of the writing of De Profundis. 
Next, we will turn to the text itself, beginning with Wilde’s self-diagnosis of his crisis 
and his recommendation of humility as the solution. We will then use his account of 
humility to bring out the nature of the process of artistic self-expression and to 
explain why it led to these changes in his model. Finally, we show that the model of 
the Humble Individualist is still a practice of freedom. 
The Writing of De Profundis 
De Profundis takes the form of a letter from Wilde addressed to Lord Alfred Douglas, 
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his former lover, who played a large role in Wilde’s imprisonment.80 Wilde’s intention, 
however, was always to publish the text more widely, as evidenced by the fact that 
he originally sent the letter to Robert Ross, who made a copy to send to Douglas in 
case he burned the letter. Wilde was forbidden from writing anything other than 
letters while imprisoned, and this was used as a way around the prohibition. As a 
result, Wilde only occasionally discusses his relationship with or feelings about 
Douglas - although at times he attempts to communicate that he doesn’t blame 
Douglas, with questionable sincerity - instead, most of the text is dedicated to Wilde 
analysing the reasons for his downfall, discussing the changes he has undergone in 
prison, and setting out the steps he needs to take in future. 
 
Wilde’s self-diagnosis 
Towards the beginning of De Profundis, Wilde offers a diagnosis of where he went 
wrong. After discussing the range of talents he was “given by the gods,” he writes: 
But I let myself be lured into long spells of senseless and sensual ease. I 
amused myself with being a flâneur, a dandy, a man of fashion. I surrounded 
myself with the smaller natures and the meaner minds. I became the spendthrift 
of my own genius, and to waste an eternal youth gave me a curious joy…. I grew 
careless of the lives of others. I took pleasure where it pleased me and passed 
on. I forgot that every little action of the common day makes or unmakes 
character, and that therefore what one had done in the secret chamber one has 
 
80 A brief overview of Wilde’s trials and imprisonment: at Douglas’ urging, Wilde sued Douglas’ father, the 
Marquis of Queensbury, for libel, for calling him a “posturing homosexual.” At the trial, it was declared to be 
“in the public interest” to refer to Wilde as a homosexual, which led to Wilde being prosecuted for “gross 
indecency with men”. Wilde had advance warning that he was to be arrested (some contemporaries believed 
that he was intentionally given enough time to leave England), but refused to flee the country, preferring to 




some day to cry aloud on the housetops. I ceased to be lord over myself. I was 
no longer the captain of my soul, and did not know it. I allowed pleasure to 
dominate me. I ended in horrible disgrace. There is only one thing for me now, 
absolute humility.’ (DeP 46-47) 
We should begin by noting the apparent tension between Wilde’s final diagnosis – “I 
ceased to be lord over myself” - and his remedy: “absolute humility.” From his 
diagnosis, one might expect the solution to be to re-establish control over his soul. 
Instead, Wilde recommends “absolute humility.” As we will see later, he defines 
humility, in the artistic mode of life, as ‘the frank acceptance of all experiences.’ 
(ibid., 84) Now, given that Wilde sees himself as having lost control over himself, 
acceptance is not the obvious solution; instead, we might expect Wilde to attempt to 
re-establish control. 
    We can go some way to dissolving this apparent tension by examining the 
language used by Wilde to describe his activities in this and the preceding passages. 
Earlier in the text, while discussing his artistic talent, Wilde exclusively makes use of 
active language: 
I made art a philosophy… I altered the minds of men and the colours of things… 
I took the drama… and made it [a] personal mode of expression… whatever I 
touched, I made beautiful in a new mode of beauty. (ibid., 45-46) 
In our current passage, however, although he still uses the active voice, the verbs 
have middle-voiced connotations, i.e., they don’t refer to actions Wilde carried out 
deliberately and autonomously, but to a process that went on through and within him: 
I let myself be lured… I became the spendthrift of my own genius… I grew 
careless of the lives of others… I forgot that every little action… makes or 
unmakes character. (ibid., 46-47) 
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To “let” oneself to “be lured” is not to actively carry out an action, instead it suggests 
that one did not act, in order that an external process might run its course. Of course, 
being lured is not purely passive either, as it requires some participation from the 
subject. Being lured, then, is arguably middle-voiced: one participates in the process 
to some extent, but cannot exercise reflective control over it. Similar analyses can be 
applied to the other verbs. “To become X’ doesn’t imply actively changing oneself in 
the way that, for instance, ‘I made myself X’ would. It suggests instead that one was 
changed, but also that one participated in this change. The same is true of “growth” 
and of “forgetting”. (Imagine actively trying to forget where you left your keys.) 
Wilde’s discussion, then, suggests that his failures are the result of a process 
unfolding through him, not of intentional activity. 
  From this we can see why re-establishing control over himself would not 
necessarily be Wilde’s solution. Previously, Wilde did attempt to be the “lord of his 
soul”, but he was undone by processes within him that are not responsive to 
attempts to reflectively control them. In fact, he specifically states that he was 
unaware of these processes occurring. Now, while you could, with these processes 
in mind, proceed in the attempt to re-establish control, although you would need to 
be aware that similar failures might occur again. However, there is a further 
possibility, which would be to start from the point of view of oneself as subject to 
middle-voiced processes. From this perspective, rather than trying to force a mode of 
life onto oneself, one could embrace these processes and the nature they are 
expressing. In his suggestion of humility, Wilde, I argue, is suggesting this second 





What is humility? 
Humility is commonly understood as a way of relating to one’s own goodness or 
excellence, specifically not overestimating, or perhaps even underestimating, one’s 
positive value. In the philosophical literature, this relationship is sometimes cashed 
out in terms of one’s beliefs about one’s goodness. For instance, Julia Driver (2001) 
argues that humility means being ignorant of one’s good qualities. On Driver’s 
account, Wilde’s claim that he has discovered humility at the core of his being seems 
doubtful, given that he has just given a self-congratulatory summary of his 
accomplishments. 
  Wilde’s account, summarised by ‘humility… is the frank acceptance of all 
experiences’, looks closer in form to Nicolas Bommarito’s account of humility as a 
virtue of attention. (Bommarito 2013) For Bommarito, humility is grounded in the 
ways in which our attention is directed, specifically, patterns of attention in which we 
do not dwell on our good qualities.81 Bommarito highlights three main forms of this. 
The first two are defined primarily by what we do not pay attention to: “Quality 
Inattention”, where our attention does not dwell on our possession of a good quality; 
“Value Inattention”, where we do not dwell on the value of a quality we possess. The 
third form is defined primarily by what we do pay attention to: although we might pay 
attention to our having a quality and its value, we further dwell on the external factors 
that led to us acquiring said quality. (ibid., 101-102) In all these cases, although we 
are pre-reflectively aware of our qualities and their value, we do not direct our 
attention towards them. Bommarito, then, shows us a model of humility based on our 
patterns of attention with regard to our positive qualities, not our beliefs about them. 
 
81 Bommarito’s account rests on a distinction between “awareness” and “attention”. Imagine a philosopher 
walking through a park while thinking about a paper she is in the process of writing. Although her attention is 
entirely on the argument of the paper, she walks around a tree that is in her way. For Bommarito, the 
philosopher would be aware of the tree, but her attention is on her paper. (Bommarito 2013, 99-100) 
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 My suggestion is that Wilde’s account of humility can be understood in a 
similar way. Wilde’s definition of humility as the frank acceptance of all experiences 
already suggests a pattern of attention: one directed towards experiences as they 
actually are. However, in looking at this account we should be concerned not only 
with what our attention is directed towards, but also what it is directed away from.82 
What this direction involves is unclear from Wilde’s definition, but we can figure it out 
by comparing the Fine Liar model with the model of humility Wilde is suggesting. 
Recall that a necessary criterion of the Fine Liar model was the activity of selection: 
the Fine Liar chooses between different experiences on the basis of their aesthetic 
qualities.83 Further, for her activity to count as art at all, the Fine Liar must focused 
on her own pleasure. We could think of the person’s experience as having two parts: 
the experience itself, and the artist’s personal response to the aesthetic features of 
the experience. The Fine Liar, then, is aware of the whole experience, but her 
attention is only on her emotional response. By contrast, the humble person’s 
attention is solely on the experience itself, although her emotional response is part of 
her awareness. For Wilde, then, humility means shifting one’s attention away from 
one’s emotional reaction towards the experience itself. 
 This shift is illustrated by several passages in which Wilde discusses his 
previous approach to life. He claims that his intention had always been to accept all 
experiences, but he had previously failed to do so: 
 
82 For a pattern of attention to count as humility, it must be directed away from ourselves in some way. 
Otherwise any directing of attention could count as humility. 
83 Note that this does not mean accepting all experiences and selecting the aesthetically pleasing qualities of 
those experiences. Instead, the Fine Liar distinguishes between valuable and worthless experiences on the 
basis of their aesthetic qualities. For a possible metaphor, imagine two computer refurbishing shops. Shop A 
only buys computers that are already functioning above a certain level, refurbishes them and sells them on. 
Shop B, on the other hand, buys all computers they are offered, refurbishes the ones they can and use the rest 
for parts. The Fine Liar would run shop A: they aren’t in the business of salvage. 
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I wanted to eat of the fruit of all the trees in the garden of the world, and [I went] 
out into the world with that passion in my soul… My only mistake was that I 
confined myself so exclusively to the trees of what seemed to me the sun-lit side 
of the garden and shunned the other side for its shadow and its gloom (DeP 81) 
This passage contains several things of note. First, Wilde identifies both the ways of 
relating to experiences we discussed above: “accepting all experiences” as “eating of 
all the trees”, and the Fine Liar model as “choosing the trees that appear to us to be 
‘sun-lit’”. Second, when talking about his interactions with the trees, Wilde uses the 
term “eat”.84 This tells us something about the nature of the acceptance Wilde has in 
mind. Rather than using a term with more purely sensual connotations, such as 
“taste” or “enjoy”, “eat” implies not only sensory experience but also consumption.85 
Third, Wilde uses the term “confined”, which carries middle-voiced connotations. In 
confining oneself, one is both the confined and the confiner, but the success of the 
confinement is not within one’s rational control: if you could choose to end the 
confinement, you wouldn’t be confined.86 This suggests, contra the Fine Liar model, 
that Wilde no longer sees his selection of certain experiences as a free and 
deliberate choice. A final point of interest is Wilde’s “shunning” of the darker side of 
 
84 Note further the archaic formulation “eat of”, especially with regard to the fruit of a tree. This brings to mind 
Genesis 2:17: ‘But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it’. (KJV) Given Wilde’s 
idiosyncratic interpretations of Christian texts it is hard to know what he means by this. It is interesting that he 
would bring to mind the “tree of the knowledge of good and evil” in a passage where he is suggesting that he 
has not tasted enough evil, as this would bring out a contrast between Wilde and Adam and Eve: their Fall 
came from eating of the tree, his seems to have come from not eating. 
85 We will return to the importance of this in the section “Acceptance and the metaphor of digestion” 
86 This statement may be disputable; take a sentence like “I confined myself to my room.” Presumably, given 
that I have confined myself, I can end my confinement at any time. While it is true that there is more flexibility 
in confining yourself than being confined by someone else, there are limits beyond which we would be doing 
violence to the word “confinement”. Imagine if someone says the following to you: ‘I confined myself to my 
room, but I left to get a drink of water every half hour’. This seems in danger of no longer being a case of 
confinement: the restrictions on their movement are quite lax. We can go beyond the limits of “confinement” 
in a sentence like the following: “I confined myself to my room, except for meals, getting drinks, going for 
walks, going to the pub, meeting my friends, and watching television in the living room.” If someone were to 
say that sentence to us, without humour, we might doubt they knew what “confinement” meant. 
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the garden, as this actually takes us beyond the Fine Liar model. As we noted 
above, the Fine Liar was concerned only with her pleasure, but there was no 
reference to pain. Here, however, Wilde admits he had been actively rejecting 
uncomfortable experiences. He offers a longer discussion elsewhere in the text: 
I used to live entirely for pleasure. I shunned suffering and sorrow of every kind. I 
hated both. I resolve to ignore them as far as possible: to treat them, that is to 
say, as modes of imperfection. (ibid., 70) 
Wilde not only pursued pleasure, he actively rejected suffering. As a result, forms of 
experiences which caused suffering in him were rejected, even if they were possible 
of also producing aesthetic pleasure. Again, we see Wilde’s solution to this: humility, 
in which Wilde turns his attention away from his specific personal responses towards 
the experience itself. 
  We have, then, Wilde’s account of humility: to be humble is to have patterns 
of attention in which one’s attention is directed away from one’s personal responses 
to experiences and towards the experiences themselves. This account is 
recognisable as an account of humility, albeit an idiosyncratic one, in that it refuses 
to dwell on one’s own preferences and tastes. If we were evaluating Wilde’s account 
of humility, a further question would be: why is humility a virtue? Some accounts of 
humility would justify its status on the basis of the role it plays in human relations: for 
instance, Irene McMullin argues that modest individuals avoid causing pain to others 
while acting as ‘exemplar[s] of a particular type of integrity’. (McMullin 2010, 805-
807) This kind of justification doesn’t seem to be there for Wilde: his humility is first 
and foremost private; any benefits for others follow accidentally rather than by 
design. However, we’ve already seen the beginning of the answer to this question. 
Returning to the “garden” quote, the implication is that humility would be valuable 
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because it will allow Wilde to achieve his goal of eating of all the trees, i.e., of 
accepting all experiences. The question, then, is why it would be valuable to be able 
to accept all experiences. 
 
Acceptance and the metaphor of digestion 
Identifying the importance of acceptance for Wilde requires that we first get a clearer 
understanding of what he means by that term. Like many other key terms in De 
Profundis, “acceptance” carries middle-voiced connotations: acceptance is a process 
which is not under the agent’s reflective control, yet they still participate in the 
process. For instance, imagine that someone is apologising to you for a wrong they 
have committed. Although we clearly participate in the process of accepting an 
apology, we are dependent on at least two things outside our reflective control: first, 
we need the other person to apologise to us; without this, there is no apology to 
accept and hence no acceptance. Second, although we can go through the motions 
and say we accept an apology, genuinely accepting the apology requires an 
emotional development which we cannot reflectively control. There may be instances 
in which we want to accept an apology and forgive someone, but we cannot bring 
ourselves to. Similarly, there may be cases where we want to reject an apology, but 
it is so heartfelt that we have no choice but to accept. 
 The middle-voiced nature of acceptance lets us see the distinction between 
the Fine Liar and the Humble Individualist. The Fine Liar engages in something that 
looks similar to acceptance: although she screens experiences based on their 
aesthetic value, the Fine Liar still approaches experiences and takes them up. The 
difference, however, lies in the way in which the Fine Liar understands this “taking 
up” of experience. For the Fine Liar, taking up an experience means encountering it, 
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evaluating it, and, if the experience is up to scratch, producing a transformed version 
of it, with it aesthetic strengths exaggerated and its weaknesses downplay to an 
extent that pleases the artist. 
 This, however, is not acceptance because the movement towards the object 
to be accepted is subject to the reflective control of the Fine Liar. In acceptance, by 
contrast, the movement towards the object is middle-voiced: we move towards the 
object, but not in a way subject to reflective control. A model of the Humble 
Individualist, then, must make room for the middle-voiced nature of acceptance. 
  The beginnings of a model of the Humble Individualist is provided by the 
“garden of the world” quote above: eating. In eating something, we take something 
up and literally incorporate it into us: we consume it, digest it, and reconstitute it as 
part of us. Wilde explicitly invokes a similar metaphor elsewhere in De Profundis, 
what we could call the metaphor of digestion: 
For just as the body absorbs things of all kinds, things common and unclean no 
less than those that the priest of a vision has cleansed, and converts them into 
swiftness and strength, into the play of beautiful muscles and the moulding of fair 
flesh, into the curves and colours of the hair, the lips, the eye; so the soul in turn 
has its nutritive function. (DeP, 59-60) 
First, we should note that the metaphor of digestion implies a middle-voiced 
experience of agency. Digestion as a metaphor is commonly used to refer to a 
process, which we cannot reflectively control, of internalisation of ideas; for instance, 
Friedrich Nietzsche writes that ‘there are dyspeptic authors who only write when they 
cannot digest something.’ (Nietzsche 2008, p.315) We also have reason to think that 
Wilde himself understands digestion as pre-reflective. He maintains that the role of 
the “nutritive function of the soul” is to ‘transform into noble moods of thought and 
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passions of high import what in itself is base, cruel and degrading’, which is precisely 
what he has been engaged in reflectively in De Profundis. 
 Second, we should note Wilde’s characterisation of the things the body 
absorbs: the body absorbs all food, sacred or profane. It is interesting here that 
Wilde talks about the food in moral, rather than aesthetic terms, as we might have 
expected the latter given our previous discussions of artistic pleasure. Arguably, 
“delicious or disgusting” food might seem a more accurate analogy to aesthetic 
experiences. However, this mirrors Wilde’s distinctly ethical framing of these matters; 
recall that he had previously categorised sorrow and suffering, not merely as 
unpleasant experiences, but as “modes of imperfection”. Digestion, then, can take 
place regardless of our personal feelings about an experience. 
 Third, note the term standing in for “acceptance”: absorption, which, like 
eating, carries connotations of incorporation. To accept an experience, then, is not 
simply to recognise that one is having it, or even to make something from it (like the 
Fine Liar): it is rather to make it part of oneself. This is what Wilde is referring to 
when he discusses the “nutritive functions” of the soul and the body. This absorption, 
however, also involves expression. In the metaphor of digestion, there are two parts: 
“absorption” and “conversion”. With food, the absorbed materials are converted into 
the body and its movements; the further question is what this expression consists in 
for the soul. 
  The metaphor of digestion, then, provides us with the first part of the way in 
which the Humble Individualist takes up experiences. When the humble artist 
encounters an experience, she eschews any consideration of the aesthetic or ethical 
value of an experience; instead, she attempts to incorporate the experience into 
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herself. This incorporation is supposed to allow for self-development or self-
expression, and so we need to turn to what this consists in. 
 
Self-expression 
Like the Fine Liar, the Humble Individualist seems to have a mode of self-
development or self-expression. However, while the Fine Liar’s expression took the 
form of an exaggeration of the aesthetic qualities of a subject matter, the Humble 
Individualist has a rather different mode. This is clear from the metaphor of digestion: 
in digestion, food is broken down and reconstituted into often quite different forms. 
One way to understand self-expression would be to follow the metaphor of digestion 
the whole way. If we take a very simple understanding, digestion provides nutrients 
to our bodies which then develop along lines which are (somewhat) genetically 
predetermined. This would therefore give us a teleological picture, where there is 
some final state of ourselves and humility allows us to approach that state. Such a 
reading is consistent with some of Wilde’s statements – for instance, his concerns 
that his life will remain “incomplete” – but it conflicts with a number of others. For 
example, Wilde claims that his ‘nature is seeking a fresh mode of self-realisation.’ 
(DeP 49-50) If we assume that self-development is about reaching some final state, 
then this emphasis on a “fresh” mode, i.e., an entirely new one rather than a further 
development of his existing one, makes no sense; presumably, a new mode of self-
expression would lead to a new final state. Further, this reading strongly conflicts 
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with Wilde’s discussion of Christ.87 When talking about what he sees as Christ’s 
creative activity, Wilde writes that:  
With a width and wonder of imagination that fills one almost with awe, he took 
the entire world of the inarticulate, the voiceless world of pain, as his kingdom, 
and made of himself its external mouthpiece. (ibid., 101) 
He continues: 
And feeling, with the artistic nature of one to whom suffering and sorrow were 
modes through which he could realise his conception of the beautiful, that an 
idea is of no value till it becomes incarnate and is made an image, he made of 
himself the image of the Man of Sorrows. (ibid., 102) 
Given that Christ has made himself a mouthpiece for the sufferings of others, it 
cannot be the case that his development took place solely along the lines of some 
natural predisposition, as this development has been at least modulated by his 
experiences of the suffering of others. Further, although Wilde grounds this in 
Christ’s nature, he also writes that Christ “made” himself in a certain image. Christ, 
then, must have played a role in this self-expression. 
 Wilde further expands on this notion of making oneself as an image: 
Every single work of art is the fulfilment of a prophecy: for every work of art is the 
conversion of an idea into an image. Every single human being should be the 
fulfilment of a prophecy: for every human being should be the realisation of some 
ideal, either in the mind of God or the mind of man. (ibid., 104-105) 
 
87 Christ is an important figure for Wilde in De Profundis, but a full discussion of him would go beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Christ is an ambiguous figure for our purposes: at times Wilde seems to distinguish 
between Christ and the artist, while other times claiming Christ to be a fulfilment of the artistic model. 
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We seem, then, to have come back to the Fine Liar model. Although the metaphor of 
digestion had suggested that self-expression meant using experiences to allow for 
the unfolding of one’s nature, in the discussion of Christ we have seen both the 
acceptance of the experiences of others and the creation of oneself in line with an 
ideal, something we saw with the Fine Liar. One possibility is that Wilde has just 
simply contradicted himself here: as we saw before, De Profundis is not the end 
result of a process of acceptance; it is part of the process. It is therefore plausible 
that Wilde is dealing with conflicting ideas, having not fully internalised his new 
understandings. However, there seems to be a possibility of reconciling these ideas 
if we look at a notion Wilde calls “getting things out of oneself”. 
 
Humble Individualism 
As we saw in the first half of this chapter, Wilde invokes the concept of Individualism 
on a number of occasions. Although he does not give a clear definition of this, and it 
goes beyond the scope of this chapter to derive one, we have previously associated 
it with an emphasis on individual idiosyncrasies. In several passages in De 
Profundis, Wilde discusses some new aspects of this concept. First: 
I must be far more of an individualist than ever I was. I must get far more out of 
myself than I ever got, and ask far less of the world than I ever asked. Indeed, 
my ruin came not from too great individualism of life, but from too little. (ibid., 
142-143) 
Second, which accompanies the quote we saw above about self-realisation. 
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I am far more of an individualist than I ever was. Nothing seems to me of the 
smallest value except what one gets out of oneself. My nature is seeking a fresh 
mode of self-realisation. (ibid., 49-50) 
Note the heavy emphasis on “getting things out of oneself”; both sections have 
almost identical formulations of the point. In the first passage, this statement leads 
into the claim that a lack of individualism lead to Wilde’s downfall. This, however, 
conflicts with our earlier discussion of this fall: we argued that it resulted from middle-
voiced processes going on within Wilde. In the second passage, however, getting 
things from oneself is connected to his nature’s self-realisation, i.e., with the 
unfolding of a middle-voiced process.  
 Wilde gives us a further hint as to what he means by self-realisation, and what 
it means to get things out of oneself: 
‘[O]ne realises one’s soul only by getting rid of all alien passions, all acquired 
culture, and all external possessions, be they good or evil. (ibid., p.96) 
He further continues: 
Most people are other people. Their thoughts are some one [sic] else’s opinions, 
their lives a mimicry, their passions a quotation. (ibid., p.97) 
What Wilde is referring to, then, is a kind of self-sufficiency where one’s thoughts, 
values and passions are not mere imitations of those of other people. Wilde’s fall 
happened not simply because there were middle-voiced processes within him, but 
because the values those processes manifested were alien. Conversely, one’s 
nature is realised when the middle-voiced process is manifesting values that are our 
own. Again, however, this leads us into problematic territory. What does it mean for a 
value to be our own, rather than being acquired or copied? Further, how does this 
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account for Christ? If Christ made himself a vehicle for the sorrow of others, then 
doesn’t this mean his sorrow did not come from himself? 
 We have already suggested an answer to this question. Remember that, on 
Wilde’s account, Christ did not simply convey the complaints of others; instead, he 
specifically took up “mute” suffering, that which could not be expressed, and made it 
expressible. This is specifically a transformation of the subject-matter. In taking up 
sorrow, then, and in making himself “the Man of Sorrows”, Christ makes that sorrow 
into something new and truly his own. We know that Wilde considers Christ to be an 
exemplar of Individualistic activity, as he writes that ‘Christ was not merely the 
supreme individualist, but he was the first individualist in history’. Wilde, therefore, 
must consider this activity to have made these things Christ’s own. Our previous 
sections, therefore, detail what it means for a value or passion to become truly our 
own: namely, they must be accepted and properly integrated. Then, when they are 
integrated and expressed, this is a realisation of ourselves. Although these things 
begin as external, once they have been accepted and absorbed into us, we can then 
get our own, idiosyncratic, form of them “out of ourselves”. 
 We can see a good illustration of this in humility itself. Wilde writes: 
[Humility] is the last thing left in me, and the best: the ultimate discovery at which 
I have arrived, the starting-point for a fresh development. It has come to me right 
out myself, so I know that it has some at the proper time. It could not have come 
before, nor later. Had any one [sic] told me of it, I would have rejected it. Had it 
been brought to me, I would have refused it. As I found it. I want to keep it. (ibid., 
49) 
Humility here is presented as the result of a middle-voiced process, the process of 
self-development we have been discussing. Note the connotations of Wilde’s 
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language: humility was something he “discovered” and, simultaneously, something 
that “came” to him. Wilde also presents this as the essential factor in humility being 
of value to him. Presumably he is not claiming to have invented humility, or to be the 
first person to have discovered it: he was aware of Christ’s humility, after all. What is 
important, however, is that this humility was his own. If humility had been presented 
to him from any other source, he would not have accepted it. However, because 
here humility came from within him, because humility had been transformed within 
him, he now values it. The expression of one’s nature, then, is the idiosyncratic 
expression of values that have been incorporated into oneself. 
 We can now complete our comparison of the Fine Liar and the Humble Artist’s 
modes of acceptance. The Fine Liar has an experience, judges it on its aesthetic 
merits and, if and only if these merits are sufficient, expresses a transformed version 
of the experience where the aesthetic qualities are exaggerated. The Humble Artist, 
by contrast, has an experience, attempts to integrate that experience – regardless of 
apparent merits – into his mode of life, and then expresses the idiosyncratic form 
that experience takes once it has been so integrated. The major difference here 
seems to be the direction of determination of the form of the expression. For the Fine 
Liar, this determination is top down: the artist imposes his artistic pleasure onto the 
subject-matter. For the Humble Artist, the determination is bottom-up: the way in 
which the experience is integrated – as part of a middle-voiced process over which 
he does not have reflective control – determines the expression. 
 
Wilde’s middle-voiced model as a practice of freedom 
We have now fully explored Wilde’s new model of artistic activity. Previously, on the 
Fine Liar model, artistic activity was selection and exaggeration carried out for the 
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artist’s own pleasure. Now Wilde sees the artist’s activity as participating in a 
process of self-expression that is already going on within and through them. In this 
activity, they no longer select their subject-matter for transformation, as the process 
can use any experiences. Furthermore, this transformation no longer involves the 
exaggeration of aesthetically pleasing elements; rather the experiences taken in 
seem to provide impetus for kinds of self-development which might be apparently 
unrelated to the input. Finally, this process is no longer directed by the artist’s 
pleasure; rather, its motivation comes from the inherent tendency of one’s nature to 
express itself. 
  An important question is whether this account is middle-voiced. We earlier 
argued that middle-voiced experiences have three criteria. First, one experiences 
oneself as engaged with a process unfolding within one; second, this engagement is 
through (pre-reflectively responding to the process; third, there is an absence of 
reflective control over the process. Wilde’s account meets all three criteria. First, the 
artist experiences his nature expressing itself within and through her. Second, the 
artist responds to the process reflectively with humility. Third, there is an absence of 
reflective control. We saw this in Wilde’s diagnosis of how his control over himself 
was slowly usurped, and even more in the case of the metaphor of nutrition. Wilde’s 
account of self-expression, therefore, is middle-voiced. 
  Next, we need to show how Foucault’s account allows us to make sense of 
Wilde’s Humble Individualist as a practitioner of freedom. 
  
Resistance to domination 
We have previously defined resistance to domination as the attempt to avoid the 
creation of situations of domination and to disrupt existing ones. One possible worry 
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for the Humble Individualist model is that, with its emphasis on acceptance, it might 
seem to argue against resisting domination. For instance, Wilde’s imprisonment 
seems to have been unjust; isn’t accepting it reinforcing a situation of domination? 
 This worry misunderstands what is being accepted. Acceptance here doesn’t 
mean seeing what happens to one as morally justified or endorsing the principles or 
motivations behind it; it means accepting the experience in itself as something 
happening to you. Wilde is explicit on this point: 
And as the gods are strange, and punish us for what is good and humane in us 
as much as for what is evil and perverse, I must accept the fact that one is 
punished for the good as well as for the evil that one does. (ibid., 61) 
Accepting his imprisonment does not mean accepting that his imprisonment was 
justified: it means accepting that it happened and, through this acceptance, making it 
good for him.  
 Rather than endorsing domination, Wilde’s account, with its emphasis on 
idiosyncratic self-expression, militates against it as, as we have discussed before, 
domination reduces the possible variety of modes of being and subjectivities that we 
can have or express. 
 Care of the self 
We defined the care of the self as the attempt to transform one’s mode of being in 
line with one’s values. This criterion is clearly visible in the Humble Individualist 
model, as the aim of accepting one’s experiences is to allow them to be integrated 
into oneself and, therefore, for the artist to be able to express their own values, 




The critical ontology of ourselves 
We defined this aim as the attempt to produce an account of the events that brought 
about our current mode of being. If the middle-voiced process under discussion 
involves properly integrating our experiences into our mode of being, it seems clear 
that this process must aim at the critical ontology, as proper integration of an 
experience requires that we understand what happened and the effect it had on us. 
We can see this most clearly if we read De Profundis itself as a reflective example of 
the process: Wilde gives a clear account of the events that brought about his current 
mode of being, and this account is essential for his coming to accept these events. 
  
Conclusion 
In our analysis of Wilde’s work we identified two distinct models of the artistic mode 
of life. The first model, the Fine Liar, present in ‘The Decay of Lying’, ‘The Critic as 
Artist’, and ‘The Soul of Man under Socialism’, sees the creation of artistic work in 
general, and the creation of one’s life as a work of art in specific, as an autonomous 
and reflective activity. In this activity, the artist selects their subject-matter solely on 
the basis of its aesthetic qualities, and then transposes the subject-matter into a new 
medium (for instance, from “events in one’s life” to a “mode of life”) while 
exaggerating the aesthetically pleasing elements. This activity is carried out solely 
for the pleasure it brings the artist to complete the work, although others may gain 
pleasure from the work as a by-product. The final work should not convey the artist’s 
moral judgments or political aims but will reflect his aesthetic values insofar as they 
shape what he will take pleasure in. 
  The second model, Humble Individualism, seen in De Profundis, sees artistic 
self-expression as a middle-voiced process in which the artist participates. This 
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process involves accepting and integrating the experiences the artist has, regardless 
of how they personally value those experiences, and then expressing these 
experiences in an idiosyncratic way. This activity is not carried out deliberately, but 
rather is a process that was already unfolding. The final product conveys the artist’s 
values, not because they imposed them onto the subject-matter, but because their 
experiences have been processed through them. 
  These two accounts differ significantly. The Fine Liar is motivated by 
pleasure, transforms the material of her subject matter while exaggerating its beauty, 
and chooses or rejects her subject-matter on the basis of its aesthetic qualities. The 
Humble Individualist is participating in a process that was already underway, 
transforms her subject-matter entirely and accepts all experiences they encounter. 
The most significant difference between the two, however, is in the experience of 
agency. The Fine Liar experiences herself as deliberately engaging in creative and 
critical activity, and so as free; as Gilbert said ‘A great poet sings because he 
chooses to sing.’ (CA, 58) By contrast, the Humble Individualist experiences her 
activity not as something she deliberately engages in but as giving herself over to a 
process already going on within her. 
  This latter model, which presents the possibility of practices of freedom being 
middle-voiced, rather than purely active, has strong implications for our account, 
firstly in responding to some of the concerns about Foucault’s account of ethics we 
discussed in the first chapter, and second, as a contrast case to Socrates, with his 
paradigmatically active practice of freedom. In the conclusion, I will discuss these 





Our point of departure for our investigation of practices of freedom was Foucault’s 
comments on freedom and ethics: 
Q.  You say that freedom must be practiced ethically… 
[Michel Foucault]  Yes, for what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the 
reflective [réfléchie] practice of freedom? 
Q.  In other words, you understand freedom as a reality that is already 
ethical in itself. 
M.F.  Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the 
considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection. (EPF 284, 
translation modified) 
Over the course of our investigation, we have given new accounts of both freedom 
as an ontological condition, and of the practice of freedom, the reflective form of 
which is ethics. We suggested that ontological freedom, understood as being within 
power relations, is a necessary condition of the practice of freedom, as we can only 
engage in practices of freedom within relations of power; further, practices of 
freedom, which are defined by the agent’s holding of specific constitutive aims, are 
restricted from engaging in activities which would remove ontological freedom. We 
have also applied our new account of the practice of freedom to two historical 
individuals, Socrates and Oscar Wilde. In the interests of clarity, let us summarise 
our conclusions. 
  In chapter 1, we argued that, if we are to address the question of the practice 
of freedom it would behove us to begin with an account of ontological freedom. We 
discussed criticisms of Foucault’s ethics raised by McNay and suggested that a full 
response to these would require us to examine ontological freedom. We further 
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maintained that we needed to suggest a new account of freedom as an ontological 
condition, as currently existing ones are not close enough to the text and cannot do 
the work we require. We then argued that ontological freedom should be understood 
as “being within power relations”, as opposed to being within “relations of violence”. 
 In chapter 2, we turned to the practice of freedom. Drawing from Foucault’s 
work, we gave three criteria of success for our account: 1) that the account allows for 
degrees of freedom; 2) that we the account would show a clear relationship between 
ontological freedom and the practice of freedom; 3) that the practice of freedom must 
have ethical content. We then suggested that Foucault’s account of freedom is best 
understood as a procedural, rather than a substantive account. More specifically, we 
established a constitutivist framework to interpret Foucault’s views on freedom. On 
such a view, engaging in a certain activity requires that one holds the constitutive 
aim of that activity. We further clarified that holding a constitutive aim is both a 
necessary and a sufficient condition of engaging in an activity. Finally, we discussed 
the way in which constitutive aims need to be held, namely pre-reflectively rather 
than consciously. 
 In chapters 3 and 4, we drew from Foucault’s work to introduce three 
candidates for the constitutive aim of the practice of freedom: resistance to 
domination, the care of the self, and the critical ontology of ourselves. We clarified 
the role that each of these necessarily plays in the practice of freedom, but ultimately 
argued that none of them could be individually sufficient. We then explored and 
confirmed the possibility of all three aims, held concurrently, being sufficient for the 
practice of freedom. This then allowed us to distinguish between successful 
practices of freedom, unsuccessful practices of freedom, and activities which were 
not practices of freedom at all. We then argued that there are further gradations of 
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success or failure within successful and unsuccessful practices of freedom. Finally, 
we examined the possibility of a paradigmatically successful form of the practice of 
freedom, greater than the sum of its parts, which we referred to as the “creation of 
new cultural forms”. 
  In chapter 5, we applied our model of the practice of freedom to Socrates, in 
order to check whether our model could actually be applied to any existing 
individuals. We argued that, in his parrhesiastic activity, Socrates could be seen to 
be acting in light of the constitutive aim of the practice of freedom. Socrates, 
therefore, by Foucault’s criteria, was a practitioner of freedom. 
  In chapter 6, we turned to Oscar Wilde. Here our emphasis was less on the 
fact that he was practicing freedom and more on his experience of agency in doing 
so. In his earlier work, we argued, Wilde’s practice of freedom involved an active 
experience of agency. However, after his imprisonment, Wilde came to experience 
the practice of freedom in a middle-voiced way, as a process which he did not begin, 
over which he did not have reflective control, but which he nevertheless participated 
in. Although this differed significantly from the practice of freedom of, say, Socrates, 
this latter form still counted as a practice of freedom. 
 
Criteria of success 
As we mentioned above, in the second chapter we suggested three criteria of 
success for our account of the practice of freedom. First, we noted that our account 
of the practice of freedom must have gradations: we must be able to distinguish 
between individuals as more or less free. As we showed in chapter 4, all three of our 
necessary aims have gradations of both success and failure, meaning that the 
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constitutive aim, and hence the practice of freedom, also has gradations. Although it 
will not always be clear how to compare individuals with differing amount of success, 
we can, in principle, draw distinctions between individuals on the basis of their 
practicing freedom with more or less success. 
 Second, the practice of freedom must be clearly connected with ontological 
freedom. We have also succeeded in showing this: ontological freedom means 
having a field of possible actions constituted by the power relations we are within, 
and the practice of freedom means putting this field into action while operating with 
certain necessary aims. We can also see clearly how ontological freedom is a 
necessary condition for the practice of freedom is, as without ontological freedom the 
practice of freedom would not be possible at all. 
 Third, the practice of freedom must have ethical content. According to 
Foucault, ethics is ‘the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself… and 
which determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral 
subject of his own actions.’ (OGE 263). On this definition, we have shown that 
practices of freedom have ethical content. One of the necessary conditions of the 
practice of freedom is the care of the self, the attempt to shape one’s mode of being 
in accordance with one’s sense of appropriate concern for oneself. This aim, which 
focuses on one’s sense of the good life, is clearly ethical. 
 Our account of the practice of freedom, then, meets all the criteria we set out 
in chapter 2. 
 
Socrates and Wilde 
In our final two chapters, we applied our model of the practice of freedom to 
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Socrates and Oscar Wilde. This was important for several reasons. First and 
foremost, there is a worry that our account may be too elitist or impractical to apply 
to any existing individuals. Insofar as we have shown both Socrates and Wilde 
practiced freedom, we have determined that our account is applicable to at least 
some individuals. Second, given that we are supposedly giving a general mode of 
the practice of freedom, applicable in different forms in different times and places, it 
was important to show that this model did not only apply to Greco-Roman 
individuals. In successfully applying the model to Wilde, I take it we have shown that 
this is true to at least some extent. Third, it was important to show that the practice of 
freedom could take different forms even in the same historical period; with Wilde, we 
have shown this to be the case even in the same individual. 
  In Wilde’s earlier period, the “Fine Liar” period, there are a number of 
similarities between Socrates and Wilde. Both understand the practice of freedom as 
a deliberate attempt to give form to one’s life; both attempt to bring about a harmony 
between speech and action; both aim to get a view of one’s values and transform 
one’s mode of being accordingly. In other words, both Socrates and Wilde take a 
top-down approach to the practice of freedom: the practitioner is actively attempting 
to transform their mode of being by imposing a new form onto themselves from 
above. However, even in this earlier period there are some striking differences. Note 
that Socratic parrhesia involves a harmony between what one truly believes and 
one’s way of life, the truth one speaks. In Wilde, however, this concern for truth is 
entirely absent. The Fine Liar is concerned with a harmony between her artistic 
creations, including her way of life, and her aesthetic values and this harmony is 
manifested by the pleasure the artist takes in her work. The truth of her 
representations is irrelevant, except insofar as they represent her true aesthetic 
214 
 
values. Although the activities of the Socratic parrhesiast and the Fine Liar are 
similar in form, then, they have very different content. 
  The differences between Socrates and Wilde become more profound after 
Wilde undergoes his transformation in his experience of the practice of freedom. In 
his “Humble Individualist” period, Wilde switches from experiencing the practice of 
freedom as an activity he is carrying out to a process he is engaging with. The first 
clear distinction from the Socratic model is that this transformation is no longer a 
deliberate activity: the process is already ongoing. Second, the transformation of 
one’s mode of being is now bottom up: rather than actively attempting to change 
one’s mode of being in line with one’s beliefs, one now experiences this 
transformation as the result of the middle-voiced process, and allowing this process 
to take place lets the Humble Individualist internalise experiences and express 
themselves. Interestingly, in the Humble Individualist the importance of harmony 
emerges, albeit in a somewhat different form than for Socrates. The Humble 
Individualist aims at cultivating a harmony between their nature and their expression; 
in other words, one’s behaviour should express a kind of truth about oneself. 
 A final point of interest about these two models is that, although they are 
different, not only in content, but even in the experience of agency involved, they are 
still both practices of freedom: they both meet all of the necessary conditions. 
 
McNay on the sovereign self and Foucault’s masculine ethics 
In our first chapter, we introduced several criticisms McNay has made of Foucault’s 
ethics. First, she argues that Foucault’s ethics, which draw from Greco-Roman care 
of the self and Baudelairean self-heroization, implicitly privilege a masculine form of 
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agency. Second, the presence of this masculine agency implies that, rather than 
beginning from a self embedded in practices, Foucault’s account actually rests on a 
sovereign notion of the self. It seems to me that we partially answered this second 
worry in chapter 1, although our account of the practice of freedom also gives us 
further responses; with our discussion of Wilde in chapter 6 and above, we can now 
also respond to the first concern. 
  Responding to the second concern, McNay maintained that Foucault’s notion 
of the subject was not actually embedded in power relations and instead was free-
floating and hyper-active. In our first chapter, we gave an account of the ontological 
freedom that underlies Foucault’s notion of the practice of freedom. Far from being 
free-floating, we saw that the subject is constituted and maintained by the field of 
power relations they are within. 
  Further, on the level of practices of freedom, we see this commitment to 
seeing the subject as embedded within practices and power relations continuing into 
the necessary aim of the critical ontology of ourselves. We argued that the critical 
ontology of ourselves involved the assumption that it was not possible to get a 
“bird’s-eye view” of the possibilities of transformation: we can only ever have a local 
perspective, and so our transformations are always partial. In other words, Foucault 
does not conceive of the subject as a sovereign who can detach from power 
relations and freely modify themselves. 
  As to McNay’s first contention, that Foucault’s ethics relies on an implicitly 
active and masculine notion of agency, this concern is harder to shake. We have, in 
following Foucault, placed a lot of weight on the notion of care of the self. There 
remains the worry, then, that doing so means importing Greco-Roman attitudes 
towards masculinity and femininity. This concern is not helped by the fact that 1) we 
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first applied our model to Socrates, a practitioner of the Greek care of the self, and 2) 
that both of our exemplars of the successful practice of freedom were men. 
However, there are considerations which allow us to give a partial response. Our 
notion of the care of the self is not the Greco-Roman form. For the Greeks, having 
control over one’s emotions and desires was a masculine action and to fail to do so 
was feminine; in the Greco-Roman care of the self, then, femininity was strictly 
negative. Our account, however, does not necessarily imply this. This is shown most 
clearly by the Humble Individualist model of the practice of freedom in Wilde. The 
Humble Individualist does not experience themselves as an active agent controlling 
their desires. On the contrary, the Humble Individualist experiences themselves as 
accepting and participating in a process that was already going on within and 
through them. This understanding of the practice of freedom fits extremely poorly 
with importance the Greco-Roman model places on self-control. A Greco-Roman 
care of the self would understand the Humble Individualist as effeminate and reject 
them accordingly. On Foucault’s account, however, this middle-voiced version of the 
practice of freedom is still a practice of freedom. In other words, although there may 
be and have been overly masculine versions of the practice of freedom, it is not a 
necessary part of the account. Foucault’s ethics, then, are not implicitly masculine. 
 
Further Questions 
We have, then, given accounts of ontological freedom and the practice of freedom, 
showed that the model of the practice of freedom can be applied to individuals, and 
additionally shown that Foucault’s ethics are not implicitly masculine. There are, of 
course, further questions to be explored. First, although we noted that the practice of 
freedom seems to have communal elements, in this thesis we have only applied it to 
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individuals. It would be interesting to ask how the practice of freedom operates in 
group settings, whether that be in the two-person setting of the Stoic master-student 
relationship, or in modern-day activist groups. A second concern is that our 
exemplars of the practice of freedom were relatively privileged. Both of them were 
male and, although persecuted for his sexual orientation, Wilde was still born into 
great privilege. At times in our discussion we worried that Foucault’s account might 
be overly elitist and difficult to apply in situations of oppression; it would therefore be 
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